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1Introduction
A pint of beer in the First World War was a controversial thirst quencher. One
contemporary noted ‘when the history of the present great and terrible war comes to
be written, it will be found that alcohol has had a not inconspicuous part, both actively
and passively, in its progress and final issue.’1 Attacked by temperance critics, whilst
being the livelihood of those involved in the trade, drink was the subject of much
acrimonious debate throughout the tumultuous years of 1914-1918. Lloyd George
wrote in his war memoirs that ‘during the first five months of the war drink became a
serious element in the struggle to avert defeat . . . on the home front alcoholic
indulgence shared with professional rigidity the dishonour of being our most
dangerous foe’.2 The war politicised the issue of drink and drinking, polarising
society. For some a liking for beer became symbolic of the nation’s drift to defeat
whilst to others it remained one of life’s pleasures, a quiet respite from the strains of
war at home.
The drink controversy resulted in the formation of the Central Control Board
(CCB): a government organisation whose remit was to oversee a radical overhaul of
drink provision throughout Britain and ensure that national efficiency was not
threatened by the continued popularity of the pint or whisky chaser. This was the first
time a government organisation had been founded with this explicit reform agenda.
Every aspect of drinking culture came under scrutiny, from pub layout, to the strength
of drinks sold within hostelries nationwide.
The ‘crisis’ over drink reveals much about British society during the war,
whilst simultaneously shedding light on the political and social repercussions of
drinking alcohol. During the Second World War the drink issue was similarly
1 Sir James Crichton Browne in Rev. Mathias Lansdown, Our Allies, Ourselves and the Drink Problem
(London, 1915), p. 25.
2 David Lloyd George, War Memoirs: Volume One (London, 1933), p. 323.
2controversial. In 1939 John Atkins urged people to ‘recall the remarkable experiments
and discoveries which were made in the war of 1914-1918 by the Central Control
Board’ whose principles ‘became the basis of our present licensing reform in the
Licensing Act of 1921’.3 Atkins speculated that ‘a general knowledge paper would
probably reveal hardly anyone, apart from politicians and social workers, who could
say accurately what the Board did’.4 This dissertation intends to broaden the general
understanding of the actions of the Board and examine the plethora of varied concerns
and events that constituted the drink problem during the First World War.
The control of drink during the First World War has already been subject to
some scholarly inquiry. Three books were written on the management of drink during
the war and in its immediate aftermath.5 Each share fundamental similarities in
argument and the type of evidence used to substantiate claims. They are united by a
‘top down’ approach which emphasised the role of government agencies, notably the
CCB, in reducing drinking to the detriment of other societal factors. The books are
guileless in their analysis of the nature and extent of the ‘drink problem’ and are all
written without the benefit of private records and correspondence from the period.
Furthermore, these books are each idiosyncratic in their origins.
Reverend Henry Carter in The Control of the Drink Trade: A Contribution to
National Efficiency 1915-1917, published in mid-1918, argued that action was
essential as drink impaired industrial efficiency leading to a loss of life abroad. 6 He
suggested that:
3 John Atkins, Drink in the Last War: A Study in Licensing Reform (London, 1939), p. 3.
4 Ibid. p. 3.
5 Henry Carter, The Control of the Drink Trade: A Contribution to National Efficiency 1915-1917
(London, 1918), Thomas Nixon Carver, Government Control of the Liquor Business in Great Britain
and the United States (New York, 1919), Arthur Shadwell, Drink in 1914-1922: A Lesson in Control
(London, 1923).
6 Henry Carter was Temperance Secretary of the Wesleyan Methodist Connexion. He was also Chair of
the Executive Committee of the Temperance Council of the Christian Churches. He was a teetotaller
and not a convinced total prohibitionist.
3Indulgence in liquor directly caused broken time and wastage of the national
resources for work and war . . . it acted with and accentuated, other causes of
lessened industrial output, such as physical exhaustion; a man, for instance,
could not give his best in work if his free hours were spent in close and
crowded liquor bars, or if his home were wrecked by the drinking habits of an
intemperate wife . . . because of the interdependence of the processes of
modern industry the intemperate habits of a minority might, and not
infrequently did, delay a much larger body of workers.7
Carter felt that the government’s actions concerning drink were of benefit and
represented ‘a great experiment which has been efficacious, in a notable degree, in
repressing intemperance, advancing efficiency and bettering the social lot’.8
Figure 1: Reverend Henry Carter
According to Carter, the actions of the state, and in particular the Central
Control Board, brought about ameliorated social conditions, principally the reduction
of intemperance. It is unsurprising that he held such a viewpoint, given he was a
member of the CCB and an active temperance campaigner. His positive and self
7 H. Carter, The Control of the Drink Trade, p. 5.
8 Ibid. p. 272.
4laudatory appraisal of the CCB’s performance was justified by his view that the state
‘in its modern role of physician can – if it will – restore and keep in health the body
politic’.9 Carter’s temperance convictions call into question the fairness and
rationality of his assessment, especially since members of the Board actually co-wrote
and edited the book. Despite these deficiencies, his account offers much valuable
factual information, much of which will be discussed later.
Carter’s acclamations concerning the success of the CCB were moderate in
comparison to the ecstatic proclamations of Lord D’Abernon, who wrote the Preface
to Carter’s book. He had been Chairman of the Central Control Board and hoped to
continue his programme of reform after the war. To a degree Carter’s book can be
interpreted as a promotional publication aimed towards this end. D’Abernon believed
that action was justified to improve national efficiency:
Drink control is admittedly a problem of vital importance to our industrial
future and to our national efficiency. But it is more than that. Throughout the
world Drink Control is recognised as one of the most arduous questions which
have hitherto baffled statesmanship. This has been notoriously so in Great
Britain, where up to 1914, despite great enthusiasm and sincerity of purpose
on the part of reformers, aided by the support of able statesmen, progress was
precarious and disappointing . . . a return to pre-war conditions of Licensing
and Drink Control cannot be contemplated with equanimity. It would certainly
mean an increase of drunkenness, involving the sacrifice of many lives, the
ruin of many homes, and a reversion of conditions conducive to crime and ill
health.10
D’Abernon believed that from the ‘irredeemable’ pre-war conditions, the actions of
the CCB had facilitated a fundamental reversal of fortune in the battle against drink.
He proposed that ‘the measures taken have been followed by a progressive decline of
alcoholic excess so rapid that it appears difficult to account for it on any other
hypotheses than that it is in large part the result of the regulations applied’.11 As with
Carter, it is difficult to distinguish the true value of D’Abernon’s brief introduction as
9 Ibid. p. 11.
10 Lord D’Abernon, Preface to The Control of the Drink Trade by H. Carter, p. vii.
11 Ibid. p. vi.
5he too was, in effect, attempting to validate the continuation of the Board’s legacy and
establish his own particular place in history. Autobiographical writing aimed at
keeping oneself in a job cannot be considered an objective historical source. However,
this does not wholly denigrate the undoubted historical value of his work, in particular
his review of the legislative changes introduced by the Board and their consequent
effect. D’Abernon’s introduction indicates his perception of the drink problem and the
actions he believed were necessary to resolve the issue.
Less tainted by association, and by participation in government agencies, is
the work of Thomas Nixon Carver, who produced a comparative piece concerning
Government Control of the Liquor Business in Great Britain and the United States
during the First World War.12 It was a preliminary economic study of the war,
produced in 1919. Carver’s contention that efficiency and prevention of waste were
the prime motivations behind the implementation of legislation concurs with both
Carter and D’Abernon. He argues, with perverse simplicity, that:
In the midst of all the controversies over the question, and of all the
uncertainties with which it is surrounded, two facts are at least certain and
beyond controversy. One is that starch and sugar are used in the production of
alcohol. The other is that large numbers of people get drunk on alcohol.13
After establishing these eternal truths, he identifies the ‘three conspicuous forms of
waste’ that drinking caused:
First, the food materials used up in the production of alcoholic liquor; second,
the prosperity and the man power used in dispensing the liquor to the drinking
public after it is produced, and third, the impaired efficiency of those guilty of
over indulgence.14
The drive for efficiency was necessary given the circumstances of war, as Carver
recounted:
12 Thomas Nixon Carver, Government Control of the Liquor Business in Great Britain and the United
States.
13 Ibid. p. 18.
14 Ibid. p. 22.
6If, in facing what might have been their last fight, they had not taken active
measures to conserve every resource which might aid in the winning of the
war, and to prevent every form of waste which might decrease their fighting
power, they would not have shown that capacity for self discipline upon
which, alone, the salvation of democracy depends.15
Carver also discussed public opinion, in all its guises, far more than Carter or
D’Abernon, contending that ‘Public opinion (concerning alcoholic liquor), as
expressed through its constituent organs, the newspapers, seems to have been very
much divided . . . the only thing which seemed clear was that the government must do
something about it’.16 His discussion of ‘public opinion’ is somewhat limited, though,
as he used only The Times newspaper in his analysis.
Carver’s book is very useful. It differs from Carter’s in that it informs the
historian of an outsider’s viewpoint of the government’s actions. The bibliography of
his book is a veritable goldmine of pamphlets and articles produced on the issue
during the war. Many of them are highly propagandistic and unscientific in their
approach to the issue, but nevertheless highlight the controversies and misperceptions
relevant to the problem. His utilisation of statistics and hard evidence benefits the
modern investigator immeasurably, as does his focussed review of the issue
throughout the war.
Overall, a consensus emerges from contemporary commentators that a desire
for improved national efficiency precipitated new drink legislation. This viewpoint
was supported by the final contemporary review of the drink issue, Arthur Shadwell’s
Drink in 1914-1922: A Lesson in Control, published in 1923. Shadwell was an author,
lecturer and avid social reformer. He argued that:
The war searched out every weak spot in national character and conduct as
nothing had ever done before . . . this habit of excess was so plainly revealed
15 Ibid. p. 17.
16 Ibid. p. 63.
7as a weak spot that extraordinary measures for dealing with it were adopted
with general approval and acquiesced in by the community at large.17
He believed that ‘the need and effectiveness of control were convincingly shown and
one of the catchwords of the day was ‘‘trust the people’’ but the truth was that there
were too many people who could not be trusted.’18 Like Lord D’Abernon, he believed
that the applied regulations were responsible for the reduction in consumption since
elements of society, particularly the lower orders, were incapable of exerting control
over their desire for drink. The assumed impact of duty and Licensing Laws play a
prominent part in this interpretation.
The voluminous records of the Central Control Board provide the greatest
scope for new historical investigation. These records, held at the national archives in
Kew, consist of some 250 boxes of material dealing with the drink issue in all its
manifestations. The documents touch upon every aspect of the drink debate and their
historical value is prodigious as they provide a window on attitudes and sources
distinctly different from the more partisan viewpoints of both the various temperance
bodies and the trade, even though these sources remain of significant historical
interest. In particular, the trade archives provide insight into the relative patriotism of
the industry during wartime and the manner in which cooperation, rather than
hostility, greeted many of the Board’s actions. This divergence in opinion between the
CCB, the trade and temperance movements provides an interesting insight into the
practicalities and difficulties of solving the drink problem.
The Board’s archives have been examined previously, though not
comprehensively, on three occasions. Michael Rose uses them in an article arguing
that the Board provides a demonstration of ‘how control of an important and sensitive
17 A. Shadwell, Drink in 1914-1922, p. 148.
18 Ibid. p. 3.
8area of social life in wartime was carried out in a positive, purposeful, and generally
acceptable fashion.’19 He highlights the positive social reforms implemented by the
Board and assesses their relative success. While he provides a valuable exposition of
this aspect of the Board’s success, the article is necessarily limited in scope.20 This too
could be said of Dr John Greenaway’s scholarly examination of Drink and British
Politics. His book, which will be considered in detail later, is a broad review of the
issue since 1830, culminating in an assessment of the impact of more modern
discourses on drink. Due to the nature of his work he only discussed certain aspects of
the Board’s policy, and in his introduction lamented the lack of historical research
done on drink in the First World War.21 Much more recently David Gutzke in his
book Pubs and Progressives: Reinventing the Public House in England 1896-1960, an
ambitious review of the ‘progressive’ nature of pub reformers, has highlighted the
reforms undertaken by the Board in Carlisle during the war.22 His book chronicles the
development of a transatlantic progressive movement which he contends affected pub
reform in Britain. His account illustrates how many reform schemes had a longer-term
history than has previously been appreciated.
More generally, Brian Harrison, in his much-lauded book Drink and the
Victorians: The Temperance Question in England 1815-1872, considered the general
impact of temperance on British society and the general role of alcohol in Victorian
life.23 The book brought attention to the multi-faceted approach to sources that could
be utilised for this purpose. His account ends in the early 1900s but has shaped the
19 Michael E. Rose, ‘The Success of Social Reform? The Central Control Board (Liquor Traffic) 1915-
1921’ in Foot, M.R.D, (ed.), War and Society (London, 1973), p. 84.
20 Rose himself admitted that the review was based on a ‘fairly cursory survey’ of the CCB’s records
which ‘deserve more detailed investigation and analysis.’ Ibid. p. 300.
21 John Greenaway, Drink and British Politics since 1830: A Study in Policy Making (Basingstoke,
2003), p.3.
22 D. Gutzke, Pubs and Progressives: Reinventing the Public House in England 1896-1960 (Dekalb,
2006).
23 Brian Harrison, Drink and the Victorians: The Temperance Question in England 1815-1872
(London, 1971).
9nature of drink investigation and the inherent techniques required of historians of
alcohol since its publication. Apart from the obvious government records, Harrison
utilised trade records, temperance publications and association accounts, newspapers,
criminal and judicial records, personal recollections and cultural productions to show
the intimate relationship of drink to society. Harrison’s approach informs the analysis
this thesis undertakes.
A discussion of social reform undertaken by the CCB will feature prominently
in this thesis and it is my intention to maximise the potential of the Board’s records
and root the bulk of this dissertation in new sources. Material such as ‘working class’
newspapers, temperance and trade journals, trade records, trade defence association
meetings, journals, personal recollections, brewery records, poetry and music hall
lyrics, which have so far proved elusive to historical investigation with regard to this
subject, will be utilised for the first time. This thesis will consider the reaction of
British society towards the Board and its work and assess how the CCB managed its
relations with both trade and temperance groups. Notable problems, such as the
relationship of women to alcohol and the perceived impact on the familial structure,
together with arguments over the use of foodstuffs in the production of alcohol, will
be investigated in detail. Other records, such as the voluminous holdings of the
Brewers’ Society, held at the Modern Records Centre at Warwick University, and the
local records of state run areas, such as Carlisle, have also divulged much of interest.
Paradoxically the mere absence of sources at certain times can tell the historian a
great deal about the nature of the drink debate. For example, the lack of interest in the
question in 1918 in comparison to the earlier years of the war suggests that the
problem had been deemed to have been dealt with both by political commentators and
10
by the population at large, or that the issue had at least become less newsworthy and
elicited less hysteria.
This thesis is unique as it is the first academic dissertation to consider the
drink question and the First World War as its primary focus. To be sure, much work
has been undertaken on various subsections of the overall debate and these have
informed this study. John Greenaway has covered the high politics aspect of the drink
question briefly, but admirably, in his chapter on drink and the First World War.24 He
deals with some of the reasons why drink became an issue of political controversy
during the war, the work of the Central Control Board and the issue of state purchase
of the liquor industry. But in his work there is, necessarily due to the scope of his
book, a lack of interaction with broader cultural attitudes and practices of the period.
In a review of his work, Matthew Hilton comments:
Politicians do not operate in a vacuum, as Greenaway would agree, but just
how wide should we understand the social, political, cultural, economic and
intellectual space within which they operate to be? Greenaway admits the
influence of war, Europe, science and social and cultural changes such as the
decline of nonconformity and the greater participation of women in the leisure
industry, but these are treated as externalities rather than intrinsic means to
understanding changing high political beliefs and reform agendas.25
This dissertation attempts to place the debates and decisions that occurred during the
war into the context of the social world in which they were taken. Most importantly,
how did class presuppositions affect the formation of drink policy? As G.B. Wilson, a
contemporary member of the United Kingdom Alliance (UKA)26, a prohibitionist
temperance group, and later historian on the subject, commented, ‘the drink problem
is one of great complexity in which the investigator who relies solely on statistical
24 See J. Greenaway, Drink and British Politics, pp. 91-113.
25 Matthew Hilton, review of Drink and British Politics since 1830: A Study in Policy Making, by John
Greenaway, Institute of Historical Research, January 2004.
www.history.ac.uk/reviews/paper/hiltonM2.html.
26 The United Kingdom Alliance was a prohibitionist organisation. Its original ‘Declaration of
Principles’ stated that ‘the traffic in intoxicating liquor is inimical to the true interests of individuals
and destructive of the order and welfare of society and ought therefore to be prohibited.’
11
evidence and ignores the human factor may find himself committed to conclusions
which are contrary to common experience.’27 It is of critical importance to know how
drink was perceived, or as Hilton suggests, to recognise ‘the ideologies of drinking
practices’, so that a greater understanding of the social world in which political
decisions were taken is garnered.28 This study will explore in detail the relationship
between the two explanatory models of the social linkage between elites and drinkers.
Central to a discussion of this relationship is the aforementioned notion of
‘moral panic’. This is a sociological notion which concerns societal fear of a threat
which far outweighs the true extent of that danger. It is best summarised by the
leading theorist of this concept, Stanley Cohen, who, in his book concerning Teddy
Boys and Mods entitled Folk Devils and Moral Panics,29 argued:
Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic.
A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined
as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylised
and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned
by editors, bishops, politicians and other right thinking people, socially
accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping
are evolved or (more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears,
submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible. Sometimes the object of
the panic is quite novel and at other times it is something which has been in
existence long enough, but suddenly appears in the limelight. Sometimes the
panic passes over and is forgotten, except in folklore and collective memory,
at other times it has more serious and long lasting repercussions and might
produce such changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way
society conceives itself.30
27 G.B. Wilson, Alcohol and the Nation: A Contribution to the Study of the Liquor Problem in the
United Kingdom from 1800 to 1935 (London, 1940), p. xi.
28 M. Hilton, review of Drink and British Politics by John Greenaway, p. 9. Greenaway refutes Hilton’s
criticism: ‘implicit in his review is the assumption that they (moral frameworks and cultural attitudes to
the policy process) impact clearly upon political reforms and policy making and influence the beliefs of
decision makers. In my study I aim to show how such factors are indeed significant but also that they
were continually mediated, in complicated wars, by political elites, both bureaucratic and party
political. Institute of Historical Research, January 2004
www.history.ac.uk/reviews/paper/greenawayJ.html.
29 Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers (St Albans,
1973).
30 Ibid. p. 9.
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This dissertation argues that the drink issue during the First World War exhibited
clear traits of a societal moral panic, in which the perception and extent of the
problem was vastly over exaggerated. Drink was politicised to previously unimagined
levels of controversy. It cannot be denied that there were issues of concern to the
government that required its intervention, for example, the issue of industrial drinking
in relation to the quest for national efficiency, but major misconceptions, or conscious
exaggerations, of the true extent and nature of the problem severely coloured the issue
from the outset. Opinion makers and arbiters viewed the problem through
preconceived filters of interpretation as opposed to undertaking a rational appraisal of
the true situation.
The old historiographical discourse on the drink issue, as illustrated by Carter,
Carver and Shadwell, proposes that policies originated from persistent governmental
anxiety concerning the debilitating effects of alcohol on the population. This shared
interpretation is a classic ‘top down’ or ‘social control’ appraisal of the potentiality of
governmental policy. This explanatory model, as Jack Blocker, a leading historian of
drink, has suggested:
Tends to portray mass drinking behaviour as a product of more or less
deliberate action by an elite or elites. Within this framework, political elites
(government officials, for example), economic elites (liquor manufacturers or
other businessmen with an interest in social control), or social elites
(aristocratic trend setters, for example) define the conditions under which
everyday drinking takes place. Ordinary drinkers exercise the choices left to
them only within the constraints – on type of beverage or container, timing or
site of drinking, or amount consumed – thus imposed. Alternatively, their
choices are channelled or moulded by advertising or by advice from above.31
This model neglects to mention those upon whom the regulations were enforced and
their complicit role in the success of such policies. The proactive concerns of the
people are lost in an interpretation which overlooks the social world in which these
31 Jack S. Blocker Jr, ‘Introduction’, Histoire Sociale/Social History Volume 27, Number 54,
November 1994, p. 229.
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policies operated. This alternative can be called the cultural, bottom up or demand
model whereby the power of group norms in determining individual drinking
behaviour is emphasised, whether the group is defined by gender, nationality, social
class, ethnicity or race.32
A more fluid interpretation is also possible: it allows for the coexistence, or at
least a malleable flux, of both models. The social control paradigm ignores the
manner in which legislation was viewed and implemented at the everyday level
whereas the bottom up model denigrates the importance of policy in establishing the
legal frameworks which establish systems of liquor control, or the effect of law in
moulding, implicitly or explicitly, group norms. For example, it is doubtful whether a
policy that had absolutely no support could be introduced in peacetime, but in
wartime the process was less controversial due to the assumed necessities of total war.
In this respect the extraneous circumstances of conflict are of equal importance as the
desires of the governing elite, as they shape the reactions and responses of the nation
toward policy. This is an issue that will be discussed throughout this study as it
emphasises the ‘communicative’ process concerning the drink issue that occurred
throughout the war. This process was of the utmost importance, yet has been
somewhat neglected in the more recent historiography of the period. The story of
drink control involves many of the leading figures of the time. It was an important
concern of many leading political actors, central to many relationships and an
important political and social issue over which relationships were formed and broken.
The debate provides a fascinating insight into the machinations of a society at war, its
morals and its attitudes to leisure whilst being the culmination of eighty years of
previous drink agitation.
32 Ibid. p. 230.
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Opinions toward drink form part of the overall history of moral attitudes. As
Virginia Berridge has argued, contemporary thoughts regarding drunkenness are not
simply an ‘arbitrary figment of man’s unreason for which history provides some
insight, they are the product of a social structure and the social tensions of that
time.’33 The debate about drink control provides insight into broader historiographical
contingencies, particularly as to whether the war brought about massive social change
or merely reinforced continuities that had been evident in the Victorian period. During
this period the consumption of ‘a pint’ became a contentious leisure pursuit as the
intermixing of political and social debate produced explosive results.
The study of drinking opens a window of opportunity to the social historian. A
worthwhile investigation of drink has to consider the question from a variety of
angles. Primarily the historian of alcohol has to explain historical patterns of beverage
use and the social response to drinking that occurred. Drink was a ubiquitous aspect
of everyday life during this period and it was difficult for someone to escape either
the product itself or not to hold an opinion concerning its societal worth. Drink was a
political issue in 1914 because primarily it was a social problem.
In this respect drink affected both the personal and the political life of many
people, operating at an individual and communal level. For some, drinking was no
more than social habit, a leisure pursuit essential to the enjoyment of life and nothing
more. To others, it was a cancerous tumour sapping the health of the local community
and the nation. As Susanna Burrows and Robin Room highlight in their excellent
introductory comments to Drinking Behaviour and Belief in Modern History:
The task for a social historian of responses to problematic drinking is to look
beyond the political struggles over prohibition or alcohol control and medical
ideologies of the treatment of inebriety and to comprehend the undercurrents
33 V. Berridge and G. Edwards, Opium and the People – Opiate Use in Nineteenth Century England
(London, 1981), p. 231.
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of problem definition and response as they shaped family, work, and
community life.34
Furthermore, an examination of how cultural values, gender roles, economic patterns,
and the actions of government can be explored by a consideration of drinking patterns
and attitudes is worthwhile.35 In effect, a study of the drink question involves the
discussion of causes, consequences and control of popular drinking behaviour.
Looking beyond the individual and moving towards an investigation of the perception
of drink can broaden our understanding of the drink crisis during the First World War.
The war provoked an unparalleled interest in the consumption of alcohol and the
social issues attached to this perceived problem inspiring a unique governmental
appraisal of how this leisurely, yet intoxicating, pursuit should be handled in the
exigencies of conflict.
Chapter One of this dissertation deals with the drink issue prior to the First
World War. It provides general context on the issue from the mid-nineteenth century
up to 1914 and considers the history of the drink question, how it was formed, which
parties developed an interest in its resolution and what impact the temperance
movement had on the perception of the problem. It serves to establish a clear
foundation for my own research and intends to provide an historical context for the
temperance movement which will aid the development of ideas present in later
chapters. This chapter establishes that subsequent problems and tendencies
concerning drink that emerged during the war were developed in these earlier years.
Chapter Two highlights the growing development of the drink problem from
August 1914 to March 1915. The chapter details press, public and political reactions
to drinking in wartime and how drink became synonymous with waste. How the
34 Susanna Burrows and Robin Room, (eds.), Drinking Behaviour and Belief in Modern History
(Berkeley, 1991), p. 17.
35 Jack S. Blocker Jr, ‘Introduction’, p. 233.
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problem was comprehended by government was of the utmost significance, but the
formation of opinion ‘from below’ and its relationship with the ‘high politics’ of the
decision-making procedure also demands investigation. By considering how broader
currents of social debate affected the governmental consciousness with regard to
drink, new light can be cast upon the familiar tale of governmental control over the
issue during the war.
A consideration of the circumstances leading up to the creation of the Board is
undertaken in Chapter Three, which details the heightening panic over the drink
problem. This includes an examination of the criticisms made towards drinkers by
leading figures of the time, including Lloyd George, considering whether the
accusations stemmed from political concerns about the anti-patriotic effect of drinking
during the war or resulted from religious, temperate and class anxieties about the
workingman being an ungodly, drink sodden, beast of burden.
Chapter Four details the formation of the Central Control Board, and considers
the initial actions taken to nullify the impact of drink upon the efficiency of the war
effort to the end of 1915. Chapter Five discusses one of the most notorious
experiments undertaken by the CCB, the state purchase of the drink trade in Carlisle.
This highlights the measures that the Board would have taken if they had been able to
bring about nationwide state purchase. Chapter Six details the debate surrounding
female intemperance during the war whilst Chapter Seven considers the Board’s ideas
concerning the reform of the workingman and the relationship between food and beer,
dealing specifically with the introduction of canteens and food taverns. Continuous
tax increases on alcohol and a propagandistic campaign concerning the continued
validity of utilising barley, wheat and sugars in the making of alcohol during wartime,
served to make drink less readily available and less appealing to an increasing number
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of consumers. This in turn nearly led to the attempt to nationalise the drink trade, an
issue considered in Chapter Eight which details the final actions of the Board until the
end of the war. In the conclusion an assessment of the Central Control Board’s brief
life after the war is undertaken together with an overview of the Board’s work and
historical significance.
The effect of this study is to rehabilitate the reputation of the ‘drinking
community’, who were condescendingly believed to be unable to control their
consumption habits.36 It will be proposed that an innate patriotic determination not to
endanger the successful prosecution of the war was present not only amongst those
who drank, but also amongst those who stood to lose economically – the trade. It will
be argued that a fundamental misreading of normal working class social habits shaped
the government’s attitude. This misperception was caused by a moral panic which
engulfed the issue and by the extraneous circumstance of war, factors that caused
latent anti-drink hostility to erupt once more.
The vast majority of drinkers were adept at policing themselves. Attitudes to
drink were determined by an overriding sense that naturally principled and
appropriate action was required in a time of war to guarantee victory. It will be
contended that the creation of drink legislation was an organic operation during which
the impetus for change was created from below, by an efficacious section of the
community concerned with curbing unacceptable social excess, as well as from
above. This ‘pressure from above’ was created by a government and state body
confronted with a situation that seemingly threatened the successful prosecution of the
war effort. Furthermore, a discussion of the motives behind some of this legislation
reveals that the rationale for action was not as clear-cut as contemporaries led people
36 This ‘drinking community’ is a somewhat open definition given that the vast majority did imbibe
alcohol. The term relates predominantly to the working classes who were believed to be the principal
‘drinkers’ of the period.
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to believe. This process involved the construction of a political, social and cultural
debate about the role of drink in Britain during the First World War, elements of
which have been previously unappreciated in relevant historiography.
This contention emphasises the continuity of the drinks issue between the
years prior to and during the war. Temperance debates had increased the belief that
alcohol was detrimental to the nation and its people. Far from being a period of
impressive innovation in drink legislation, the governmental response to the problem
was in accordance with much pre-war temperance conjecture. Its success was also
purely dependent upon the consent of the people. Without an enduring commitment
towards and acceptance of these policies within the local sphere no progress could
have been made. It will be argued that the political and social controversy surrounding
the drinks issue was merely a self-fulfilling prophecy in which the socially malevolent
predictions of temperance ideology crystallized around perceived failures in the
execution of total war. Preconceptions of those who drank reflected prevalent class
biases and the undisputed class divisions prevalent throughout society at the time,
obscured by the camouflaged cloak of national efficiency. Lastly, it will be suggested
that it is inconsequential as to whether a drink problem actually did exist; statistically
it is difficult to prove. The importance of this issue stems from the perception of over
exuberant social activity acting as a possible hindrance to the war effort. Fanciful
folklores morphed into false realities. This conviction was widely held and valid
enough to reinvigorate a far-reaching debate about the role of alcohol in society
during wartime. This dispute, though, had commenced long before 1914.
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Chapter One: A Tale of Temperance and Drink 1870-1914
This chapter will first outline how drink, via the temperance movement, was
conceptualised as a social problem. The development of Liberal social theory and the
evolution of a new form of social investigation will be examined as contributing
factors to the renewed interest in the potentiality of an abstemious society. The
influence of governmental intervention and legislation in this period will also be
considered. Finally, an analysis as to whether these societal warnings were justifiable,
given the magnitude of their malevolent predictions in relation to the actual situation,
will be undertaken. By juxtaposing the two, contemporary misconceptions will be
evident. This section will examine alcohol consumption figures and the problems
facing the drink trade prior to the outbreak of conflict. It will be argued that the trade,
in terms of overall consumption of its product, was actually undergoing a period of
relative decline in the early 1900s. The extent of this decline is contentious, but the
impression that the industry faced an uncertain future is overwhelming. It will be
argued that drink was perhaps not the omnipresent social cancer that popular opinion
believed it to be.1 Contemporary debates, perceptions and opinions on the drink issue,
though, are the primary concern of this dissertation. Arguments during this period
coloured the judgement of those in power for the foreseeable future and, more
importantly, those in charge of leading Britain through the most demanding conflict
the world had seen.
The domestic situation of a century ago is perplexing and reveals a British
society preoccupied with the same social problems that linger today. ‘Binge drinking’
has become a ‘national disease’, and has come to encapsulate an entire framework of
attitudes, behaviours, lifestyle and philosophy common to those who engage in this
1 One historian disagrees with this contention. Asa Briggs, in a lecture delivered to the English Brewers
Congress, described the drink problem between 1900 and 1914 as ‘particularly serious’. ‘Beer and
Society: A Major Theme in English History’, The Brewer August 1983, p. 317.
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act of ‘wasteful leisure’. Far from being a golden age of order and sobriety,
Edwardian Britain, like contemporary Britain, was seemingly under the duress of a
supposed drinking epidemic. In 1936, the eminent historian, R.C.K. Ensor, recalling
the Edwardian period, detailed ‘the monstrous evil of intemperance – how monstrous,
it is perhaps difficult for the present generation to realise’.2 Recent debates
surrounding drinking culture echo those of the Victorian and Edwardian eras in that
society as a whole, or at least certain sections of that society, are believed to drink far
more than is appropriate for personal health and social well-being. In both cases,
appropriate notions of conduct are allegedly ripped asunder by the consumption of
alcohol.
A debate about the type of society that Edwardian Britain was, and what could
be done to halt the waste associated with drink, precipitated an unprecedented
increase in the amount of societal introspection in the early 1900s. It was believed that
a route to a more abstinent and sober future could be found. Millennial optimism
gripped the chattering classes. As one journalist prophesied, ‘we stand upon the
threshold not so much of a new century . . . as of a new era in political and social
life’.3 The time was ripe for solving social questions that had endured throughout the
past century. The experience of the Boer War caused much anxiety; it was widely
believed that Britain must either reform or decline. The drink problem was a perennial
focus of social reformers and perceived as a constant hindrance to the development of
a ‘civilised’ community.
The temperance movement was a focal point for those who believed in the
seditious qualities of alcohol. Their actions provide an accessible route to the crux of
the alcohol problem, though the drink controversy should not be solely viewed
2 B. Harrison, Drink and the Victorians: The Temperance Question in England 1815-1872, p. 23.
3 G.R. Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency: A Study in British Politics and Political Thought
1899-1914 (London, 1990), p. 51.
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through the prism of temperance thought and agitation. One must appreciate the
subtler impact of temperance propositions upon the wider political and social debate
to assess its overall long-term effect on the continuing liquor controversy. It is not,
however, the purpose of this discussion to retread the entire history of the temperance
campaign. Other historians have explored this path and produced much laudable
work.4 This chapter will summarise the historical importance of the temperance
movement and extrapolate from this why it is important when considering the
emergence of a drink problem during the Great War.
It is not intended, as is sometimes popular, to argue that the unprecedented
drink reform of the First World War was a radical departure from early Edwardian
society.5 On the contrary, the long term continuity of attitudes to drink will be
apparent given the nature of ‘traditional’ social debate in the years 1870-1914. Only
by understanding this pre-war debate can the context in which extensive action was
taken over the drink question during the First World War be truly understood. This
chapter will identify how the warnings made by various political and social actors
established a coherent programme of anti-drink assertions which established rigid
parameters within which the drink debate was conducted.
As British society remained influenced by Victorian beliefs it is unsurprising
that excess drinking was a social problem in the 1900s. Since the 1830s, a battle over
drink had perpetuated throughout Victorian society with the temperance cause gaining
increasing support. The working man allegedly had a tendency to overindulge.
4 See, for example: A.E.Dingle, Campaign for Prohibition in Victorian England: The United Kingdom
Alliance 1872-1895 (London, 1980), B. Harrison, Drink and the Victorians, E.King, Scotland, Sober
and Free: The Temperance Movement 1829-1979 (Glasgow, 1979), W.R. Lambert, Drink and Society
in Victorian Wales c1820-1895 (Cardiff, 1983), James S. Roberts, Drink, Temperance and the Working
Class in Nineteenth Century Germany (Boston and London, 1984), L.L. Shiman, Crusade against
Drink in Victorian England (London, 1988), J. Walvin, Leisure and Society 1830-1950 (London,
1978), G.P. Williams and G.T. Broke, Drink in Great Britain 1900-1979 (London, 1980), N. Longmate,
The Waterdrinkers: A History of Temperance (London, 1968).
5 Gareth Stedman-Jones, ‘Class Expression versus Social Control? A critique of recent trends in the
social history of ‘leisure’’, History Workshop Journal, Issue 4, 1977, p. 167.
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Frederick Engels claimed in 1844 that for the working men of Manchester ‘liquor is
almost their only source of pleasure, and all things conspire to make it accessible to
them.’6 In 1896, the Reverend Thomas Page alleged that the working class due to
drink had gone ‘from being a mainly independent, industrious and thrifty portion of
the community attentive to the interests of their employers’ and had become
‘disaffected, dissolute, impatient of superiority or control and reckless of family
duties’.7 Beer during the period 1870-1914 accounted for 60 per cent of all alcoholic
drinks consumed with another 30 per cent accounted for by spirits.8 There were over
100,000 pubs and beer shops selling alcohol in Britain.9 Alcohol, in one form or
another, was the dominant drink of choice in the nineteenth century.
Temperance ideology established the ‘dominant’ school of thought concerning
the drink question contextualising the parameters of the drink problem for the future.
The temperance movement was influenced by evangelicalism. Drunkenness was
denounced in line with religious principles. God and drink did not mix well. It was
argued that the consumption of drink was inconsistent with the scriptures or with
leading a righteous Christian life.10 In a society in which religion played a far greater
role than today the support given to the temperance cause by the major denominations
– Nonconformist, Quakers and the Church of England – greatly aided its popularity.
To be temperate was seen as analogous to living a godly life. The movement
consistently promoted anti-drink propaganda arguing that alcohol was too readily
available and fostered irreparable social disintegration.
6 J. Walvin, Leisure and Society, p. 2.
7 N. Longmate, The Waterdrinkers, p. 31.
8 A.E. Dingle, ‘Drink and Working Class Living Standards in Britain, 1870-1914’, Economic History
Review, 25, (1972), p. 608.
9 T.R. Gourvish and R.G. Wilson, The British Brewing Industry (Cambridge, 1994), p. 31.
10 The point at which seven men of Preston took the pledge on 1 September 1832 at a temperance
meeting is sometimes accredited with the official ‘birth’ of the temperance movement. Longmate
suggests that the first British total abstainers were probably the Cowherdites, an obscure religious sect
founded at Salford, Lancashire by a former Anglican clergyman, the Reverend Cowherd. N. Longmate,
The Waterdrinkers, p. 33.
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Whilst being commonly in favour of temperance per se the movement was
split into different groups each advocating a particular method of abstinence. The
‘Teetotal Movement’, which was not interested exclusively in merely temperance but
persuaded by the virtues of complete abstinence from all kinds of intoxicating liquors,
formed one branch of the temperance lobby.11 Initially this mode of thought
dominated the movement but eventually wilted under the pressure of seemingly more
attainable abstinence ideologies exemplified by the ‘Moderationists’: Protestants who
allowed the moderate use of alcohol consumption. These divisive interpretations
limited the possibility of any longstanding coherent legislative programme being
created.12 Whilst united in condemning drink, the temperance movement floundered
due to dogmatic internal squabbling concerning the implementation of practical
measures.
Temperance propaganda and agitation was nevertheless effective in casting
aspersions on the act of drinking. The temperance movement made the drink debate
increasingly vituperative and established divisive views within society on how an
appropriate life should be led. The temperance movement had several concerns.
Numerous reports, such as G. Blaicklock’s The Alcohol Factor in Social Conditions:
The Report of an Inquiry presented to the National Temperance League, highlighted
drink as an agent of doom. These reports argued that drink harmed the individual and
tore at the moral fabric of the family as a social unit. Drink was portrayed as being
responsible for innumerable social problems – crime, vice, disease, pauperism,
insanity and mental illness were all seen as the consequence of drinking. Temperance
protagonists argued that drink was responsible for, amongst other things, syphilis,
11 B. Harrison argues that the teetotal movement prospered due to the desire for respect and self
reliance within the working class itself. See B. Harrison, Drink and the Victorians, p. 350.
12 David Fahey, ‘Drink and the Meaning of Reform in Late Victorian and Edwardian England’, Cithara,
Volume 13, 1974, p.51.
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pneumonia and cancer.13 More extreme temperance advocates even suggested that
spontaneous combustion resulted as a consequence of heavy drinking. Drunkenness
was seen to be an individual failure of social discipline and as a surrender to base
animal instinct. The temperance movement served to make the drink issue one of the
most prominent concerns of the nineteenth century.
Negative perceptions of alcohol consumption meant that the trade, by
association, was stigmatised as an uncaring, profit driven industry, callously
prospering upon men’s ‘degraded appetites’ whilst happily bringing moral and
physical degradation to the nation in exchange for profits. The term ‘the trade’ was
used to synthesise the wider coalition of groups involved in the drink business such as
retailers, wine and hop merchants, maltsters, company directors and bond holders. As
one contemporary commented, ‘the stream of horrible profits which drunkards pour
into the drink trade . . . everywhere leaves the slime of its overflow over devastated
areas of society’.14 One temperance activist argued that publicans and brewers were
nothing more than ‘wholesale and retail manufacturers of drunkards’.15 In 1901 the
Reverend Ian Fry described the trade as ‘wealthier and stronger than any continental
mafia’.16 Reformers concurred that the requirements of being a publican were
detrimental to the duties of a provider of public services.
Brewers formed pressure groups in response to escalating temperance attacks
on the trade as the debate became increasingly acrimonious.17 Two contending
viewpoints of the role of drink within society were therefore established. The trade
13 See G. Blaiklock, The Alcohol Factor in Social Conditions: The Report of an Inquiry presented to
the National Temperance League (London, 1914), p. 35.
14 F.W. Farrar, Contemporary Review, 1894, quoted in D. Gutzke, Protecting the Pub: Brewers and
Publicans Against Temperance (London, 1989), p. 37.
15 W.R. Lambert, Drink and Sobriety in Victorian Wales, p.101.
16 D. Gutzke, Protecting the Pub, p. 52.
17 Ibid. p. 30. Some brewers even hired hecklers to disrupt temperance meetings, see N. Longmate, The
Waterdrinkers, p. 87.
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recognised that temperance activity threatened its existence and had to respond. The
ensuing debate garnered an obsessive following with the proper place of drink in
society discussed with an intensity and exhaustiveness which has interesting parallels
with today.
The public agitation solicited by the temperance movement was successful in
recruiting subscribers to the cause. The more people began to worry about the
problem the greater the support the temperance movement received from both middle
and upper class members. Founded upon a mixture of middle class benevolence and
working class self respect and self-realisation, the temperance movement looked
forward to the creation of a society of self disciplined individuals. It was a movement
ideally suited to the Victorian world. That is not to say however that it was universally
popular, far from it. It proved on occasion to be a divisive force; as one resident of
Hanover Square in London put it, ‘this fanatical crusade against the drinking of
fermented liquor . . . has passed beyond the legitimate limits of a fad and is beginning
to assume the proportions of a public nuisance’.18
Assessments of the social profile of those within the temperance movement
are somewhat speculative, as substantive records do not remain. Harrison contends
that the United Kingdom Alliance was probably correct in believing that its
‘numerical strength lay with what The Economist called upper class workmen, the
humblest of the middle classes and generally speaking, persons below the class of
gentlemen’.19 There were those amongst the middle class who were genuinely
concerned about the welfare of the emerging working classes but others acted for
reasons of self-interest as the incompatibility of drinking with the necessity of
industrial punctuality and regularity provided an indisputable financial spur to the
18 N. Longmate, The Waterdrinkers, p. 137.
19 B. Harrison, Drink and the Victorians, p. 221.
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dissemination of temperance sentiment.20 Discipline thus emerged as a key concept of
temperance thought. The importance of ‘social discipline’ as a whole was widely
stressed throughout Victorian society. Victorian arguments concerning leisure
revolved around whether the action undertaken was rational and produced some social
benefit. The pleasure of drinking was not believed to be a suitable rationale for
alcohol consumption; consequently all drinking was assigned a negative moral value.
One of the principal criticisms made of the temperance movement was its failure to
articulate the benefits of abstinence to the occasional drinker who lay between the
teetotaller and the chronic alcoholic, and who could drink seemingly without physical
or physiological complications. This ‘silent majority’ were the quiet men of the drink
debate. Prohibiting drink would not, after all, immediately end the demand for
alcohol.
As Shiman has noted, new conceptions of ‘rational recreation’ dictated that
leisure time had to be spent appropriately to ensure the continued economic
development of the nation; this transformed drunkenness from ‘a personal state of
excess sociability to an anti-social vice’.21 From the outset, temperance was imbued
with a distinct emphasis upon class and its relationship to character. Class was vital to
the drinks debate. To be intemperate was a characteristic of the wayward working
class individual, wasting his life away by spending his money in the depraved haunts
of the public house, whereas temperance seemingly offered the possibility of an
advance up the social scale and a gateway to assured economic prosperity. Sobriety
was posited by the temperance message as an essential pre-requisite to self-
advancement, interlinked with a distinct concern regarding established morals.
20 As Harrison notes ‘can it be considered a coincidence that most of the major donors to the United
Kingdom Alliance were drawn from industrial manufacturers mostly from the North of England?’ Ibid.
p. 220.
21 L.L. Shiman, Crusade against Drink in Victorian England, p. 2.
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Originally the temperance movement emphasised its moral argument. Moral suasion,
though, proved to be a slow and genuinely unproductive process.
Persuasion eventually gave way to prohibitive inclinations, best exemplified
by the UKA at the end of the nineteenth century. Prohibition increasingly became the
preferred choice of temperance activists, but the aforementioned divisions amongst
them remained.22 They argued that drink reform was necessary because the working
class were believed to be incapable of resisting temptation; the only way of doing this
was to ban all drinking. Harry Quelch, an early historian of the temperance
movement, argued that ‘the temperance movement was based on the assumption that
the working man is a vile incorrigible drunken beast incapable of self control’.23
When the workingman was in possession of disposable income, it was assumed that
irresponsibility and drunkenness inevitably followed. This low estimation of the
working class was not just a belief common to the temperance movement however. In
a class-ridden society the workingman bore the brunt of a great deal of criticism.
Ancillary social activities, lifestyles and communities developed around the
temperance movement. Organisations such as the Gospel Temperance Movement and
the Band of Hope, a group aimed at inculcating children into a temperate way of life,
represented, as Harrison contends, the ‘increasing self consciousness of temperance
reformers as a community’.24 In 1908, there were 22,000 Band of Hope societies with
3,000,000 children enrolled.25 To the ardent temperance proponent, abstinence was
more than just a political conviction but formed the core of an entire system of beliefs.
Living an idealised life, safe from the dangers of a drink infested world, these
communities had their own social networks, meeting places and leisure activities
22 D. Gutzke, Protecting the Pub, p. 85.
23 B. Harrison, Drink and the Victorians, p. 404.
24 Ibid. p. 194.
25 Philip Snowden, Socialism and the Drink Question (London, 1908), p. 23.
28
founded upon a common desire to live a good temperate life. Temperance hotels,
friendly societies, halls, periodicals and building societies emerged to aid the social
exclusivity of abstinence, providing welcome to the elite and most devout temperance
devotee. While these communities were not completely isolated from the outside
world, the chances of the presumed negative consequences of drink affecting their
existence became severely diminished by their self-imposed isolationism. Film
footage of temperance demonstrations reveals how much joining the temperance
movement was a clear lifestyle choice.26 Vast numbers of onlookers gathered to watch
the procession of those that had ‘saved themselves’ from the degrading drink. The
difference between the crowd and the marchers illustrated the divide between those
who had chosen a ‘virtuous’ life and those who had not.
The temperance movement was large and with so many different social and
cultural groups it was possible to live a well-rounded temperate life. As W.R.
Lambert, utilising the example of the Temperance movement in Victorian Wales, has
observed:
There is little doubt that the temperance society provided colour, interest and
amusement in what was to many of its members a fairly drab life. The
influence of ‘temperance’ . . . was ubiquitous. There existed a temperance way
of life, with temperance drinks, temperance funerals, temperance weddings
and temperance benefit societies.27
By attempting to isolate themselves from the outside world temperance advocates
again failed actively to engage in converting non-abstainers. Only those who
abandoned liquor could gain access to the benefits of this temperance utopia.
This physical separation compounded the ideological separation of the
temperance movement from the mostly intemperate population. The contempt
temperance reformers held towards the popular culture of the normal working class
26 Exhibition ‘The History of Drink’ at the National Archives, Kew, London, Summer 2006.
27 W.R. Lambert, Drink and Sobriety in Victorian Wales, p. 109.
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male meant that drinking habits were not studied objectively. Temperance activists
pontificated on the evils of drink without engaging with drinkers.28 To escape the
perils of drinking, the individual was urged to choose a temperance lifestyle. The
benefits of temperance, however, were not recognised by everyone.
By the end of the nineteenth century, and after seventy years of temperance
activity, no real progress had been made: drinking remained a popular social pursuit.
Consumption statistics indicate that there had been no shift in overall consumption; in
fact, drinking was as prevalent as ever. Per capita consumption of drink steadily rose
till 1900 but was followed by a decline thereafter, with the exception of 1910-1913.29
Yet temperance activity had been advantageous in some respects. The UKA believed
that ‘riotous drinking was gone, but that quiet soaking drinking was on the increase’.30
The temperance movement cannot take sole credit for this given other advances in
leisure provision. Nevertheless, the virtue of a quiet drink and mild intoxication
remained, forever unknown to those within the temperance movement, but
indisputably enjoyed by a significant proportion of the British people. As T.P.
Whittaker, author of The Economic Aspects of the Drink Problem, and a temperance
activist, testified:
In my opinion the true explanation of what is considered to the greater
sobriety of the people is to be found in another direction. There is more
drinking now than there was sixty or eighty years ago. But it is of a different
kind. It is more frequent and regular. There is less obvious intoxication, but
there is more soaking. There is less reeling drunkenness, less evident excess,
and consequently there are fewer cases in the police courts, and fewer guests
under the dinner table. But, taking the year round, more liquor is swallowed . .
. Habitual drinking, continual and frequent, has taken the place of occasional
bouts of brutal drunkenness.31
28 Shiman argues that during the First World War the ferocity of Temperance advocates beliefs were
lessened in the trenches when conduct between the drinker and non drinker exposed the falsehood of
many temperance propositions. See L.L. Shiman, Crusade Against Drink in Victorian England, p. 243.
29 A. Dingle, ‘Drink and Working Class Living Standards in Britain 1870-1914’, pp. 619-620.
30 James Whyte, Secretary of the UKA testifying before the Royal Commission on Licensing in 1899.
L.L. Shiman, Crusade against Drink in Victorian England, p. 240.
31 Quoted by P. Snowden, Socialism and the Drink Question, p. 36.
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The liquor traffic, according to one disappointed temperance proponent, ‘remained the
stone that had to be rolled away before the dead Lazarus could emerge from the
grave’.32 Historical verdicts are no more complimentary, with Harrison believing that
‘the movement had insulated an elite from temptation; it had produced no nationwide
temperance reformation’.33 Whilst lacking a ‘reformation’ the temperance movement
did succeed in maintaining focus on the drink issue, as it remained perennially high
on the political agenda.
Party political positions on the drink debate were contentious. Generally the
Tories allied with the trade, partly because a good number of Tory M.P.s had brewing
interests. The Liberal Party was generally aligned with temperance activism. Later, in
the early twentieth century, the clear links between Labour and Methodism meant that
many Labour M.P.s were often of a temperate inclination; as was the case with Keir
Hardie and the aforementioned Philip Snowden. But these boundaries were blurred by
the changing position of the drink debate in society. The emphasis upon Britain’s
imperial position in the world in the late nineteenth century meant that temperance
ideals found favour amongst Unionist Tariff Reformers, Liberal Unionists and Fabian
Socialists alike. The boundaries were thus muddled, but in general terms the links
between the Tories and the Trade, and the Liberals with Temperance, were the most
definite.
The temperance movement still had its advocates in the early twentieth
century. The largest temperance organisation in the UK, the Church of England
Temperance Society, had in 1899 7000 branches with 150-200,000 members, while
estimates suggested that there were three million abstainers in Britain by 1908. 34 It is
32 L.L Shiman, Crusade against Drink in Victorian England, p. 109.
33 B. Harrison, Drink and the Victorians, p. 318.
34 L.L. Shiman, Crusade against Drink in Victorian England, p. 107.
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unwise to equate the impact of temperance sentiment with the number of assumed
subscribers. Nevertheless the ideological residue left by the temperance movement
was to have a permanent effect upon the drink debate. As a social habit drunkenness
now carried a horrid stigma. The temperance movement succeeded in equating a
respectable status to abstinence or moderation in alcohol consumption.35 Its agitation
was often effective in its subtle effects upon social conventions. The boundaries of
‘acceptable’ sociability owe a debt to temperance agitation, perhaps even to this day.
Thanks predominantly to the association of public drinking with the working classes,
private drinking for the upper and middle classes became a mark of respectability and
evidence of their supposed higher differential status. An increasing number of Britons
accepted that the consumption of alcoholic beverages was no longer an essential
prerequisite to good health.36 Philip Snowden believed the prevailing public sentiment
to be ‘one of condemnation of drunkenness and respect for the total abstainer’.37
Drunkenness was no longer celebrated; more often than not it was condemned.
Prohibition may never have been likely but its subtle social message filtered down
into the public sphere. The movement highlighted the genuine desire for respectability
and self-reliance which permeated amongst sections of the working class. This
message encapsulated the Victorian desire for betterment and in a developing
industrial society there evidently were many willing listeners.
The temperance society also offered a rational alternative to the public house
by showing the potentiality of an abstemious way of life. Some saw it as
sanctimonious preaching on behalf of the upper and middle class, as mere meddling in
a lifestyle they could not or did not comprehend. Indeed the majority were not willing
35 This link is also evident when one considers the language used in the war to describe those who
favoured the reduction of drinking. Although not necessarily ‘temperance activists’ they were often
described as such.
36 L.L. Shiman, Crusade against Drink in Victorian England, p. 244.
37 P. Snowden, Socialism and the Drink Question, p. 23.
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revolutionaries and remained attached to the routine of the odd drink and occasional
insobriety.38 Nevertheless, the idea that drinking inhibited social advancement had
permeated wider society. Yet the temperance movement in Britain, by the early
twentieth century, was just a single component of the broader drive towards
progressive, humanitarian social reform evident at this time. The initial temperance
battle had been fought valiantly, but was lost. Subsequent encounters were fought on
new ideological ground whereby improvement rather than prohibition proved a more
successful and convincing platform.
Drink and drunkards had long been an easy target for moralisers, but in the
late Victorian and Edwardian era the need for a solution to the problem became all the
more acute as degenerate behaviour became contextualised within the framework of
national progress and the common good. As the Spectator opined in 1902, ‘there is a
universal outcry for efficiency in all the depth of society in all the aspects of life’.39
The belief that alcohol was congruent with a healthy lifestyle was diminishing, and
led to the widespread conviction that drink corrupted and endangered social evolution.
A progressive conglomeration of middle class professionals, doctors, civil
servants, journalists, health workers and politicians argued that a developing and
competitive nation state could no longer tolerate invidious habits detrimental to its
overall advance. These groups embodied the ‘new school’ of thought regarding the
drink problem. This contextualisation of the drink debate built upon and modified
many older temperance mantras. Improper consumption of alcohol was now an
acknowledged hindrance to the required public health of the nation with its effect
upon the individual and the family regularly highlighted by temperance propaganda.
In a society that viewed the wasting of time as sinful, and in which recreational
38 P. Bailey, Leisure and Class in Victorian England: Rational Recreation and the Contest for Control
1830-1885 (London, 1978), p. 48.
39 G.R. Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency, p.1.
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activities had to have moral justification, it is unsurprising that the link between the fit
individual and the strength of the nation became firmly entrenched.
In a world in which a perversion of social darwinism predominated, concerns
regarding national efficiency and racial degeneration were all the more pertinent
leading to a reinterpretation of the necessity of social reform in the face of mass
insecurity. These social anxieties, shared by both the political left and right, were
increased by new international trade and political competition from America and
Germany, intensified by a slow population growth in comparison with these nations,
and by the debacle of the Boer War, which seemed to prove the inadequacy of the
British working class lifestyle, particularly of those living in urban environments,
which was later confirmed by official government inquiries.40 These inquiries drew
attention to the fact that society’s failures could no longer remain hidden within the
public house if British superiority was to be guaranteed. Drastic social reform based
upon good housing, public health measures, education, clean air and water, and an
adequate wage, were believed to be the necessary foundations for the creation of a
renewed populace of sufficient manpower to maintain the industry and armies of
Empire. As the universal appreciation of self-disciplined individuals grew, it is
unsurprising that anti-drink thought assumed a newfound credibility. In this context,
as R.B. Weir argues, the drunkard ‘was the worst enemy which the trade has to fight
and the best weapon possessed by the temperance orator’.41
The Edwardian era thus witnessed an important shift away from simply
blaming the individual for woes concerned with alcohol to a new interpretation, which
viewed the individual as being collaterally damaged by the failure of society to
uphold social standards. The impact of socialist thought on the drink question was of
40 For example, see the Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Physical Deterioration, 1904.
41 R.B. Weir, ‘Obsessed with Moderation: The Drink Trades and the Drink Question (1870-1930)’,
British Journal of Addiction, Volume 79, (1984), p. 99.
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paramount importance. ‘There is no shortcut to universal abstinence’, Philip
Snowden, later a member of the Central Control Board, contended:
The relation of the drink question to the whole social problem is now being
recognised by reformers of all schools. In so far as we elevate the ideals of the
people, lessen the strenuousness of commercial and industrial life, improve the
surroundings of the poor, increase their leisure and provide rational
entertainment, so far shall we be working most effectively for temperance
reform.42
The concept of a universal social duty to protect the ‘unreformed’ individual was
gradually emerging.
The notion of the state as being intrinsically linked with the characteristics of
its individual citizens was popular with many promoters of the ‘new democracy’, such
as Sydney Webb and Ramsay MacDonald. The social basis of political power
assumed a new prominence within political debate of the time, shown by the
transition from individualism to collectivism during the period.43 The increasingly
influential biological interpretation of man and his world meant a new impulse from
the state was gradually emerging towards moralism and social reform for the benefit
of the nation. The state was flexing its muscle, becoming, as one commentator put it,
‘the physician of society . . . it should prevent rather than cure the evils which are in
its midst’.44
This belief was substantiated by new methods of social investigation. Charles
Booth was one of the first investigators to consider the totality of the working class
experience in his book Life and Labour of the People in London, published in 1899.45
He revealed how each aspect of working class life, work, leisure, physical
environment and religious conviction, was intertwined and dependent upon the other.
42 P. Snowden, Socialism and the Drink Question, p. 191.
43 For a stimulating analysis of this transition see Jose Harris, Private Lives, Public Spirit: Britain 1870-
1914 (Oxford, 1993).
44 Dr Kate Mitchell, The Drink Question: Its Social and Medical Aspects (London, 1891), pp. 17-18.
45 Charles Booth, Life and Labour of the People in London (London, 1899).
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Primarily he demonstrated that men did not become poor simply because of individual
failings, for example, idleness, improvidence, or drunkenness. In particular he
postulated that drink was not the chief reason for poverty, his evidence showing that
only 13 per cent of the poor and 14 per cent of the very poor in his sample owed their
misfortune to drink.46 Accordingly, as J.A. Hobson had argued in 1896, no separate
‘drink problem’ existed per se, it was just one of many unresolved social problems.47
Excess drinking was much more the consequence of the larger question of working
class poverty, deflating temperance claims to the contrary.
Booth’s work laid the building blocks for other social investigators, such as
the Webbs and Seebohm Rowntree, who concurred that poverty was a social
condition, rather than an individual problem, and made a powerful case for the
extension of state assistance.48 The resolution of the drink issue was thus part of an
overall programme of required reform as opposed to being the sum total of the
problem. A consensus was emerging amongst opinion makers that the drink question
was, as Snowden wrote, ‘inextricably intertwined with all the questions which aim at
the elimination of the social waste of human health, of human life, of labour and of
wealth’.49
These beliefs were blended together into a new critique of alcohol
consumption. As David Gutzke has argued, temperance assumptions were now
critical of ‘workers’ expenditure on drink’ which:
meant deficient nourishment, uncompetitive productivity, numerous
pauperised families with retarded economic development, reduced potential
incomes and squandered purchasing power, which caused under consumption,
46 Quoted in B. Harrison, Drink and the Victorians, p. 404.
47 Ibid. p. 405.
48 See B. Seebohm Rowntree, Poverty: A Study of Town Life (London, 1901).
49 P. Snowden, Socialism and the Drink Question, p. 65.
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and immense costs to the state – in adjudicating legal offences, incarcerating
criminals, hospitalising the diseased and supporting widows and children.50
If temperance thought provided the foundations of the alcohol critique then writers
such as Sherwell and Rowntree in their book The Temperance Problem and Social
Reform, published in 1899, articulated and developed these ideas, adding extensively
to their scope and rationale.51
The belief that the pernicious effects of alcohol were still widespread was
given credence by political and social commentators. As Philip Snowden observed:
‘The evil effects of drink cannot be hidden. They obtrude themselves upon our
attention at every turn. The public house is everywhere. The reeling and brutalised
victims of drink meet us in the streets; the slum areas of our town reek with its filthy
odours.’52 Social environment was believed to be crucial in determining the
psychological and physiological health of the individual. As Lady Bell, a social
investigator, admitted in her most famous book At the Works:53
Social evils bring in their train not physical deterioration only, but spiritual
deterioration as well, are not the monopoly of one particular class, and the
tendency to them may be latent in us all. Each of us is born into the world as a
mass of possibilities, and it is the lot in life and the surroundings of the
average mortal that determine which of these possibilities, whether for good or
for evil, shall be developed, and which are to remain for ever dormant.54
A greater concern for the welfare of the working class permeated each of these
commentaries. The previously neglected cloistered precincts of working class
sociability assumed a new relevance as these commentaries argued for a specific
50 D. Gutzke, ‘The Cry of the Children’: The Edwardian Medical Campaign Against Maternal
Drinking’, British Journal of Addiction, 79, (1984), pp. 73.
51 See A. Sherwell and J. Rowntree, The Temperance Problem and Social Reform (London, 1899).
52 P. Snowden, Socialism and the Drink Question, p. 1.
53 Florence Eveleen Elanore Bell (1851-1930) was an author, social investigator and playwright. At the
Works was published in 1907. It was a detailed investigation of Middlesbrough where her husband’s
workforce lived. Utilising limited statistical analysis the book instead dwells upon not just the
workplace but also on the homes of more than one thousand families. The evidence for the book was
gathered over a period of thirty years. Angela V, John, ‘ Florence Bell’ Oxford Dictionary National
Biography, Oxford University Press, September 2004.
54 Lady Bell, At the Works: A Study of a Manufacturing Town, p. 270.
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political and social agenda. Cabinet memoranda proliferated upon the effect of drink;
it was, the ‘buzz’ topic of the day, with Cabinet time spent on the question increasing
fourfold.55
Ideas that gained currency in the political domain soon filtered down into
wider society and were discussed with renewed intensity. The emphasis placed upon
national efficiency dictated that the condition of the working classes was now
paramount in ensuring Britain’s continued superiority. The leisure habits of the
working class, and particularly the role of drink, were the subject of many
propagandistic polemics. How leisure time was spent was an increasingly contentious
issue over which many groups speculated and theorised. The aforementioned Arthur
Shadwell, a British economist and social commentator, remarked in 1906 that Britain
was ‘a nation at play’ where Englishmen were ‘still interested in breaking records, but
only sporting records; their competitive drives and ambitions now centred not on the
workplace and its product but on cricket and their product, betting.’56 He argued that
the emerging degenerate by-products of sport, increasingly popular amongst the
working class, had superseded the intrinsic benefits of leisure. National decline was
seemingly confirmed by this emerging ‘degeneracy’.
The existence of this and other similar commentaries illustrates that the vast
majority of working class leisure was conducted in the public sphere, and thus could
be observed, as opposed to much middle and upper class leisure which occurred in
private, as this Punch cartoon from 1900 hints toward.
55 Jose Harris, ‘The Transition to High Politics in English Social Policy 1880-1914’ in M. Bentley and
J. Stevenson, High and Low Politics in Modern Britain (Oxford, 1983), p. 61.
56 Ross McKibbon, The Ideologies of Class: Social Relations in Britain 1880-1950 (Oxford, 1990), p.
140.
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Figure 2: Punch, 27 June 1900.
The cartoon illustrates the manner in which ‘gentlemen’ could drink at home from
their cellar and highlights their subsequent moral concern as somewhat duplicitous
and hypocritical. Many groups and individuals were defined solely by what they
drank, where they drank and how much they consumed. As Roberts has argued,
‘styles of alcohol consumption, drinking and not drinking were an integral part of
individual and group identity and thus one of the focal points around which social and
cultural conflict revolved’.57
57 James S. Roberts, Drink, Temperance and the Working Class in Nineteenth Century Germany
(George Allen and Unwin, 1984), pp. 1-2.
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If one is to understand why the working class was indelibly associated with
drink it is necessary to investigate working class social habits to see if historical
evidence supports the widespread perceptions of the period. If a pervasive
discrepancy is apparent between the two, this can inform us about the manner in
which the drink debate was based more upon presupposition than actual fact. This is a
difficult task but one aided by the excellent work of other historians, such as Andrew
Davies, who have written at length on working class culture and leisure during this
period. In the introduction to his book Leisure, Gender and Poverty: Working Class
Cultures in Salford and Manchester, 1900-1939, Davies notes that the British working
class is ‘encumbered with a historical mythology’ that has created a ‘vivid set of
images of a traditional working class peopled by cloth capped, fish and chip eating,
pub going, football watching working men, taking holidays in Blackpool’.58 For
stereotypes and mythologies to prosper there must be a certain element of truth in
them, but Davies argues that working class leisure was much more varied than
contemporary investigation and perceptions suggested. It is essential to look beyond
these longstanding historical mythologies in order to make a judgement as to the
validity of criticisms of the workingman. Once this has been analysed we can explore
how these debates influenced the discussions that occurred during the war and how
they impacted upon the world of the public house.
Class is an integral facet of British society, yet it is difficult to comprehend
and has its own idiosyncrasies. It surrounds us yet remains elusive to sound definition.
It can take many forms, as Stein Ringen recently commented:
What is peculiar to Britain is not the reality of the class system and its
continuing existence but class psychology: the preoccupation with class, the
belief in class and the symbols of class in manners, dress and language. This
58 Andrew Davies, Leisure, Gender and Poverty: Working Class Cultures in Salford and Manchester,
1900-1939 (Buckingham, 1992), p. viii.
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thing they have with class is a sign of closed minds and it is this which is
difficult for a stranger to grasp in the British mentality.59
An awareness of class was central to Edwardian society. Class was a constant and real
concern dictating, consciously and unconsciously, to a great extent how people
behaved and thought. As J.B. Priestley, in his book The Edwardians, reflected:
Unless they happened to turn themselves into good gardeners, footmen or
maids, the common working people must be kept in their place and out of
mischief! Give them more leisure and more money and God knows what they
might get up to! This prejudice was as strong among all but the best of the
middle class as it was among the nobility and gentry. There was a vicious
circle here. Many workers were brutalised by long hours, unhealthy
conditions, low wages, bad housing. Their social superiors had only to assume
they were all like that, not the victims but somehow the creation of their
environment, to declare then with a clear conscience that anything better
would be wasted on such people. Though it survived as a joke, it was said
quite seriously at first that if baths were installed in their houses these people
would only keep coal in them. Edwardian England, and indeed the England
that survived him, had many severe economic problems, but there is no doubt
in my mind that they were complicated and bedevilled by a class system and a
class feeling.60
Clear class boundaries existed not only between the upper and middle class but also
between the working and middle class, as Stephen Reynolds, who had lived in the
house of a Devonshire fisherman, argued: ‘The poor and the middle class are different
in kind as well as degree. More different than the poor and the aristocrat. Their
civilisations are not two stages of the same civilisation, but two civilisations, two
traditions.’61 British society was mesmerised by class and class structure, as Robert
Roberts, whose autobiography is an excellent source for the student of working class
culture, recalled:
Whatever new urges might have roved abroad in early Edwardian England,
millions among the poor still retained the outlook and thought patterns
imposed by their Victorian mentors. For them the Twentieth Century had not
begun. Docilely they accepted a steady decline in living standards and went on
wishing for nothing more than to be respectful and respected in the eyes of
59 Quoted by David Cannadine, Class in Britain (New Haven and London, 1998), p. ix.
60 J.B. Priestley, The Edwardians (London, 1970), p. 78.
61 Harold Wright, Population (Cambridge, 1923), p. 159.
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man. For them the working class caste structure stood natural, complete and
inviolate.62
Class differences manifested themselves in many ways. For instance, the manner in
which people spent their leisure time was an important indicator in determining social
status.
Increasingly standardised and regularised work patterns brought new
opportunities for relaxation to many people who had previously been unable to afford,
or even have, leisure time. More free time was made available by the provision of
bank holidays and the opportunity of cheap excursions due to developing transport
networks, which precipitated an unprecedented increase in the number of individuals
seeking pleasure.63 This fostered the development of new businesses and leisure
destinations, such as pleasure resorts like Blackpool, aimed at tapping working class
expendable income. Leisure itself had become an industry requiring heavy capital
investment and astute management with a clear consumer market. Aside from the
more ‘traditional’ uniform working class leisure pursuits believed to be orientated
solely around the public house, evidence suggests that a variety of local leisure
pursuits existed within various communities. Davies stresses the continued utilisation
of more ‘nineteenth century’ entertainments such as street markets, parades, bands,
street cultures and ‘doorstep leisure’ into the twentieth century, which accompanied
the more obvious leisure pursuits.64 The upper and middle class’ contention that drink
and sex were the only leisure pursuits pursued with vigour by the working class was
clearly wrong.
Gender and age variables also played a key role in forming leisure choices.
Every family and individual was subject to different limiting factors but evidence
62 Robert Roberts, The Classic Slum (Manchester, 1971), p. 16.
63 J. Walvin, Leisure and Society, p. 76.
64 See A. Davies, Leisure, Gender and Poverty, pp. 116-141.
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suggests that more leisure activities were enjoyed by the lower ranks of society than
had ever been taken before, or at least more discernible and conspicuous leisure.
Changing leisure patterns and the development of more ‘rational recreations’ did not
bring an end to the popularity of drink within the working class. ‘The friendly mug of
beer,’ as Charles Booth remarked, remained ‘the primordial cell of British social
life’.65 Yet Peter Bailey has argued that ‘with certain gross exceptions drink was
becoming more of an incidental social lubricant and less of a total experience’.66 This
may have been the case but drinking remained a tempting and alluring pastime. Drink
was built into the fabric of social life playing a part in nearly every public and private
ceremony, commercial bargain and craft ritual.67 It was crucial in creating the
construction of identity as well as a means of bonding, and consolidating, social
networks.68 At most public and family occasions it was customary to indulge in
alcohol and remains so to this day. Roberts recalled the role that the pub played in his
local community:
To the great mass of manual workers the local public house spelled paradise.
Many small employers of labour still paid out their weekly wages there. In the
main fetid dens, they held an attraction with which nothing in present day
society can quite compare. After the squalor from which so many men came
there dwelt within a tavern all one could crave for – warmth, bright lights,
music, song, comradeship, the smiling condescension of a landlady, large and
bosomy, forever sexually unattainable, true, but one could dream.69
The pub was thus the focal point of much community life during this period, a place
for contemplation, escape, fellowship, entertainment and social discourse unavailable
in other premises. Like today, it existed as a place to spend those individual and
communal moments of respite from the daily grind of life. In 1904, Arthur Sherwell, a
temperance advocate and author, reluctantly conceded that for a long time ‘the
65 P. Bailey, Leisure and Class in Victorian Britain, p. 10.
66 Ibid. p. 174.
67 Virginia Berridge, ‘Why Alcohol is legal and other drugs are not’, History Today, May 2004, p. 18.
68 J. Burnett, Liquid Pleasures: A Social History of Drinks in Modern Britain (Routledge, 1999), p. 45.
69 R. Roberts, The Classic Slum, pp. 93-94.
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opportunity for enjoyment of social and friendly intercourse open to a very large
portion of the community has centred in the public houses.’70
The public house was also the principal everyday setting for other leisure
experiences aside from drinking. It played host to a variety of games and local clubs
and was an institution central to neighbourhood life, the heart of a multitude of daily
and weekly routines and social rituals. Rowntree, in his own investigation, made
reference to the ‘social attractiveness’ of many pubs he viewed.71 Historical
investigation therefore suggests that social drinking was often more of an
accompaniment to other leisure activities as opposed to the sum total of the working
class leisure experience.
Although the social experiences available within the confines of the public
house varied greatly, the power of association meant that time spent within a pub was
automatically assumed to have been spent imbibing alcohol. As Lady Florence Bell
somewhat pessimistically warned after conducting an investigation of Middlesbrough:
‘as long as the public houses are practically the centres of social life of the workmen,
as long as they are the most accessible places in which he can spend his leisure, it is
difficult to see how drinking is likely to be lessened to any great extent’.72 The pub
was thus portrayed as the breeding ground of the slothful workingman.
Other working class leisure pursuits were irrevocably linked with alcohol
consumption. For example, the music hall had evolved from within the public house,
with most early proprietors being in the wines and spirit trade, and drinking remained
a central facet of a night’s entertainment at many a musical venue. At the height of its
popularity in the years before the First World War, the music hall industry in Britain
70 Arthur Sherwell, The Drink Peril in Scotland, (London, 1904), p. 44.
71 B. Seebohm Rowntree, Poverty: A Study of Town Life, p. 312.
72 Lady Florence Bell, At the Works: A Study of a Manufacturing Town (London, 1907), p. 246.
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entertained 25 million people a year and employed 80,000.73 The music hall by this
point had succeeded in cutting across class boundaries. Temperance activists still
sought to eliminate drinking from these venues. Time spent in distinct leisurely spaces
was consequently subject to certain pejorative connotations often related to the social
class into which the individual fitted.74
Within Britain there was a clear demarcation between places of leisure that
were suitable for each respective class. Social exclusivity prevailed. Mixed audiences
occurred at certain venues of entertainment. In music halls, and later cinemas,
differing ticket prices for certain seating areas enforced class distinctions. Roberts’s
account of the classic slum makes reference to the social reputation and exclusivity of
certain pubs within his locale: ‘as if by natural order each establishment had its status
rating over and above the social gradations to be found within a house itself’.75 Even
within pubs social divisions clearly existed. As Roberts related, ‘workers other than
craftsmen would be frozen or flatly ordered out of the rooms where the journeymen
gathered. Each part of the tavern had its status rating, indeed ‘‘he’s only a tap room
man’’ stood as a common slur’.76 Class, space and presumed behaviour were all
interlinked in the Edwardian leisure experience.
The working class leisure experience was never celebrated by the middle class
but remained the constant subject of reformers’ suspicions. However, limits to this
type of social investigation existed. The vast majority of investigators were from a
non-working class background. The likelihood of being able to construct a full
appreciation of the typical working class experience, if one had never truly
73 Paul Maloney, Scotland and the Music Hall 1850-1914 (Manchester University Press, 2003), p. 1.
74 This can particularly be seen with the material produced concerning women who drank in pubs.
75 R. Roberts, The Classic Slum, p. 94.
76 Ibid. p. 6.
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experienced it, was slim.77 Judgement was thus skewed. As Noel Buxton and Walter
Hoare, despite pontificating upon the social ills brought upon society by the pub,
confessed: ‘to most of us the public house is as little known as China.’78 To many,
working class culture remained hidden, somewhat alien, potentially dangerous and
subversive. The social background of many politicians from the period mirrored this
disassociation from the working class life. Lines of status were clearly demarcated
and hard to breach, as Lady Florence Bell readily admitted:
It is probable that any human being attempting to describe the life of another
will only approximate to representing that life as it appears to the person
described. A good deal of guessing will always remain to be done, and at the
end we may not know whether we have guessed right – whether we have
understood or misunderstood.79
Despite their inadequacies, however, these texts were seized upon by reformers as
being representative of the necessity of social reform.
The prevalence of the music hall and the popularity of seaside holidays
indicates the existence of new working class social experiences but these indicators
were not immediately recognised by all social observers. Gareth Stedman Jones, for
example, has argued that it was only at the beginning of the twentieth century, in
London at least, that middle class observers began to realise that the working class
was not without culture or morality, but in fact possessed a culture of its own.80
Concurrently this was also an admission of defeat. By acknowledging the continued
prevalence of working class drinking, the middle class accepted the failure of their
attempts to regulate working class behaviour. For the observer it proved much easier
77 This is a problem for the historian who often has to deal with sources ideologically antipathetic to
working class life.
78 Noel Buxton and Walter Hoare ‘Temperance Reform’ in C.F.G. Masterman, The Heart of the
Empire: Discussions of Problems of Modern City Life in England, With an Essay on Imperialism (First
Published London, 1901) Reprinted, Editor and Introduction by Bentley Gilbert (Brighton, 1973) p.
171.
79 Lady Florence Bell, At the Works, p. 272.
80 See G. Stedman-Jones, ‘Working Class Culture and Working Class Politics in London 1870-1900:
Notes on the Remaking of a Working Class’, Journal of Social History, Vol. 7, Summer 1973-1974.
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to believe the stereotype and predetermined judgement than investigate the reality of
the situation.
The belief that the public house was now the sole preserve of the working
classes gained impetus due to subtle changes in consumer behaviour. The
development of bottled beer and off licenses meant that the middle and upper classes
were less inclined to drink in the pub as they could drink and entertain in the home.
Harrison maintains that as early as 1850 ‘no respectable urban Englishmen entered an
ordinary public house’.81 Clubs for a more discerning customer emerged. As Algy
Burke, Secretary of White’s club in London, proudly declared in 1896: ‘The West
Enders (I am speaking of my own class) are not attracted to the public house . . . the
class I deal with and the class I associate with and the class I know do not go into
public houses’.82 By 1910 many brewers, retailers and commentators had noticed ‘a
change of fashion towards off consumption’, matched by the increased sales of
bottled beer.83 For example, at the London brewery of Whitbread and Co bottled beer
accounted for 58 per cent of gross sales in 1914.84 Medical, religious, social and class
based attacks on drunkenness formed a conglomeration of criticisms which
diminished the allure of being drunk.
Working class leisure habits seemed to reconfirm class preconceptions already
present amongst social observers. The pub was the principal leisure centre of the
working classes and attracted their business more so than any other class. This does
not mean that other classes did not frequent the pub but that they were less likely to
do so. This perception made it easy to draw conclusions about the type of social
problems which afflicted the class as a whole. As Davies argues, ‘most observers
81 B. Harrison, Drink and the Victorians, p. 46.
82 M. Girouard. Victorian Pubs, p. 12.
83 D. Gutzke, Protecting the Pub, p. 45.
84 Ibid. p. 45.
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simply took the question of participation in leisure for granted, assuming that the
presence of working people in beerhouses and music hall . . . was evidence of the
behaviour of an entire class’.85 The working class drunk served to reconfirm cultural
and class presuppositions about the character of the working class as a whole. This
was a stereotype easily created and accepted with relative ease, and, on occasion, with
peculiar glee.
The definition of deviant behaviour relies upon someone providing that
definition. As Stanley Cohen observed, ‘a social problem consists not only of a fixed
and given condition but the perception and definition by certain people that this
condition poses a threat which is against their interests and that something should be
done about it.’86 Those interested in tackling drink had defined the problem, or at least
the debate surrounding the issue, for many years. In order for the perception of threat
to gain currency the message has to be promulgated or held sufficiently for it to gain
credence. As working class public leisure supposedly centred on the pub it was easy
to blame inefficiency upon the activities taking place within the premises. As Noel
Buxton and Walter Hoare said of the public house, ‘probably no single institution was
ever so much spoken against, or so little spoken about’.87
As part of this increased interest in the pub a new consensus emerged from
medical men, Royal Commissions, social workers, housing reformers, educationalists
and labour leaders that all British people shared a common social citizenship. The
Edwardian period witnessed an attempt to bring the notion of an ‘organic’ society
closer to reality, which lent itself to the increasing ‘medicalisation’ of the drink
problem. In 1898 the state codified its conception of alcoholics as patients with the
Second Habitual Drunkards Act which gave magistrates the power to commit
85 A. Davies, Leisure, Gender and Poverty, p. 168.
86 S. Cohen, Images of Deviance (Harmondsworth, 1971), p. 14.
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‘criminal’ inebriates to special reformatories.88 Health professionals postulated that
drinking was not just a pernicious social habit but also a disease that required specific
scientific research. Previously medical opinion had erred in favour of drink with
moderate doses of alcohol being seen as beneficial to overall health. Medical opinion,
though, gradually changed, facilitated by a group of professionals who viewed alcohol
with disdain on medical grounds. By 1904 the Society for the Study of Inebriety had
over 270 doctors as members.89 Indeed, several leading medical doctors, who shared
many assumptions regarding the use of alcohol, contributed to the Physical
Deterioration Report of 1904 which linked female insobriety with high rates of infant
mortality.90 The report stated: ‘the committee are convinced that the abuse of
alcoholic stimulants is a most potent and deadly agent of physical deterioration.’91
If Britain was to breed enough fit children to ensure the survival of Empire,
this situation could no longer continue. Founded amongst fears concerning the future
of the nation’s youth, this progressive coalition argued that drink was a contagion
affecting the health of the nation and, in social darwinist terms, an identifiable
representation of weakness. As Lord Roseberry summarised, ‘a drink sodden
population . . . is not the true basis of a prosperous Empire’.92 It was believed that if
the British nation was to fulfil her civilising mission, such an illness would have to be
eradicated, as would the inefficiencies of the ‘drinking class’. Even the treatment
received by criminals incarcerated for drink offences showed a shift away from a
88 The Reformatories proved to be generally unsuccessful. Only 12 were ever built and during their
existence they dealt with 4590 inmates compared with 250,000 prison committals annually in the UK
for drunkenness. Nevertheless in 1909 a Departmental Committee still advocated some means of
removing chronic drunkards who were a ‘source of social disorder and social contamination.’ See
David Smith, ‘Drinking and Imprisonment in Late Victorian and Edwardian Scotland’, Histoire
Sociale/Social History Volume 17, 1986, pp. 161-176.
89 D. Gutzke, ‘The Cry of the Children’, p. 74.
90 See D. Gutzke, ‘The Cry of the Children’, pp. 71-84.
91 P. Snowden, Socialism and the Drink Question, p. 8.
92 David Wright and Cathy Chorniawry, ‘Women and Drink in Edwardian England’, Historical
Papers/Communication Historiques, (Canada) 1985, p. 124.
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purely punitive to a medical approach, fostered by an increased appreciation of the
wider societal forces operating on drunkards before they came before the police
magistrates.93 By the Edwardian era the influence of the state was recognised as a
means to help the individual overcome his or her own debilitating habit to ensure
continued national prosperity.
These changes were echoed politically by the transition from old Gladstonian
Liberalism to New Liberalism. Aimed at alleviating the physical deficiencies of the
lower orders of society, the welfare legislation of 1906-1911 was an unprecedented
development in national social policy. In providing old age pensions, unemployment
insurance, and national health insurance, the British government undertook for the
first time to make payments to the poor as a right of citizenship. At the heart of this
Liberalism lay a hatred of the very idea of drunkenness. The ‘mechanical potentiality’
of the state had finally been demonstrated; the question seemed to be where would it
stop?
Increasingly interventionist policy ran counter to the traditional nonconformist
attitude to the drink question. Although nonconformity still exerted some influence
over Edwardian society it had declined in importance since the 1890s and this
acceptance of societal responsibility merely hastened its demise. Nonconformist
thought articulated the personal morality required to abstain from alcohol; temperance
thus remained a moral issue absolved from any notion of requisite social amelioration.
Drunkenness was seen as an all-explaining evil which led to a multitude of other sins
rather than as the possible outcome or manifestation of social conditions.94 Notions of
the medicalisation of the problem were anathema to traditional nonconformists who
continued to believe that drinking was indisputably sinful. The drink debate had
93 See D. Smith, ‘Drinking and Imprisonment in Late Victorian and Edwardian Scotland’, pp. 161-176.
94 W.R. Lambert, Drink and Sobriety in Victorian Wales, p. 154.
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progressed, however, and nonconformist beliefs were subsequently left behind, only
relevant to a few, who, nevertheless, retained a certain degree of influence within
British politics.
The question must be asked what was the point of the temperance movement
when so much of its ideology was now incorporated into the agenda of social
reformers? When Sir Wilfred Lawson, President of the UKA, lost his seat in the
election of October 1900 he declared ‘there is nothing whatever in the result of the
election which needs to cause the Temperance Party any discouragement’.95 He was,
like most defeated politicians, wrong. The temperance movement as a political
organisation was subsumed under other political parties developing social reform
agenda. Attempts to end the ideological paralysis which handicapped the movement
failed.96 Arguments concerning drink were now transmitted to a population willing to
engage with different views about social reform. In newspapers much greater
attention was given to wider social questions precipitated by a vast increase in the
number of readers and contributors to the national press. The period 1881-1911 saw a
quadrupling of the newspaper reading public, together with an increase in the number
of journalists, authors and editors.97 All the leading newspapers gave extended
coverage to community issues and engaged in constructive debate as to how problems
could be resolved. Nevertheless, social investigations ensured that drink remained at
the forefront of contemporary discussion. Various governments and politicians of
every persuasion believed they could resolve the issue. Attention must now focus on
these attempts.
95 G.P. Williams and G.T. Broke, Drinking in Great Britain, p. 13.
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The 1896 Royal Commission on Liquor Licensing marks a watershed in the
history of the drink problem. It was established to consider the operation and
administration of licensing laws and to suggest modifications if required. This was a
narrow remit yet one which offered an opportunity for the trade to present their views
and demonstrate their willingness for reform. It also allowed the temperance
movement, despite an evident split between prohibitionists and restrictionists, to again
elucidate upon the evils of drink. The Royal Commission was a public demonstration
that progress towards the resolution of the ‘drink problem’ was in the interests of all
parties and of society in general. However, behind this public demonstration of
progressive intent lay the harsh realities of political stagnation and calculation. The
government committed to nothing by establishing the commission but could point
towards possible improvement whilst the commission was sitting. The composition of
the commission, with eight temperance reformers, eight representatives of the trade
and eight neutrals to give each body a fair hearing, seems predisposed to eventual
disagreement since neither side was going to abandon their principles completely and
subjugate themselves to the whim of the opposition. The commission provides a neat
illustration of the complexities involved in the drink question. After three years, 259
witnesses, 74,451 oral questions at a cost of £7,880 17s. 10d., the commission
produced nine volumes of evidence, but was split into two opposed factions, who met
in separate rooms and produced two divergent and partially contradictory reports.98
These reports escalated disagreement as opposed to creating a settlement. One of the
most extensive official inquiries undertaken in Britain had ended in a fudge with no
clear resolution evident.
98 See J. Greenaway, Drink and British Politics since 1830: A Study in Policy Making, pp. 59-68 for an
assessment of the political significance of the reports.
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The Royal Commission is representative of the trend toward increasing
governmental and societal investigation and inquiry into the drink problem. In the
Majority Report, signed by seventeen participants, eight directly concerned with the
trade, they concluded that ‘it is undeniable that a gigantic evil remains to be remedied
and hardly any sacrifice would be too great which would result in a marked
diminution of this national degradation’.99 The stage had been reached when even the
trade, whose livelihoods depended on the sale of liquor, was at least willing to admit
that some reform was required, another example of the general shift in the debate
towards greater regulation and a greater public acceptance of social responsibility. As
The Times reported in 1901 ‘other social questions occasionally slumber and die, but
the Temperance question never rests . . . the general current of public opinion – so far
as it can be gauged – seems rather in favour of doing something’.100
Licensing legislation, however, was patchy and modest in its scope. The
Licensing Act of 1902 changed the laws on drunkenness, improved the machinery of
licensing, brought all ‘off’ licenses under the magistrates’ control and registered
clubs. In the debate considering the Bill, Charles Tritton, a Conservative, told the
House of Commons:
I am an advocate for a sober nation. I know what a sober nation means. It
means less sin and sorrow, less crime and cruelty, less pain and poverty, less
ruin and wreckage. It means happier hearts and homes, and it means a people
more fitted to cope successfully with those imperial responsibilities which
whether we like them or not, are slowly but surely falling on this Empire.101
The bill indicates the growing trend towards the control of the drink trade in line with
improving national efficiency.
In 1904 another Licensing Act established a compensation fund to pay off
publicans whose licenses were not renewed by local magistrates financed by a levy on
99 G.P. Williams and G.T. Broke, Drink in Great Britain, p. 6.
100 The Times 31 August 1901.
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every licensed house. This stemmed from magistrates’ tendency to deny pubs a
licence on the basis that they were seen as a corrupting social influence. However, the
compensation fund was limited; thereby the number of licenses which the justices
could reject was, by default, also limited. The Kennedy judgement established a
precedent for generous compensation two or three times greater than the Inland
Revenue had anticipated, thus further limiting the potential of the licensing act, and
aiding publicans as they often received more than the actual pub was worth. This
pseudo protection of the trade, as temperance activists saw it, under the guise of
temperance legislation, resulted in the temperance movement opposing the
measure.102
Licensing reductions were now official government policy but in the years
1905-1909 only one thousand licenses, two thirds of them beerhouses, were revoked
annually.103 The dearer the pub the higher the compensation and so the figure fell to
nine hundred annually between 1910-1914.104 Paradoxically the Act, rather than
punish drink sellers, aided publicans in getting rid of unprofitable pubs. It is
unsurprising then that the trade confirmed its support for the Unionist cause. In
December 1905 the Licensed Trade News commented ‘the trade cannot . . . cast off its
allegiance to a party which has been just, fair and equitable in its attitude’.105
The 1906 ‘Liberal landslide’ general election, which saw the pro-trade Tories
receive a bloody nose, benefited the temperance cause. At this point Henry Carter,
later a prominent member of the CCB, began to immerse himself in the study of
Licensing Law.106 In 1908 a controversial Licensing Act was proposed, which sought
102 See D. Fahey, ‘Temperance and the Liberal Party – Lord Peel’s Report 1899’, The Journal of British
Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, May 1971, pp. 132-159.
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to reform the 1904 bill. This measure restricted compensation, accelerated and
expanded licensing reduction in order to reduce the number of licensed premises by a
third, raised licence fees and permitted local referenda on licensing options. The
House of Lords eventually rejected the legislation. The trade was thus able to present
itself as an industry hounded by an unrelenting movement intent on running it down.
In response, it organised protests in London against the Bill. This proposed legislation
was justified by the great increase in the number of licenses in the late nineteenth
century, which encouraged the viewpoint amongst temperance and religious leaders,
magistrates, police constables and doctors that more licenses had merely encouraged
rampant insobriety.107 The bill was so controversial that The Times reported that
‘clearly the heart of the people is stirred as it can be stirred neither by religion nor
patriotism nor tariff reform, nor even by Chinese slavery nor by anything but beer.’108
The trade’s feeling of persecution was compounded by the 1909 budget which greatly
increased licence duties.109 But were these concerns over drinking valid in light of a
consideration of falling alcohol consumption during the period 1900-1910?
Both a long and short-term decline are evident, despite drink prices remaining
relatively constant between 1870-1914 with beer at 2 1/2d a pint, spirits averaging 3s
4d a pint (proof) and wine averaging 3d a pint.110 Per capita consumption from 1875
to 1913 declined with regard to beer by 17 per cent, spirits by 46 per cent and wines
by 53 per cent. In the short term, The Statist calculated that between 1900 and 1908
per capita consumption of beer fell by 18.2 per cent.111 Hardened drinkers, who
exhibited the battle scars of excessive over exuberance and were often laid low by
alcoholism or cirrhosis of the liver, were 13 per cent less prevalent in 1914 than in the
107 D. Gutzke, Protecting the Pub, p. 45.
108 The Times 4 April 1908.
109 D. Gutzke, Protecting the Pub, pp. 173-174.
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early 1880s.112 This suggests a decline in sustained drinking in the late nineteenth
century but an overall trend of declining consumption is especially evident in the
years leading up to the war. From 1900-1904 per capita consumption of beer in
gallons was 30.2, from 1905-1909 27.3, declining even further from 1910-1913 to
26.9.113 A Parliamentary Paper issued prior to the budget in 1909 stated that ‘The
diminishing consumption of alcoholic liquors, though to some extent attributable to
the recent depression in trade is principally the result of a continuing change in the
habits of the people which has been in progress for some time and seems likely to be
permanent.’114 The people themselves were evidently rendering the necessity of
government intervention redundant.
The pub also faced increased competition from new centres of leisure
encouraged by the influence of ‘non institutionalised’ temperance. Counter
attractions, a concept, or at least a terminology, that originated in the temperance
movement, proved to be increasingly popular in a world in which service capitalism
was prospering. As Austen Chamberlain commented in his budget speech of 1905:
I think the mass of our people are beginning to find other ways of expending
some proportion of the time and money which used previously to be spent in
the public house. No change has been more remarkable in the habits of the
people than the growing attendance in the last fifteen years at outdoor games
and sports and large places of public entertainment like theatres, music halls
and so forth, which, though not conducted on strictly temperance lines, do not
lend themselves to the consumption of drink or offer it as their chief attraction.
Again the extension of cheap railway fares and the enormous growth in cheap
excursions absorb a further portion of the money which used to be formerly
spent on drink.115
In 1912 one Brewery Chairman, David Faber of Strong of Ramsey, concluded that
‘the times are different – your old toper who would sit in the public house until
112 D. Gutzke, ‘Rhetoric and reality: The Political Influence of British Brewers 1832-1914’,
Parliamentary History, Vol. 9, part 1, 1990, p. 98.
113 T.R. Gourvish and R.G. Wilson, The British Brewing Industry, p. 30.
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closing time is gradually dying out and is not being replaced. Popular amusements,
such as picture shows, have multiplied.’116 It is clear that the pub was no longer the
sole social pursuit of the working class male, albeit the pub and drinking remained an
adjunct to other social pleasures.
The increased reduction of licenses was also a longer-term trend. From 1886
to 1914 the number of on-licenses fell from 104,792 to 88,445 whilst the population
had increased by 44 per cent from 1881 to 1911.117 Liberal attitudes, as Leonard
Hobhouse expressed in 1911, saw an ‘obvious and elementary duty (on the part of the
state) to remove the sources of temptation and to treat as antisocial in the highest
degree every attempt to make profit out of human weakness, misery and wrong
doing.’118 ‘This argument’, he added, ‘went beyond the problem of drink, it applies to
all cases where overwhelming impulse is apt to master the will’.119 It was argued by
Liberal progressives that the state, by allowing the opening of multiple hostelries, had
vastly increased working class temptation. Gutzke has argued that this attitude
‘derived from convictions of inferior working class morality and of drinkers’ impaired
powers of resistance’.120 This opinion was popular with temperance activists who
often recounted the tale of the poor woman who complained ‘I can get my husband,
sir, past two public houses, but I cannot get him past twenty.’121 These restrictive
measures were not always successful, however, as shown by the failure of the 1908
act.
In the 1900s, due to the restrictive tendencies of successive governments, a
‘scramble for licensed property’ resulted. As the number of licenses was reduced their
116 Ibid. p. 307.
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commercial value increased and larger breweries began to buy up smaller houses to
ensure their retention of commercial dominance. Many breweries, following the
example set by Guinness in 1886, floated their companies. After all, a brewer could
not make much money if there were no pubs willing to sell his produce. This became
known as the ‘tied house system’ which began due to Justices of the Peace demanding
improvements in premises before they would grant a licence. So great was the desire
to secure pubs that one shareholder conceded in 1888 ‘there had been a tremendous
run upon free houses and in the course of a short time there would scarcely be a house
worth buying in the market’.122 Time proved him correct. By 1900, 75 per cent pubs
were ‘tied houses’. By 1914 this figure had increased to 90 per cent.123 The trade was
becoming increasingly centralised, with larger brewers exhibiting monopolistic
tendencies that gave little credence to their proclamations of acting in the public
interest. A reputation for greed, above all due to the trade’s actions during this
licensed property boom, was hard to deny.124 In tough times brewers and the new
influx of businessmen in the trade had responded to protect their business by acting in
an efficient and rational manner in response to the unpredictable consumer market of
the time. This in turn placed obligations on brewers to make pubs more hospitable in
order to attract a more diverse clientele. This centralisation of the trade went further
with unprecedented amalgamation and merger amongst brewers. The number of
brewers from 1880-1914 fell by 44 per cent whilst average output increased by 130
per cent.125
As a result of the decline in consumption this period also witnessed a
prominent decline in sales and decreased spending on alcohol. From over 15 per cent
122 A. Crawford and R. Thorne, Birmingham Pubs 1890-1930 (Birmingham, 1975), p. 4.
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of total working class family expenditure at the crest in 1876, spending on drink
declined to under 9 per cent in 1910. Popular beers such as Burton pale ale also
suffered. The early 1900s witnessed a yearly decline in sales, by 4 per cent in 1900-
1901, 3 per cent in 1901-1902, and 7 per cent in 1904-1905. By 1910 sales had fallen
by 40 per cent across the decade, to well under half their early 1880s peak.126 Bass
saw its sales fall by over 26 per cent during 1902-1910. As the Brewers’ Journal
commented in 1910 ‘the year just closed will undoubtedly go down in history as the
blackest without exception in the annals of the brewing and licensed trade’.127
This decline suggests that brewery profits were hit hard, but the work of T.R.
Gourvish and R.G. Wilson has uncovered an interesting paradox of sluggish output
and sales yet rising profits for the larger breweries. The decline of private brewing
meant that consequent output figures of the industry understated the growth potential
for common or commercial brewers since their total market increased from rather less
than eight million barrels in 1830 to almost thirty million by 1900. Secondly, by 1914,
although there were still around 1100 breweries, the industry was dominated by only
54, which were turning out more than a hundred times the minimum threshold
qualification for a commercial brewery, 1000 barrels. Financially then, the trade was
not in absolutely dire straits as the industry offered continued financial rewards.
Management strategy was the decisive factor in determining a brewery’s overall
success and profitability.128
Falling consumption and sales precipitated a growing sense amongst some
progressive brewers that customer’s tastes were changing and that they expected a
pub to provide more than just drink. As Sydney Neville, a brewer with reformist
inclinations, commented:
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I became more and more concerned at the evidence of drunkenness and
disorder which was too often obvious at ‘turning out time’ and I began to
understand the depth of prejudice against the Trade which had led the social
workers to propound their policy of prohibition as the only solution. I also
appreciated the force of the criticism, becoming more and more general, of the
low average standard of public houses in working class districts and of their
failure to supply a more varied range of refreshments. My conviction grew
that unless the trade could improve the general standard of these houses,
prejudice was justifiable; and that higher standards and better surroundings
would themselves encourage sobriety.129
To gain custom publicans relied upon generous measures, exhibited by the emergence
of the ‘long pull’.130 This encouraged new notions of progressive intent. As Neville
continued:
There was a growing opinion that the public houses ought to cater for the
supply of other refreshments beside beer and spirits, and should be suitable for
women and perhaps children. However the extreme temperance party
vigorously and usually successfully opposed any attempt to improve the
standards of service; they were still alleging that ‘‘the best public house is the
worst public house.’’ . . . By improving our houses and our services we stood
to attract new customers and broaden the basis of our trade. I was convinced
that the brewers needed a constructive instead of a defensive policy, that it was
foolish and indeed wrong to wait for attack and never put forward alternative
proposals.131
Neville may have been writing through hazy hindsight, but his work indicates the
reformist inclination in the drink trade. When interaction between classes occurred,
the middle class reforming instinct proliferated. Associations aimed at reforming the
public house had formed in the early 1900s. For example, in May 1901, Albert Henry
Grey, 4th Earl Grey, founded the Public House Trust Company in Northumberland,
which eventually became the Central Public House Trust Association covering the
whole country. The trust maintained that ‘a public house as a social institution is a
public necessity, and that consequently it is desirable to convert it as far as possible
from a mere drinking bar into a well conducted club.’132 Another successful reforming
129 Sydney Neville, Seventy Rolling Years (London, 1958), p. 64.
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131 S. Neville, Seventy Rolling Years, p. 67.
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association was the ‘People’s Refreshment Houses Association’ (PRHA) which
acquired existing licensees and reformed them by providing temperance drinks and
food as well as beer under the management of a public trust. By 1907 the PRHA had
reformed 233 premises. In 1909 the True Temperance Association (TTA) was formed
with the same intent on reforming the public house. Each of these organisations
shared a common belief that reform would premeditate an improvement in the
respectability of those using the pub.
Changing consumer tastes were reflected by the ready availability of non-
alcoholic drinks in pubs. By the 1890s most pubs offered food as well as Bovril, tea,
coffee and ginger beer alongside alcoholic drinks. Prior to the First World War tea
consumption rose from 6.07lb per person per year in 1900 to 6.89lb in 1914 with tea
imports increasing by 160 per cent over the period 1870-1913.133 It was sufficiently
realistic to understand that the function of the pub was not just to sell alcohol. As
Hepple Hall noted in 1878:
Persons in the humbler walks and occupations of life, who were not habitual
drunkards were often compelled to frequent the public house because in this
class of establishment alone were supplied the ordinary and natural cravings
for society, the news of the day, and a place where they could pass a sociable
hour.134
The competition for working class expenditure was increasingly fierce. For example,
the amount of money spent on tobacco increased from £13.5 million in 1870 to £42
million by 1914.135 Alternatives to drink were increasing and counter attractions were
having a clear affect on social habit.
All did not bode well for the licensed trade. Declining consumption, slightly
tempered by a small recovery from 1910-1913, according to some statistics, brought
about, according to Dingle, by an increase in wages, a falling number of licenses and
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a hostile taxation policy, suggest that the brewing industry was struggling and faced a
fight for its future.136 Falling beer consumption, together with excessive investment in
licensed properties, served to create a depression in the industry further serving to
accentuate the tax burdens of 1904 and 1909. Drink consumption was still at
significantly lower levels than those experienced from 1870 onwards and absorbed a
much smaller proportion of total purchasing power than previously.137 The monetary
situation, as noted above, is more complex. These dark realities facing the trade did
not match the longstanding and moralistic perception perpetuated by the temperance
movement of the invidious brewer and publican facilitating the moral and physical
decline of the nation. As Gutzke contends, the trade had a ‘much vaunted but largely
illusory power’ brought about by a ‘certain amount of delusion on behalf of its
critics’.138 Nevertheless the trade, in fact, was a large contributor to the Treasury, with
almost one third of state revenue coming from alcohol taxation.139 As long as the
industry retained this economic power its future, however unstable, was almost
guaranteed.
Drinking as a social activity was undoubtedly becoming less popular.
Although history shows this decline, the perception of the time as propagated by
temperance and social reformers was that the trade was expanding its negative social
effect on society and exerting an unhealthy influence over certain political
organisations. This was represented by the prominent position of several leading
brewing magnates within the political parties. For example Asquith was married to
Margot Tennant of the Tennant’s brewing family. Society was apparently fixated by
insobriety and drunkenness. The two interpretations do not match up. The drink
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137 Ibid. p. 621.
138 D. Gutzke, ‘Rhetoric and Reality’, p. 98.
139 B. Harrison, Drink and the Victorians, p. 60.
62
problem was overblown and the foundations of moral panic established in the years
prior to the First World War. Within discussion of the issue assertion was much more
common than appreciation of hard fact.
Moralistic Victorians had viewed drinkers with great suspicion and this
showed little sign of abating in the Edwardian era. Moreover, the predominance of
teetotal sentiment, just as it had prejudiced collaborative temperance attempts
previously, still limited the potential of any temperance collaboration with the trade.
Leif Jones, a liberal M.P. and temperance activist, urged M.P.s not to forget the
lessons of the temperance movement when discussing the DORA (Amendment No. 3
Bill):
These societies have concentrated their attention upon the very problem which
is now engaging the house and whether you agree with their conclusions or
not at any rate, without prejudicing this question when it is necessary instantly
to deal with the problem, the house would do well not to disregard wholly the
experience of the temperance workers throughout the land during the last
seventy or eighty years.140
With war approaching, two prominent criticisms of alcohol use retained their
societal currency. The twin concerns of individual responsibility and the
responsibility of the state had become enmeshed into a universal hostility towards the
act of drinking, each with its own advocates, its own false prophets and its own
believers. Within this environment stereotypes favoured by the middle and upper
classes, together with the ideas of the temperance movement, prospered and ensured
that working class consumption was misunderstood, and tainted by misconceptions
which had little grounding in objective fact. It was easy to believe stories of
excessive drinking because they were commonly believed to be traits of the working
class - ‘the other’ which was unknown but whose social pursuits evidently legitimised
the criticisms made of them. The working class entered the war with their reputation
140 Hansard 10 May 1915.
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tainted by misperceptions. These misperceptions pervaded public opinion ensuring the
creation of an atmosphere conducive towards the introduction of reformist policy. The
drink problem was thus as much about class and perception of behaviour as about
drink itself. It was, to an extent, a middle class creation based around middle class
social mores. The true impact of the pre-war debate on drink can only truly be
appreciated when one considers the type of arguments that emerged concerning
alcohol when the war began. Only then can the impact of temperance ideology be
fully appreciated and assessed.
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Chapter Two: Vodka, Absinthe and Drunkenness on Britain’s Streets in 1914: A
Tale of Fear and Exaggeration?
The war began calmly. Readers of The Times were assured that stocks of
champagne in France were safe and that 1914 would be a very good year similar to
the year of the Franco Prussian war.1 The Wine Trade Review concurred, describing
the year as one of ‘exceptional quality’, adding that the vintage would have the
additional prestige of ‘the war year’.2 This relaxed attitude did not last. The onset of
conflict heralded the beginnings of a new epoch in the drink debate. Beer drinkers in
particular were in for a hard time. The early months of the war witnessed a renewal of
anti-drink campaigning and an escalating press interest in the issue. Letter pages were
filled by anxious correspondents distressed by continued drinking supposedly
indicative of a decline in moral standards on the home front. When war came the
language of moral virtue rang truer than ever.
Concentrating on the period of August 1914 to March 1915 this chapter will
consider the earliest political and social responses to the drink problem during the
war. The communal response to drinking will be evaluated in the context of the
comparisons made between the abstinence efforts made by both France and Russia
and how this affected societal anxiety over the problem. It will be argued that the
portrayal of the drink problem relied upon emerging totems of moral panic, such as
‘the drunken soldier’, and led to widespread fear mongering and the perception of a
national crisis during these months. It will be contended that simmering undercurrents
of hostility to drink emerged into the public sphere once more via these easily
communicated stereotypes, which aided the swift transfusion of anti-drink thought to
society at large. How groups, which had long been involved in the drink question,
1 G. DeGroot, Blighty: British Society in the Era of the Great War (London, 1996), p. 210.
2 The Wine Trade Review 15 August 1914.
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responded to this changing climate of intolerance will also be considered.
What had altered was the environment in which these opinions now circulated.
To the unforgiving eyes of national efficiency proponents, drinking was a paramount
cause of inefficiency and a threat to a nation at war. This view dictated that in a titanic
struggle each inhibiting factor had to be eliminated. Previously the drink issue had
been lying in wait, hiding in the shadows, emerging periodically to stalk society.
Within days of the outbreak of hostilities there was no hideaway where the problem
could continue to linger, as the beacon of national efficiency shone brighter, exposing
presumed social deficiencies for all to see.
The war shattered Britain’s sense of security. Renewed attention was focussed
from the outset upon the drink problem. The war was meant to be a renewal and an
exposition of the nation’s noble values but, instead, drunkenness brought uncertainty.
As drink was now a national issue, important to the national interest, debates
concerning alcohol garnered a much wider audience. To be sure, temperance
advocates still guided the debate but now most people held an opinion over the issue.
As the Dundee Advertiser observed, after less than two weeks of war:
The movement in favour of early closing is not a puritanical movement. It has
the support of multitudes of men and women who have the scantiest sympathy
with Puritanical sentiment and who are simply conscious of the moral and
economic incongruity of maintaining the fullest facilities for the waste of
money on intoxicating drink at a time when the fate of the nation is in the
balance.3
It is undeniable, as Arthur Marwick observes, that the war acted as a fillip for
renewed endeavour on the part of temperance advocates.4 The minutes of the UKA
from the period are peppered with references to new publicity campaigns. Religious
groups, often linked closely to temperance organisations, were also swift to join in
3 Dundee Advertiser 17 August 1914.
4 Arthur Marwick, The Deluge: British Society and the First World War (London, 1965), p. 50.
66
condemnation of alcohol. The war offered them the opportunity to propose
temperance solutions to assist in the prosecution of the conflict. For the moral
establishment drink was not heroic, neither was it Christian or manly and thus should
not be tolerated by a society at war. This new link between abstinence and patriotism
benefited the temperance movement allowing it to cloak itself in patriotic garb even if
the introduction of temperance measures remained its primary motive. This duplicity
lies at the heart of much that will be considered henceforth.
The power of the trade had often been overestimated and this demonisation
showed no sign of abating. The Spectator magazine, which campaigned for
prohibition during the war, printed a letter which is characteristic of the hyperbole
concerning the influence of the drink industry:
Something must be done to free our country from the power of the trade, which,
with its immense financial resources and powerful organisation, has so far resisted
every attack . . . I am possessed with a fear that the war will drag on until we as a
nation have attacked and overcome this foe within our gates.5
This form of criticism was not uncommon during the war. Two days into the war a
Master Douglas Gray, despite his modest rhyming skills, won a poetry contest in the
Alliance News with an entry entitled The Curse of the Drink:
With voices noisy and loud,
With toasts degraded and rude,
The public house customer drinks away
The money that should purchase food.
Drink, drink, drink,
Comes the call from the throat that is dry,
Unmindful of being on misery’s brink
In squalor and dirt they lie.6
The UKA liked the poem because it succinctly summarised the major arguments
against drink. Douglas Gray could not have known, however, how frequently these
5 The Spectator 6 November 1914.
6 Alliance News 6 August 1914.
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arguments would be discussed during the next few years and how mainstream most of
his ideas were to become. War magnified the temperance ideal, its moralistic
inclinations feeding into a national consensus regarding national efficiency.
Figure 3: This advertisement by the UKA is demonstrative of the new
momentum the war gave to the Temperance movement.
The First World War witnessed the growth of the state. In order to prosecute
the war successfully, state intervention was used to influence areas of public and
private life which had previously escaped intrusion and became an accepted aspect of
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life in wartime Britain. The early months of the conflict witnessed a deep-rooted
hostility developing within public debate towards continued drinking during the
conflict. Previously, as Reverend Joseph Keating noted, ‘total abstinence, like every
other good cause, had suffered from the advocacy of the fanatical and ill instructed’,
but now public fears about waste and defeat were enmeshed with this social issue,
even though the situation was no worse than it had been previously.7 The drink
problem had changed shape even though its essential characteristics, and the debates
which constituted it, remained the same. Notions of a communal responsibility had
emerged in the 1890s and its impact upon the individual and his or her relationship to
the nation meant that people understood that the individual had duties toward the state
but that the state also had a reciprocal duty towards the individual. As Keating argued:
The drink question concerns in varying degrees both the individual and the
community and so it has many aspects – moral, sociological, economic, historical,
political. It may sometimes be the duty of the individual to determine very
definitely, in his own interest, to what extent he should make use of alcoholic
beverages. It is always the task of the community, in view of the general welfare,
to settle how far it should permit the drink traffic.8
This determinate relationship was at the heart of the alcohol problem in 1914. It is no
wonder, then, that so many were interested in offering their opinion as to the best way
to restrict drunkenness.
Most assessments were decidedly negative and uncomplimentary. The
Archbishop of Canterbury in October 1914 stated that ‘we are, in many places face to
face with a worse condition of intemperance than we have been accustomed to for
many years’. 9 Within the press much was made of reports from journalists that
exposed the moral anarchy that drink facilitated within urban centres. Publications
exposing this drunkenness struck at the rationale of the modern urban planner, whose
7 Reverend Joseph Keating, The Drink Question (London, 1914), p. 5.
8 Ibid. p. 9.
9 M. Murray, Drink and the War: From the Patriotic Point of View (London, 1915), p. 37.
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streets and cities were configured to preserve order in regulated public space. As
Arthur Mee and Reverend J. Stuart Holden observed:
There is to be seen within our towns and cities, as these words are being
written, the most appalling spectacle of woe that ever eyes can look upon. The
pavements in our streets are made impassable by long queues of people,
regulated by police, waiting their turn outside the whisky shops. ‘I wish I
could not get it’ cried one poor woman bitterly, and another, fresh from prison,
was heard to proclaim ‘they say we shouldn’t be able to get it after Christmas,’
and hidden from the streets, behind these brick walls that hid the tragedy of
the drink ruined homes of England, every daily paper tells us what is
happening.10
Mee was an anti-drink writer, and later the founding member of the Strength of
Britain movement, so it is unsurprising that he draws attention to a woman bemoaning
the fact that she can still buy alcohol. He simultaneously points toward a future in
which this no longer need be the case by highlighting this ‘lost’ woman whilst
reinforcing conceptions of inferior working class morality. He alerts the reader to the
problem of ‘drink ruined homes’ which society continues to ignore even though
‘every daily paper tells us what is happening’. This in itself suggests that only a part
of the problem is ‘public’ and thus visible. His work is a classic case of fear-
mongering propaganda that emerged during the war. The exposition of this scandal
allowed the media to shape public opinion. The Daily Mirror pointed out that:
In Paris the cafes are being closed at 8 o’clock, and I think it would be much
better for us if our public houses were closed at that time – or even altogether
– for the present. Walking from the Strand to Victoria station last evening
between 6 and 7 o’clock I saw more half tipsy men than one usually sees in a
month. If this type of man is too selfish and lazy to trouble about his wife and
family, I think it is time the government stepped in and made him do
something else with his money than spend it on beer.11
By printing such provocative news stories the press made the issue current and worthy
of public debate.
10 Arthur Mee and J. Stuart Holden, Defeat or Victory?: The Strength of Britain book (London, 1917),
p. 23.
11 The Daily Mirror 15 August 1914.
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In newspapers and journals, other contributors also sought to alert the general
populace to the social costs of drinking. An editorial in the Dundee Advertiser related:
A very large amount of correspondence has reached us showing that during a
national emergency like the present there should be early closing every night
of the week . . . Drunkenness in the streets has been deplorably common and
has not been confined to the civilian population. The country is urged to avoid
every form of waste and the reduction of every kind of luxurious living is
preached as a national duty. Liquor consumption is an unmitigated waste and
it is perfectly certain that if the public houses are open on Saturday an
enormous quantity of wages will be wasted which should be reversed for
possibly hard emergencies before us.12
Each communal shortcoming was seen in relation to necessary national sacrifice.
Evidently the nation, and particularly the government, was not doing enough.
Social Darwinism determined that the superior nation would emerge
victorious in war. A reliance on alcohol was thus deemed to be a casual admission
that the nation did not deserve, or want, to be victorious. As A.W. Richardson stated,
‘a growing slackness and torpor seemed everywhere apparent, and the resourceful
energy and initiative which had once characterised us, seemed to have passed to other
peoples’.13 Indeed this problem was exacerbated by the widespread belief that the war
would be over quickly. Britain’s seemingly lackadaisical attitude to drink control
contrasted unfavourably to the apparently rapid and efficient measures implemented
both in France and in Russia that quickly gained widespread publicity and admiration.
In Russia swift action was taken to abolish the government vodka monopoly
by the Tsar, who had been described by The New Statesman as the ‘biggest dram
shop keeper in the world’, which resulted in the closing of over 26,000 vodka
shops.14 He was in a position to do so as in Russia the state was the sole seller of
Vodka, and had a free hand to deal with its own business. One of the Russian
12 Dundee Advertiser 12 August 1915.
13 A.W. Richardson, The Nation and Alcohol (London, May 1916), p. 8.
14 E.S. Turner, Dear Old Blighty (London, 1980), p. 86.
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government’s main motivations was the rabid drunken degeneracy which had afflicted
the country during the ill-fated Russo-Japanese War of 1905. The decision was thus
legitimised in terms of improvements in industrial and military efficiency, social
welfare and by the potential for economic savings. Several pamphlets extolling the
virtues of Russian abstinence emerged in Britain after the decision had been taken. In
a pamphlet entitled Alcohol and the War: The Example of Russia, John Newton, an
author with no great temperance standing, highlighted reports from Russia on the
immediate benefits of abstinence. One report read:
There was never a drunken peasant or soldier to be seen, and in consequence
the mobilisation was effected several days sooner than the official schedule
time, and three weeks sooner than the German military staff anticipated.
Hence the marvellous progress of the Russian armies, which upset the German
calculations and relieved the pressure on the Allies in the Western fields of
battle. 15
The explicit implication was that military success was due to alcoholic abstinence. So
too were untold social improvements that supposedly sprouted up throughout Russia.
As one report taken from the Novoye Vremya suggests, ‘The old women in the
villages can hardly believe their eyes and ears, so changed are their menfolk. Not a
hard word, not a row, but everywhere peace, kindness, and industry. War is said to be
hell but this is like a foretaste of heaven.’16 So great were the alleged benefits that
emerged from prohibition that Henry Carter described the act as one of the ‘greatest
moral decisions of modern history’.17 One must take these accounts with a pinch of
salt, given the propagandistic nature of the writing, but at the time they seemed to
accentuate the contrastingly slothful response of Britain to alcohol control.
15 John Newton, Alcohol and the War: The Example of Russia (London, 1915).
16 Ibid. p. 10.
17 H. Carter, Europe’s Revolt against Alcohol (London, 1916), p. 221.
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Figure 4: This cartoon aimed to maximise the propaganda potential of The
Times’ support for the prohibition of Vodka in Russia.
Politicians and the press were keen to comment upon the positive benefits of Russian
action. Lloyd George described it as ‘a great act of national heroism and sacrifice’.18
In October 1914 The Scotsman reported:
In renouncing the sale of vodka and the profits arising from it, the Russian
government have taken a step which shows both courage and confidence . . . the
enforced sobriety of the people is itself proving a great economic gain. The money
previously spent on a particularly demoralising beverage is now being saved and
more constant application to work is producing larger gross earnings.19
In March 1915 The Times reported that ‘Ministers have been greatly impressed by the
moral gain achieved by the Russian suppression of Vodka’.20 The argument that
Russia had benefited from enforced abstinence was clear. Within Britain there was
universal acclamation for Russia’s actions, which forced the nation to look at each
18 Ibid. p. 221.
19 The Scotsman 22 October 1914.
20 The Times 2 March 1915.
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individual and community’s respective contribution to the war effort. The Bishop of
Manchester, in November 1914, noted: ‘I have been most profoundly impressed by
the action taken in Russia. It seems to me that a public act of that kind calls upon
other nations to think and thinking to take right action.’21 Similarly, John Newton
asked, ‘Is it too much to hope that an enlightened democracy may under the
inspiration of so splendid an example, do an equally great and beneficial work for
itself?’.22 It was a bold move which implicitly challenged Britain to follow in her
footsteps. Nevertheless the true extent of the sobriety of the Russian people was
debateable when considering reports that emerged concerning the alleged ‘widespread
nature of Russian illicit distilling being carried out on a widespread scale’.23 This
aspect of the Russian experience did not corroborate with the temperate interpretation
placed upon the banning of vodka and so was subjugated beneath the more important
benefits that abstinence had supposedly brought.
This implicit challenge to Britain was made all the more explicit upon
consideration of the action taken by France to tame its alcoholic excesses. Within
France there had been a long-term concern over the use of strong liquors, particularly
the consumption of absinthe. For fifty years absinthe had gained a ‘fatal popularity’
amongst sections of the French population with unfortunate consequences. With an
alcoholic strength of between 47 and 72 per cent, absinthe was an extremely potent
drink which temperance advocates pointed out had the potential for creating extreme
harm, a trait which endeared it to some, but generally caused much consternation
within French society. 24 Furthermore, the presence of wormwood within the
substance allegedly caused hallucinogenic trips if drunk in extreme quantities.
21 H. Carter, The Control of the Drink Trade, p. 39.
22 J. Newton, Alcohol and the War: The Example of Russia, p. 1.
23 Dundee Advertiser 10 April 1915.
24 H.Carter, Europe’s Revolt Against Alcohol, p. 219.
74
The war, the favourable publicity towards the Russian example, and the
awakening of temperance sentiment within Britain about the effects of drink upon the
productiveness of the labouring classes, drew yet more public attention to the problem
of French drink.25 Carter elucidated upon the societal wreckage that absinthe left in
its wake. He wrote ‘insanity has rapidly increased in France, and 20 per cent of the
present inmates of French lunatic asylums became insane from drinking absinthe’.26
The apparent effect upon children was even more alarming. As Carter observed: ‘In
some districts even children drank it. In one communal school in Paris attended by the
children of workmen, out of class of forty-nine averaging ten years of age thirty said
they were in the habit of drinking absinthe.’27 One can only speculate as to the effect
of this pamphlet upon popular sentiment during wartime. Further attention was paid to
absinthe’s effect upon crime, disease, productivity and military efficiency. Scare
stories concerning murders undertaken by ‘absinthe fiends’ underlay moral concerns
about the continued use of such fiery intoxicants.
A ‘Prohibition of Absinthe Bill’ swiftly emerged which described absinthe as
the ‘internal enemy’ of France. By February 1915 the Chamber of Deputies quickly
passed the measure and the Senate ratified it successfully. Further restrictions upon
home distillation, increased tax on alcohol and a state monopoly of commercial
alcohol quickly followed. These decisions found understandable favour among
temperance advocates in Britain. Carter commented that ‘France now realises that to
fight alcoholism is her urgent duty’.28 Marr Murray, in a pamphlet Drink and the
War: From the Patriotic Point of View, commented that:
It is not immediately that France will feel the benefit of her action in banning
25 John Koren, ‘Drink Reform in Europe’, Atlantic Monthly, December 1917, p. 743.
26 H. Carter, Europe’s Revolt Against Alcohol, p. 219.
27 Ibid. p. 219.
28 Ibid. p. 220.
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these poisonous drinks. In ten years time, according to expert medical opinion,
the birth rate will begin to show a steady rise, better and healthier babies will
be born, the prisons and lunatic asylums will be less crowded and the nation
will be happier and more prosperous.29
Temperance advocates argued that by prohibiting absinthe, France was guaranteeing
her future. This sentiment is unsurprising given the hereditarian debate surrounding
drink that had occurred in pre-war Britain. What was somewhat lost in the
contemporary reaction to the act was that steps to deal with absinthe predated the war,
but conflict acted as the catalyst for these measures to be implemented. Moreover, at
the same time as absinthe was being barred, large supplies of wine were being ferried
to the front to maintain morale.
That Russia and France had ‘dealt’ with the drink issue, yet Britain had not,
irked the sentimentalities of those in favour of action at home. Marr Murray
proclaimed that other nations had chosen ‘the path of victory’ whilst:
We have thrown away the winning power of the war. Into that ditch where our
great allies have flung their powers of weakness we have flung our strength. In
a ditch in France lies Absinthe, in a ditch in Russia lies Vodka, but beer and
whisky swagger through the streets of Britain, and in the ditch we fling the
power of victory.30
A sense of social anxiety and panic is evident throughout such accounts. Paranoid
about Britain’s place in the world, campaigners presented the drink issue as being
much more than a workingman enjoying a pint in a pub but as a symbolic totem of the
decline of the British race. A moment of national reckoning had been reached yet
nothing was being done. This created a sense of frustration, whose conduit to
mainstream opinion was the media. Arthur Mee summarised the reaction to these
measures when he wrote:
To this nation has now come the moment to decide. Whatever our fate, at least
it will stand on the national record that there were not a few men and women
29 M. Murray, Drink and the War, p. 27.
30 Ibid. p. 70.
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in Britain who saw the truth when it was as clear as the sun at high noon, and
who knew and proclaimed that the truth alone could keep us free.31
He asked ‘what good is an expanding Empire to a declining race?’. 32 These
scaremongering views, although understandable given the context, were challenged
by other commentators. Referring to these comparisons with France and Russia in an
article entitled Drink Reform in Europe, John Koren argued:
Fertile imaginations have played with it, publicists have glorified the new
found zeal for abstinence in co-belligerent countries, and often the writings
reveal the clumsy hand of the propagandist who does not hesitate to make
capital even out of desperate conditions.33
Brewers responded by drawing attention to the ‘mildness’ of beer in comparison to
both absinthe and vodka and by pointing out that the French drank a gallon of spirits
more per head than the British.34
The worldwide movement in favour of temperance was nevertheless enlivened
by French and Russian action. An American cartoon of 1915 showed the anti-saloon
campaigner Carrie Nation in the guise of Mars having destroyed a house labelled
‘French Absinthe’ and another called ‘Russian Vodka’ now bearing down on ‘Ye
Olde English Inn.’35
31 A. Mee and J. Stuart Holden, Defeat or Victory?, p. 9.
32 Ibid. p. 80.
33 J. Koren, ‘Drink Reform in Europe’, p. 739.
34 The Brewers’ Gazette 16 March 1916.
35 Jad Adams, Hideous Absinthe: A History of the Devil in a Bottle (London and New York, 2004), p.
214.
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Figure 5: This cartoon was printed in The Brewers’ Gazette and aimed to
differentiate beer from Absinthe and Vodka due to its supposed ‘mildness’.
Figure 6: This cartoon, taken from an American Newspaper, illustrates the
conviction that British booze was to join Russian Vodka and French Absinthe in
being unemployed due to the new sobriety encouraged by the war.
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The proposed link between racial decline and an alcohol habit meant that drink
was often utilised in propaganda to highlight the lack of moral character within
German combatants. Some drinks companies, fearing association with the enemy,
sought to reassure customers of their origins. One advertisement read ‘Carlsberg
Lager is not German as someone with malicious intent is circulating. Carlsberg is
brewed by the world renowned Carlsberg Breweries at Copenhagen Denmark where
only Danish labour is employed.’36 Schweppes also vehemently denied that they were
a German firm whilst Perrier was described as the ‘table water of the allies’ while a
whisky and Perrier cocktail was presented as the ‘perfect entente’.37 Wine drinkers
were urged to ‘drink imperially’ and ‘support the colonies’ by drinking Australian
claret.38 Another brewer placed the following advertisement reminding readers that
‘patriotism begins at home’.39
36 The Scotsman 19 August 1914.
37 The Scotsman 11 January 1915.
38 The Scotsman 17 September 1914.
39 The Daily Mail 2 October 1915.
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Figure 7: An advertisement for Peter Walker Lager urges readers to drink
British and not German Lager.
One unfortunate wine merchant, who specialised in German wines from the Moselle,
had a hard time as the Pall Mall Gazette urged readers not to drink German wine. The
concerned merchant replied that his wines:
Were bought and paid for long before the war broke out, or if it was not paid
for, so much the better. No more German wines are likely to come into this
country yet awhile, so let us drink what we have if we can afford it with a
good conscience. I believe Nelson drank sherry the night before Trafalgar. He
might have signed himself Patriot.40
Many stories emerged concerning the excesses of Germans fighting at the front.
These stories varied from the serious, with drunkenness acting as a precondition for
German atrocities carried out in Belgium, to the comic, with German moral character
40 The Wine Trade Review 15 August 1914.
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being questioned in amusing ways. Within Germany alcohol production was limited
to 40 per cent of the average output, alcohol was banned in certain towns and the sale
of spirits to the general public and the military was restricted. These measures were
not widely reported in newspapers as they contrasted relatively favourably to the
actions of the British government. Reports concentrated more on the excesses that
many Germans supposedly indulged. This indulgence merely confirmed the lack of
moral character within Germany and illustrated succinctly the sickness and sloth of
the enemy.
Figure 8: These pictures appeared in the press to substantiate the alleged
atrocities committed by drunken Germans in Belgium. These pictures appeared
in both The Daily Mirror and The Daily Express 28 September 1914.
Most prominent amongst these criticisms were the alleged actions of the German
troops who had invaded France and Belgium. Attention was drawn to the fact that
when the Germans entered Belgium their ‘first visit was to the cellar’ where the
‘Teuton has been drinking his bottle of Burgundy as he swallows his gallon of beer’
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before committing ‘the crimes of brutes under the influence of bestial
intemperance’.41 Atrocities were committed, according to Edward Hicks, the Bishop
of Lincoln, because they ‘had unlimited opportunities for getting themselves drunk’.42
Instances of over exuberance permeated the Bryce Report of 1915. Although a
propagandistic report, it shows the method in which drink was used as a symbolic
totem of declining German standards of humanity in war, as this report relating to an
incident that allegedly occurred at Campenhout in France shows:
In this village there was a certain well to-do merchant (name given), who had
a good cellar of champagne. On the afternoon of the 14 or 15 August three
German cavalry officers entered the house and demanded champagne. Having
drunk ten bottles, and invited five or six officers and three or four private
soldiers to join them, they continued their carouse, and then called for the
master and mistress of the house: ‘Immediately my mistress came in,’ says the
valet de chambre, ‘one of the officers who was sitting on the floor got up, and
putting a revolver to my mistress’ temple shot her dead. The officer was
obviously drunk. The other officers continued to drink and sing, and they did
not pay great attention to the killing of my mistress. The officer who shot my
mistress then told my master to dig a grave and bury my mistress. My master
and the officer went into the garden, the officer threatening my master with a
pistol. My master was then forced to dig the grave, and to bury the body of my
mistress in it. I cannot say for what reason they killed my mistress. The officer
who did it was singing all the time.43
By illustrating the drunkenness of the German officers this incident suggests that the
entire German moral framework, and that of the Prussian Junkers, was corrupt. The
officer’s loss of control contrasts unfavourably with their supposed status as leaders of
men. To be sure this entire story could have been fabricated. If this was the case, what
remains of interest is the way in which German soldiers were portrayed as slothful
and degenerate, behaviour intertwined with a fondness for alcoholic liquor. To drink
to excess was not seen as a positive attribute but indisputably part of the character of
the disreputable element of society.
41 M. Murray, Drink and the War, pp. 30-31.
42 Alliance News March 1915.
43 Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages (Cd. 7894) pp. 30-31. Quoted in H. Carter,
Europe’s Revolt Against Alcohol, p. 229.
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This apparent lack of moral character within the German ranks was confirmed
by other stories relating to their conduct. The Scotsman reprinted a letter found on a
captured German soldier and printed in Le Figaro newspaper, adding that the story
simply ‘spoke for itself’.44 The letter read:
We have plenty of wine to drink here, and we drink it like water. The first
thing we do is to empty the cellars and fill our water bottles surreptitiously
with wine. The beer is horrible, but a good brand can often be found. Looting
is general. Picture to yourself rooms turned into piggeries, and sugar, rice,
flour, broken window panes, wine glasses etc lying about everywhere . . . we
have looted everything on which we could lay our hands, including women’s
stockings and underclothing. I myself am at present wearing a low cut
chemise.45
By portraying the German troops as drunkards let loose within France, as hooligans
abroad with transvestite tendencies, the reputation of the Prussian archetypal soldier
lay in tatters. This was contrasted with reports of the ‘spectacle presented by the
Allies . . . the British soldier marching through the best vineyards in existence and
temperately demanding, as many letters tell us, the cup of tea’.46 Sobriety, it seems,
came to embody the cultural values of the nation. With abstinence accepted as a key
factor to victory, news stories such as these were used to show the higher moral value
of the British soldier in comparison with the moral deprivation of the Germans.
44 The Scotsman 25 September 1915.
45 Ibid.
46 The Scotsman 21 September 1914.
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Figure 9: This picture shows the decadence of the German troops in consuming
vast amounts of the Chateau’s champagne supply, ‘now a mass of ruins instead
of the historic mansion of a fortnight ago’.
Propagandistic incidents were disputed by more clear-headed, or at least not
distinctly biased, accounts which denied the existence of a drink problem in Germany
comparable to Britain. One such article, written from an American perspective, stated
that ‘there is no evidence that either the economic or military powers of Germany
have been greatly impaired by drink’.47 To the contrary ‘Germany is perhaps the
largest contributor to the study of alcohol’.48 Assumed moral failings made better
news, however, and show how alcohol was a weapon of insult in the war of
mobilising minds given drink’s place in political debate prior to and during the war.
Incidents of over exuberance served to crystallise the moral fears of Edwardian
society. Since efficiency was paramount, the drink issue necessarily had to be solved.
As Sir Alfred Pearce argued:
47 J. Koren, Drink Reform in Europe, p. 747.
48 Ibid. p. 748.
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To a nation at war alcohol is a traitor, it is made by a wasteful expenditure and
of much needed food and labour, it lessens the physical fitness and power of . .
. the civil community, it blurs their judgement, lets loose their emotions,
exposes them to greater risk than epidemic diseases, and it undermines their
power to make good the most serious ravages of war.49
In wartime, incidents such as that may have previously been ignored now became
obvious examples of societal breakdown. A large proportion of ‘news’ was devoted to
reports about what was classed as deviant behaviour of the time and its consequences.
Like today, bad news, particularly scandalous headlines, sold newspapers. One of the
most prominent headline grabbing concerns of the time was insobriety amongst
soldiers.
During the early months of the war Britain’s streets were littered with soldiers
about to be sent to war in France. On occasion some of these troops were boisterous
in attitude and lacking in sobriety. Looking back, it seems perfectly natural that these
men would have wanted to savour their last hours of freedom before being sent off to
war and possible death. To some the best way to go about this was to get drunk.
However, moral frameworks dictated that a soldier, if he was going to be of any use,
should be sober. Insobriety equated to a breakdown in the discipline of the army,
which was an essential prerequisite of victory. The propagandistic portrayal of the
sober British soldier in contrast to the enemy was compromised by drinking on the
home front. The government was aware that drunken soldiers were proving
problematic. In November 1914, Lord Roberts appealed to the civil population to stop
treating soldiers to drinks: ‘thousands of young recruits are now collected together in
various places and are having their work interfered with and their constitution
undermined by being tempted to drink by a friendly but thoughtless public.’ 50
49 Sir Alfred Pearce, ‘Alcohol and the War’ in T.N. Kelynack, (ed.), The Drink Problem of Today
(London, 1916), p. 218.
50 P. Snowden, An Autobiography: Volume One 1864-1919 (London, 1934), p. 377.
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Criticism often came from established moral authorities, be they religious institutions
or investigative journalists, who were not averse to adopting the moral high ground.
For example, the Bishop of Liverpool was critical of the city’s relationship with
alcohol at this time:
A few nights ago I went off to see my two sons by the mail train. I saw there a
sight which I will never forget. The departure platform of Lime Street station
was crowded from end to end. Here were three drunken soldiers with linked
arms, rolling up the platform to the train; here were soldiers, leaning against
each other and supporting each other, trying to find their carriage, here were
friends, themselves half intoxicated, seeing off half drunken men whom they
had been treating. The whole place was a pandemonium. There were drunken
shouts, drunken songs, and a babel of conflicting sounds. An officer returning
to the front, a complete stranger to me, turned to me and said, ‘What a
disgusting sight! If these men were at the front they would be shot at once.’ It
was the saddest send off I ever saw, and it was a scandal and a disgrace to a
great city.51
The Bishop saw the drunkenness as evocative of Liverpool’s disregard of the
sacrifices required in wartime Britain, exemplifying the link between religion and
abstinence. Allied to this was anger at the way the army had been besmirched by a
break down in discipline at home. The comment by the officer that ‘if these men were
at the front they would be shot at once’ illustrates the inequality of sacrifice between
the home and military front lines that the Bishop hoped to illustrate. Moral criticism
of this sort was very common when military drinking was being discussed. In London
the situation was seemingly no better, as one frustrated observer wrote to the
Secretary of the Admiralty:
I wish you could have seen the scene round a public house just outside King’s
Cross Station today. There were scores of men – sailors and soldiers drinking .
. . It was heart breaking to see them fine fellows reeling about on the
pavement with glasses in their hands. One man was violently sick on the
kerbstone. It was disgusting. Lots of girls and women were about also, the
house was crowded to the doors. Can nothing be done to lessen the temptation
to the men? Since the war began this particular house has done a roaring trade
and the scenes there are appalling.52
51 M. Murray, Drink and the War, p. 48.
52 HO 185/247, CCB’s orders in London, William Best to Secretary of the Admiralty, 22 June 1915.
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A similar tone of criticism is apparent in a report entitled ‘the drink evil as seen on the
streets of the city’ by the ‘man about town’ in the Dundee Advertiser of 29 November
1914:
Intoxication more or less pronounced was everywhere observed and it was
saddening in the extreme to observe the many youths of both sexes carrying
on in a way that was positively unseemly and calculated to make the man or
woman that wishes well to our dear old country utterly despair of its future.
Indeed with such hooliganism abounding the pessimist who concludes that the
inhabitants of these islands are degenerate, and not worth saving, may be
excused. Young men wearing the King’s uniform were the principal
transgressors against decorum.53
This piece articulates three themes of anti-drink polemical writing. Firstly the
corruption of youth by sexual immorality in acting ‘positively unseemly’; secondly
social decline (‘our dear old country utterly despair of its future’); and, finally, the
corruption of the King’s uniform. This type of journalism utilises these key themes
and invites the reader to agree with the author in reaching a similar conclusion. In
creating stereotypes (e.g. the drunk soldier) the report makes the problem ‘real’ to
those reading the article as these stereotypes were visible on Britain’s streets. This
was a necessary dramatisation of the problem. As Kenneth Thompson, writing on
moral panics, has argued:
If the world is not to be represented as a jumble of random and chaotic events,
then they must be identified (i.e. named, defined, related to other events
known to the audience) and assigned to a social context (i.e. placed within a
frame of meanings familiar to the audience.) This process – identification and
contextualisation – is one of the most important through which events are
‘made to mean’ by the media. An ‘event’ only makes sense if it can be located
within a range of known social and cultural identifications.54
This can be called the ‘labelling process’, by which commentators attempt to
‘restructure and make sense of an ambiguous situation’.55 It can be no coincidence
53 Dundee Advertiser 29 November 1915.
54 Kenneth Thompson, Moral Panics (London and New York, 1998), p. 58.
55 S. Cohen, Images of Deviance (Harmondsworth, 1971), p. 56.
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that such stereotypical characters as the ‘drunk soldier’ emerge as totems of the
decline of Britain’s morality. When creating an effective story easily identifiable
characters are always required to deepen and progress the narrative. They do not
necessarily have to be accurate. For many soldiers drink was forced on them. One
soldier on leave from Flanders told a correspondent of the Manchester Guardian ‘I
cannot put my head outside my own mother’s door without having people total
strangers to me pressing me to take drink. I’m sick of it for one, and glad my leave is
short.’56 His opinion did not matter, however, since the symbolic damage had already
been done.
Such scandalisation was sometimes subject to a more critical eye. The two
articles above were both subjective personal opinions. Another commentator, Murray,
was critical of this type of reporting:
A visit to Woolwich, Chatham, or any other garrison town gives the
impression that the British soldier’s sole concern is for strong drink and loose
women. The sensational observations of those who describe what they have
seen in such places must, no matter how honest the intentions of the writer, be
watered down very considerably. The average British soldier is not to be
found in the public houses or lurking along the streets, there exists a drunken
minority.57
However, the drunken minority grabbed the headlines.
56 H. Carter, Europe’s Revolt against Alcohol, p. 237.
57 M. Murray, Drink and the War, p. 47.
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Figure 10: This cartoon illustrates the discrepancy between accepted notions of
service to the national cause and the continued use of the pub by men from ‘the
works’.
If drunken soldiers were neglecting their patriotic duty, drunken civilians were
an ‘enemy within’. Writing to The Scotsman, a J.D. Robertson argued, ‘our country is
engaged in a life and death struggle with a powerful foe. We believe we will triumph,
but what if we allow an enemy within our gates to devastate the homes of the very
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men who will win for us this country.’58 This was a familiar strand of criticism
which placed drinking in the context of national decline. By concentrating on the
eradication of the drink problem ‘within our gates’ the nation could help those
fighting at the front. Any proposed solutions often fell back to temperance ideas for
inspiration. As we shall discover, these proposed solutions, despite the view of those
implementing them, were not that innovatory.
Though the belief in the existence of an alcohol problem was widespread it is
hard to discern the true extent of the problem. While one section of the population
saw drinking as having increased since the start of the war, others saw little or no
difference. The judgement on what needed to be done depended upon the individual’s
own viewpoint. Apparent flouting of efficiency doctrine and incidents of copious
indiscretion led to much public outcry. The government had to respond to this public
disquiet. During this period the method by which politicians could make calculations
about ‘public opinion’ was very limited, and, as Michael Bentley has argued, ‘was
often the product of a personal (perhaps chance) encounter with individuals or
organisations, or of hearing reports of such encounters from others’.59 In this context
it is unsurprising that the drink issue, as it was related in the media, caused such a
controversy. The government may have argued that business was as usual, but
‘drinking as usual’, a phrase used ironically by advocates of abstinence, could not be
allowed to continue.
The first step taken by government in response to this public outcry was the
introduction on 12 August 1914 of powers to naval and military authorities to close
licensed premises in or near a fortified place. On 31 August 1914 the Intoxicating
Liquor (Temporary Restriction) Act was introduced which gave licensing authorities
58 The Scotsman 20 October 1914.
59 M. Bentley, The Liberal Mind 1914-1929 (Cambridge, 1977), p. 216.
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the power to restrict pub-opening hours. This generally meant earlier closing at (9 or
11 p.m.) instead of 12.30 a.m. Initially these regulations were imposed on munitions
areas but gradually became more widespread. In the first two months after the
enactment of the act the hours of sale were curtailed in 259 out of 1000 licensing
districts in England and Wales and by the end of 1914 the order covered 427 licensing
districts. 60 In Scotland little action was taken, as hours were already stricter. 61
Introduced to curb late night drunkenness and inhibit the opportunity of the over
consumption of alcohol, this act was intended as a representation of the government’s
desire to crack down upon ‘industrial drinking’. Furthermore, civilians were not
allowed in the restricted areas to buy drinks for members of the armed forces. The
Act’s effect was immediate, as The Brewers’ Gazette testified:
A transformation of the night scenes of London has followed from the closing
of the public houses at 11 p.m. Great traffic centres, like the Elephant and
Castle, at which immense crowds usually lounge until one o’clock in the
morning, have suddenly become peaceful and respectable. The police, instead
of having to ‘move on’ numbers of people who have been dislodged from the
bars at 12.30 at night, found very little intoxication to deal with . . . Many of
the public houses were half empty, some before closing time. Journalists, who
are necessarily out late, have quickly noticed the effects of the change upon
public conduct and have been spared the sounds of ribald songs, dancing and
quarrelling which hitherto have marked ‘closing time’ since the war began.62
This, in effect, was a governmental quick fix to the problem. Indeed the Act built
upon earlier reports written by the Imperial Defence Committee. 63 Shortening
opening hours was a minor reform of the public house. This was the equivalent of
placing a plaster on an alleged gaping wound. By curtailing the hours available for
60 H. Carter, The Control of the Drink Trade, p. 32.
61 A. Shadwell, Drink in 1914-1922: A Lesson in Control, p. 4.
62 H. Carter, The Control of the Drink Trade, p. 36.
63 ‘The Imperial Defence Committee had at a much earlier date recognised that in the event of any
outbreak of war it would be immediately necessary to take powers to deal with the perils arising from
the presence of the public house and consequently had already drafted a series of orders which were
immediately put into force under the Defence of the Realm Act.’ G.B. Wilson, Alcohol and the Nation
A Contribution to the Study of the Liquor Problem in the United Kingdom from 1800 to 1935, p. 157.
This hints toward the level of anticipation that surrounded a ‘drink problem’ emerging and the extent to
which central planning was deemed an appropriate response to such an issue.
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drinking it was assumed that less damage could be done. It was a populist measure to
deal with the furore that had emerged over drinking since the war began, but it is one
that is easily explainable. From the vantage point of a politician wanting to be seen to
be making a difference and listening to the concerns of the people, this legislation
made perfect sense. Moreover it could be passed uncontroversially. Whilst quelling
popular discontent this act left the drink trade relatively unregulated, and for many
this was a situation that rankled.
The government also sought to limit consumption of drink by making it more
expensive. On 18 November 1914 a war tax on beer was introduced which raised the
duty per standard barrel from 7 shillings 9 pence to 23 shillings, with further advances
of 1 shilling to follow in April 1916 and April 1917. The immediate intention was to
raise the retail price by half a penny per half pint, so as to encourage a drop in
consumption, as it was assumed that people had a fixed amount to spend on beer. The
absence of any political opposition to these measures indicates the level of consensus
that had emerged over the issue and the extent to which moral panic had overturned
the divisive splits of the pre-war drink debate. One slightly eccentric wine merchant in
Soho welcomed this tax rise, as he announced in a price list from the period:
I am proud to think that the dusty thousands of bottle necks which peer at me from
the dimness of my old crypts, like guns from between the timbers of an oaken
frigate, represent hundreds of gold pieces, or scores of tons of coal, or thousands of
cartridges now at Britain’s call in our hour of danger.64
The Brewers’ Gazette believed this patriotic view to be ‘an admirable sentiment
admirably expressed’ whilst one brewery advertised the following ‘Brewery Tax –
order a pint of beer and drive a nail into the Kaiser’s coffin. If you can’t manage a
pint, order half a pint, and drive a tintack. Drink the national beverage and help your
64 The Brewers’ Gazette 10 September 1915.
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country by paying your share of the war tax.’65
Figure 11: The brewing trade seized upon Lloyd George’s comment that
drinking supported the war effort and milked its propaganda potential.
However, these attempts to curb alcohol use did not stem moral criticism of drinking
during wartime, which remained vitriolic. One pamphleteer wrote:
It sometimes seems as if the powers of hell have broken loose, and one of the
agencies which is giving powerful support to Germany in this awful war is the
selfishness of men in England who will break their engagements and strike
without notice for a slight rise in wages, or will sit boozing in a public house
instead of doing their utmost to help to supply the munitions of war, for want
of which their fellow countrymen have been dying in thousands at the front.66
Drinkers were viewed not only as morally culpable, but also as stupid in failing to
realise the national cost of their actions. So obsessed were certain writers with the
drink question that one wrote: ‘if out of this terrible war could come a real settlement
65 M. Murray, Drink and the War, p. 111.
66 Lauder Brunton, ‘Alcohol: What it does to us and what we ought to do with it’, The Nineteenth
Century, July 1915, p. 74.
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of the drink question the tragedy might seem almost worthwhile’.67 In the face of
such fanaticism it is unsurprising that the government was regularly castigated for its
alleged failure to deal with the problem. In each case of social controversy drink was
posited as a possible, and in most cases, undoubted cause. Accusations were made by
temperance advocates that drink sellers were morally complicit in continually
promoting alcohol to a drinking public that anti-drink commentators believed were
unable to control themselves.
Figure 12: This portrayal of the drink seller in The Pioneer, a Temperance
Journal, was common. It attempted to expose the hypocrisy of those profiting
from drink whilst ‘supporting’ the war effort.
The accusation that wartime brewers were making large profits and capitalising upon
67 A.W. Richardson, The Nation and Alcohol, p. 63.
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the misery of others was widespread and drew upon the pre-war hostility directed
towards the trade. They were seen as carriers of wanton ‘drunkenness, poverty,
ignorance and vice to all classes’.68 Criticism of the trade was common: Alexander
Part wrote that ‘the influence of the trade is all pervading, and affects a larger number
of individuals than any other. Its power and wealth are enormous . . . it has become
almost unconsciously the most powerful and dangerous factor in the life of the
nation’.69
In reality the situation was much more difficult for the brewer than was
commonly appreciated. George Younger wrote that ‘the start of the Great War in
1914 generally upset all continuity of trade. Sales abroad dropped off, more
particularly in bulk, due to the difficulty of securing transport and also to the home
demand.’70 Beer output fell by 35 per cent from August to December 1914 and prices
rose due to heavily increased liquor duties and because of increased raw material
costs. But as Neville recounted, ‘war is a thirsty business and as there was soon full
employment and rising wages throughout the country these fears were not wholly
realised’.71 General inflation meant higher profit margins, though, and consequently
‘the first crop of annual statements by brewing concerns rather surprisingly reported
no fall in profits.’72 On the contrary, brewers were believed to be making huge
profits. This was yet another case of assertion outweighing factual reality as evidence
shows that breweries were merely treading water.
Experienced after years of conflict with the temperance cause, brewers were
adept at defending their interests. Pointing to falling sales after one month of war, one
68 K. Mitchell, The Drink Question: Its Social and Medical Aspects, p. 29.
69 Alexander Part, ‘Licensing Reform: A New Policy’, The Nineteenth Century, January-June 1915, p.
61.
70 A Short History of George Younger and Son Ltd 1762-1925 (Alloa,1925), p. 23.
71 S. Neville, Seventy Rolling Years, p. 82.
72 J. Vaizey, The Brewing Industry 1886-1951, p. 20.
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anxious brewer in The Scotsman proclaimed that ‘the fact is that there has been
already a very serious drop in sales, and that will be all the more pronounced as time
goes on’.73 Furthermore, brewers had support from politicians sympathetic to the
trade’s denials of facilitating nationwide insobriety. In Parliament in March 1915, J.D.
Rees suggested that ‘the extent of drunkenness in this country is exaggerated for
political reasons . . . there is a danger that again this honest loyal trade will not have
fair justice’.74
Furthermore, the drink trade suffered through military recruitment. Staff
volunteering for the armed forces caused labour problems in some breweries. Sydney
Neville wrote ‘as these were the days before conscription, we thought it right to
encourage our men to enlist’.75 By 1916, only three men of military age were working
at McEwans Brewery where more than two hundred men had joined the armed forces
and their places had been taken over by ‘over one hundred women, old men, Italians,
niggers and what not’.76 Within pubs barmaids as opposed to barmen became more
prevalent. This was, according to the Brewers’ Journal, ‘not because the trade is
putting pressure on its male employees, nor is it entirely from the latter’s pure and
undiluted patriotism, but the men have been such a target for sarcastic remarks that
many have enlisted’.77
The trade was also not averse to going on the offensive to defend its interests.
In December 1914 the brewers issued their own manifesto which questioned the true
necessity of further control. It read: ‘the extent of drunkenness in this country at the
present time is grossly exaggerated and investigation of such drunkenness as there is
73 The Scotsman 14 September 1914.
74 Hansard 28 August 1914.
75 S. Neville, Seventy Rolling Years, p. 79.
76 B. Ritchie, Good Company: The Story of Scottish and Newcastle (London, 1999), p. 85.
77 Brewers’ Journal 10 June 1915.
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would show that only a negligible part of it was due to the drinking of beer’.78
However, responding to allegations in this way gave some validity to them. In trying
to deflect criticism the manifesto was not universally effective, and merely succeeded
in exacerbating divisions between the trade and the temperance movement, as the
reaction of the UKA exemplifies:
We have filed this manifesto as perhaps the most glaring illustration which ‘the
trade’ has ever given of its shameless selfishness and utter disregard of its
responsibility to the nation and to humanity. The shamelessness of the appeal is
only equalled by the unscrupulousness of its arguments.79
Murray, a drink pamphleteer, commented that:
[The manifesto] did the trade a great deal of harm by prejudicing moderate
opinion. The whole thing was shallow and anybody with ordinary intelligence
could see through it. The brewers were obviously more concerned at the prospect
of a reduction in their profits and at the fact that drunkenness was hampering the
conduct of the war.80
Indeed, long held criticisms of the trade’s implicit greed were going to be difficult to
refute given the vituperative hostility that critics held of the industry.
The first months of the war were given to debating the extent of the drink
problem and what it actually entailed. This chapter has attempted to see through the
thicket of entangled prejudice. By looking at this material it has been possible to see
the development of a panic created by moral entrepreneurs keen on confirming the
seditious nature of drink on the individual and on society. The key message seems to
have been that the public could not be trusted. The panic did not begin and stop at a
definite moment but developed organically over time, as can be seen from the news
coverage given to the drink problem. Concern became consternation; frustration
developed into fear. Increased attention on drinking focussed attention on those
believed to be the biggest drinkers – the working class and the manner in which they
78 G.P. Williams and G.T. Broke, Drink in Great Britain 1900-1979, p. 45.
79 Alliance News January 1915.
80 M. Murray, Drink and the War, pp. 117-119.
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lived their day-to-day lives. In the spring of 1915 the panic became even more
widespread thanks to the actions of a prominent politician and the King. It was only
then that the true ‘severity’ of the problem was finally realised, or merely confirmed
to those already obsessed by the seditious effects of intoxicants and insobriety.
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Chapter Three: Best Laid Plans? Lloyd George and the Drink Question.
As the war progressed, its pressures had increasing repercussions on the home
front. The expenditure of shells and arms on an unprecedented scale increased
pressure on Britain’s industrial infrastructure. Armament firms were expected to
produce 176 million rounds by the end of 1914 when their capacity was just 3 million,
and from 25 August 1914 to 1 October 1914 as many artillery pieces were ordered as
during the previous ten years.1 Adjusting to this demand for military hardware was a
difficult task and the type of war being fought accentuated the problem. Trench
warfare dictated that high calibre, high explosive shells were needed in large numbers.
Britain’s factories, whilst simultaneously having to deal with a large amount of its
experienced workforce joining the army, could not cope with demand. The shell
shortage at Neuve Chapelle, and later problems at the second battle of Ypres, was a
manifestation of these difficulties and increased worries about the British army’s
efficiency being let down by disorganisation on the home front. Blame had to be
placed somewhere, so it is unsurprising that the industrial working class bore the
brunt of accusations regarding degenerate behaviour
By the spring of 1915 concern over the consumption of drink had reached
fever pitch. Moral conclusions regarding drink had been reached. With this discontent
public opinion became ever more vociferous in criticising the continued moral laxity
of those who drank in wartime. This chapter aims to detail the gathering crescendo of
this coalition for change and will assess whether these fears were real or imagined.
This was the period during which the ‘severity’ of the drink problem was finally
realised by society. It was argued that all of the previous symptoms of abject
degeneracy caused by drinking were subjugated to, yet implicitly part of, the loss of
1 G. DeGroot, Blighty: British Society in the Era of the Great War, p. 74.
99
industrial productivity allegedly caused by the continued over indulgence of workmen
involved in heavy industry. Drink provided a convenient excuse to discipline the
labour force of the country.
In Bangor on 28 February 1915 Lloyd George delivered his famous speech on
the drink problem, during which he ascribed continued industrial inefficiency to the
drink habits of an intemperate minority of the British workforce:
I hear of workmen in armament works who refuse to work a full week’s work
for the nation’s need. What is the reason? They are a minority. The vast
majority belong to a class we can depend upon. The others are a minority. But,
you must remember, a small minority of workmen can throw a whole works
out of gear. What is the reason? Sometimes it is one thing, sometimes it is
another, but let us be perfectly candid. It is mostly the lure of the drink. They
refuse to work full time, and when they return their strength and efficiency are
impaired by the way in which they have spent their leisure. Drink is doing
more damage in the war than all the German submarines put together.2
This statement had a significant impact on the drink problem. Lloyd George
employed no statistical support for his rhetorical description, but the lack of factual
material was inconsequential as his words confirmed latent fears concerning the social
habits of this section of the population.3 The speech fed into many familiar
stereotypes. As Arthur Shadwell confirmed, ‘the whole controversy had been
coloured by class feeling. Drink, being a real weakness and too familiar, was the
simplest reason to give and became the stereotypical charge.’4 Lloyd George denied
that he had attacked the social habits of the working class directly but upon
consideration of the evidence this denial is questionable. The speech coalesced all of
the social costs of drinking and re-emphasised their effect upon the productivity of the
nation in wartime. Reaching out to those less concerned by social welfare, but more
2 Lloyd George, War Memoirs: Volume One, p. 325.
3 In fact, a report Lloyd George commissioned later stated that no significant increase in drinking had
occurred on the Clyde since the war began. See Stuart Mews, ‘Urban Problems and Rural Solutions:
Drink and Disestablishment in the First World War’, in Derek Baker, (ed.), The Church in Town and
Countryside: Studies in Church History (Oxford, 1979), p. 455.
4 A. Shadwell, Drink in 1914-1922: A Lesson in Control, p. 22.
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concerned about victory in war, Lloyd George raised the stakes of the drink problem,
magnifying its inextricable links with national efficiency. By creating a climate of
opinion in which restrictive measures could be pursued he set in motion the
development of several policy initiatives aimed at curtailing drinking in Britain. From
February to May 1915, state purchase, heavily increased taxes and abstinence
campaigns were considered as appropriate solutions. Many facets of the drink
problem were examined in this period, resulting in the compromise creation of the
Central Control Board.
According to Carter, the Bangor speech ‘changed the perspective of the
question. Concern was no longer limited to administrators and to enthusiasts, the
nation awoke’.5 The speech expressed the ‘idea’ of drunkenness in association with a
clear class critique of behaviour. Unsurprisingly it aroused significant comment in the
press and amongst the usual interested parties. In fact it was an easy speech to make.
The pub was much easier to criticise than the factory or farm. The UKA saw it as a
turning point in the battle to prohibit drink:
The closer this nation is getting to the realities of war the more clearly it is
seeing that the liquor traffic is menacing our very existence. We do not
suggest that this traffic is consciously working in the interests of our enemies
but we do say that it could scarcely serve our enemies more effectively than it
is at present doing.6
The Daily Mail was scathing in its condemnation of the speech:
We must confess our profound amazement at the wholesale charges of
drunkenness brought by Mr Lloyd George against the skilled workers of this
country . . . we frankly do not believe that the British trade union workers are
habitual drunkards . . . the fact is that the government is sheltering itself
behind these random charges. It failed to realise the need for munitions at the
outset and did not organise the productive power of this country at once . . .
We recognise Lloyd George’s honest intentions but the truth seems to be that
this drink question has become such an obsession with him that he is unable to
see facts in their proper proportions.7
5 H. Carter, The Control of the Drink Trade: A Contribution to National Efficiency 1915-1917, p.48.
6 Alliance News April 1915.
7 The Daily Mail 30 April 1915.
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The Brewers’ Gazette alleged that the temperance movement was to blame for the
content of the speech whilst portraying those who believed in Lloyd George’s
argument as intrinsically un-British:
In the matter of publicity, the advocates of intolerant teetotalism enjoy a
marked advantage over the trade. Scarcely an utterance is made, even by the
veriest nonentity, without it finding a prominent position in the columns of the
antiquarian press . . . Let us give Lloyd George credit for one thing. He knows
how to trap the fools . . . We have been bred up on beer. We have built our
Empire on beer. We have got drunk and still prospered. Our forefathers
thrashed Napoleon, beat him to a frazzle, but they never went to bed sober.8
The Daily Express concurred that Lloyd George was being unreasonable blaming his
‘tendency to picturesque exaggeration as well as his confirmed tendency to excessive
Puritanism’ as responsible for the attack.9 Yet the true accuracy of Lloyd George’s
statement remained open to conjecture. Marr Murray proclaimed that if ‘the
Chancellor’s words were based on the truth then the nation will be prepared to
sacrifice its habits and pleasures in order to annihilate the third enemy’.10 The Times,
on the other hand, lamented that Lloyd George had laid stress on ‘crude statistics
supplied by anonymous firms . . . the inevitable inference is utterly misleading’.11
During the war, however, time was in short supply, action, not debate, was the
watchword of the day. Momentum for change was gathering.
Historians disagree over why Lloyd George chose to denounce a ‘small
minority’ of workmen drinking. Cameron Hazlehurst stresses the dynamism of Lloyd
George’s personality and innate desire to ratchet the war effort. Frustrated by
Kitchener and Asquith’s wavering leadership, Lloyd George, according to Hazlehurst,
delivered the speech to whip up public opinion in favour of greater state control of the
industrial life of Britain and, as he saw it, of one of the social factors which was
8 The Brewers’ Gazette 18 March 1915.
9 The Daily Express 1 March 1915.
10 M. Murray, Drink and the War: From the Patriotic Point of View, p. vii.
11 The Times 30 April 1915.
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inhibiting production.12 Other historians, such as John Turner and Stuart Mews, have
pointed to Lloyd George’s political and social roots in nonconformity as being
influential in shaping his overall attitude to alcohol consumption.13 These
interpretations are not mutually exclusive. Undoubtedly Lloyd George’s background
influenced his thoughts on the subject, but the effect of this will forever remain
difficult to measure. Hazlehurst’s interpretation is convincing given Lloyd George’s
subsequent actions. Having been convinced of the need for improved organisation
within factories as early as September 1914 it is unsurprising that he scrutinised the
condition of factory workers and their particular social habits. In the context of
answering critics of the Munitions of War Bill, who contended that the bill threatened
the working classes, his intentions in this respect are clearer:
If we cannot, by voluntary means, get the labour which is essential to the
success of this country in a war upon which its life depends, we must use, as
the ultimate resort, use the means which every state has its command to save
its life. You have got to save the life of Britain. We talk about the State as if it
were something apart from the workman. The workman is that state. He is a
living ingredient in it.14
In common with the New Liberal view concerning the organic interdependence of
society, reforming the individual was thus, at least to Lloyd George, intrinsic to
ensuring victory. Lloyd George’s background hampered attempts at prosecuting this
agenda, however, as regardless of the manner in which his viewpoint was presented, it
could always be said that the accusation sprung from his innate prohibitionist
tendencies.15
12 See Cameron Hazlehurst, Politicians at War July 1914 – May 1915: A Prologue to the Triumph of
Lloyd George (London, 1971), pp. 210-215.
13 J. Turner, ‘State Purchase of the Liquor Trade’, The Historical Journal, 23, 3, p. 597 and Stuart
Mews, ‘Urban Problems and Rural Solutions: Drink and Disestablishment in the First World War’,
Studies in Church History, Volume 20 (1983), pp. 337-350.
14 John Grigg, Lloyd George: From Peace to War 1912-1916 (London, 1985), p. 216.
15 Lloyd George had a long history of anti drink agitating. His very first appearance on a public
platform was at a temperance meeting at Machynlleth in 1883, and his maiden speech in the Commons
on 13 June 1890 was made on the issue of proposed compensation to publicans who might be
dispossessed of their licenses. A young Lloyd George had taken money from the UKA to subsidise his
103
The speech was also undeniably an articulation and product of class politics.
In The Making of the English Working Class E.P. Thompson argued that ‘class
happens when some men, as the result of common experience (inherited or shared),
feel and articulate the identity of their interests as between themselves and as against
other men whose interests are different from (and usually opposed to) theirs.’16 If one
defines ‘interests’ as including social culture then the argument that Lloyd George
used the speech as a method of evoking class identities is made all the clearer. He
used class, willingly or unwillingly, as a means of expressing ‘common traditions,
experiences and values’17 to articulate the differences between an ideal state of
behaviour and the form of behaviour that manifested itself, as he saw it, in industrial
centres throughout Britain.
This point was not lost on contemporaries and criticism of the speech gathered
pace. Speaking to an Independent Labour meeting at Norwich, a couple of months
later in April, Keir Hardie attempted to escalate the issue further on class lines by
proclaiming that ‘workers who were putting in eighty-four hours a week had been
maligned and insulted and the lying word – on the authority of Mr Lloyd George –
had gone round the world that the British working class were a set of drunken
wasters’.18 Hardie, a temperance man himself, utilised the simmering discontent that
Lloyd George’s comments had created to make a broader political point. He argued
that it was not productivity that was the genuine motive for reform but an innate
hostility to the working class which determined the government’s actions. By seeking
local veto speeches. In 1907 he spoke of drink as ‘the great recruiting sergeant of the unemployed army
. . . the greatest evil and the greatest wrong of all the old evils that have festered for generations.’ John
Turner suggests that the anti drink aspect of the Bangor speech may have been tailored specifically for
the Welsh nonconformist audience to which it was given as they were listening to a political speech on
a Sunday and so needed some reward. Lloyd George was surely aware of the significance of what he
was saying, however, and aware of the controversy that would result from his delivery of a line so
beautifully crafted as ‘Drink is doing more damage . . . ’ suggests.
16 E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (New York, 1966), pp. 9-10.
17 Joanna Bourke, Working Class Cultures in Britain 1890-1960 (London, 1994), p. 4.
18 The Times 9 April 1915.
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to move the blame for the shell scandal onto the working class, the government was
trying to avoid its own responsibilities, to ascribe blame where Hardie believed there
was none.
Hardie was not alone in criticising Lloyd George for blaming the workers. The
Daily Express saw the speech as a precursor to a governmental attempt to introduce
prohibition:
This is humbug and nauseous humbug, a cowardly excuse of incompetent
politicians for their own blunders. It is notorious that the British working class
has become more and more sober each year . . . It is strictly true that the
British Empire has been largely built on beer and the Bible. We are fighting
for an English England, the England of Shakespeare and Dickens, an England
of large hearted, kindly cheerfulness and we are trying hard to believe that
after the war we shall see again a prosperous, happy and merrie England . . .
Prohibition is impossible and would be sheer tyranny if it was possible.19
Criticism also came from fellow Liberal M.P.s. E.S. Montagu wrote to Lloyd George
expressing his unease at the situation:
I cannot find myself in agreement with you that there is any evidence that
drink has hampered us in this War on any substantial scale which calls for
heroic remedies . . . It is true that receipts from the sale of drink are large but
this is due mainly to your own taxation, which has increased the price of beer
and to the increase in the price of raw material and of labour, which has
increased the price of whisky . . . It is a habit of mind which treats the working
man as a machine with no vested interest in his habits and with no right to
humane consideration, Just as if an engine can do 500 revolutions a minute it
can do 30,000 in an hour and 300,000 in ten hours, so they think a man who
can drill 6 holes in an hour ought to drill 60 in 10 hours and 600 in 100 hours.
Anything wrong with their system they are accustomed to put down to their
unpatriotism, to the want of a sense of duty, the gross habits of these animals
whom they regard as their inferiors . . . Every one of the deputation which
waited on you the other day drinks moderately – they told you so – but they
would be insulted if you told them that they were unfitted for work because of
this habit and I really believe that you run grave danger by insulting or being
understood to insult the people of this country of all classes by interfering with
their liberty. The agricultural labourer, the honest, self-controlled artisans, the
small tradesman, inspired by patriotic motives and doing his duty, may feel
that those who are running the war do not trust them and you may impair the
fighting enthusiasm of your country.20
19 The Daily Express 9 April 1915.
20 Lloyd George Papers, LG/C/23/2/9.
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Lloyd George denied these accusations, responding to Hardie and other critics by
stating:
I went out of my way to make it clear that in my judgement drink only
affected a small minority of the workmen and that the vast majority were
doing their duty loyally so that as far as the first speech I delivered on the
subject is concerned there is not a syllable to justify Keir Hardie’s reckless
assertions but quite the reverse.21
The Bangor speech is symptomatic of Lloyd George’s impulsiveness during this
period. Its content was vague and lacked evidence. It may not have been his intention
to link ‘working class’ drinking as a whole with work inefficiency but that was the
result, as in an environment in which every aspect of society was constantly assessed
to ensure that it was contributing to victory, accusations, no matter how true or valid,
were more difficult to deny. Moreover, his words built upon a negative view of the
workers’ ability to handle money. Money spent on drink was believed to hinder
spending upon the essentials of life. As one commentator suggested, ‘the money spent
by the working class in this way is not, recollect, taken from their reserve funds for
they have none, it is taken from what is needed often for bare existence and always
for existence under decent human conditions’.22 By raising the spectre of wasted
funds Lloyd George further interlinked the behaviour of the working class with the
general efficiency of the nation.
The Bangor speech was given added support by Lord Kitchener, who in a
speech to the House of Lords a few days later announced that ‘there have, I regret to
say, been instances where absence, irregular timekeeping and slack work have led to a
marked diminution in the output of our factories. In some cases the temptations of
drink account for this failure to work up to the high standard expected’.23 At a
meeting on 17 March with the Trade Unions Lloyd George drew further attention to
21 The Times 9 April 1915.
22 The Daily Telegraph 3 May 1915.
23 A. Shadwell, Drink in 1914-1922, p. 14.
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reports emanating from the Admiralty and the War Office that supposedly ascribed
unproductive output to drink. The Trade Union representatives at this point indicated
their willingness to support whatever measures were required so long as there was
evidence to support such accusations and that legislation was to be applied equally
and to all classes. Indeed the Transport Workers’ Federation went further. In a letter
to Lloyd George they urged the government ‘to take immediate and decisive action to
reduce the results of intemperance to a minimum’.24 At a conference held with the
Shipbuilding Employers’ Federation on 30 March Lloyd George was given added
support when the industry pushed for total prohibition during the war. Employers
were keen to lay blame on the workers to avoid possible action being taken against
them on grounds of non-production of war materials.
On the 30 March 1915 Lloyd George provided another quotable sound-bite to
the press, stating with typical exuberance that ‘we are fighting Germany, Austria and
Drink, and as far as I can see, the greatest of these three deadly foes is Drink.’25 This
statement is hyperbolic, exemplifying how the problem had lost all sense of
perspective. Fired up by stories relating to the impact of drink, such as the battleship
that was sent for urgent repairs but was ‘ignored for twenty-four hours as the riveters
refused to leave the public house’26, he set about attempting to remedy the problem.
Beaverbrook wrote in his diary that:
Mr Lloyd George had become obsessed with a totally different aspect of the
same problem – the slow rate in the production of munitions which he
ascribed to drink. His energies became directed rather to seeing that the
workingman got less beer than to making certain that the soldiers got more
shells. The abolition of vodka in Russia went to the Chancellor’s head, and he
became determined to carry state purchase and control in England in order to
promote war efficiency.27
24 Ibid. p. 14.
25 The Times 30 March 1915.
26 E.S. Turner, Dear Old Blighty, p. 88.
27 Lord Beaverbrook, Politicians and the War (London, 1960), p. 65.
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It was this fervency that led Lloyd George to begin to cultivate support for restrictive
measures.
Further support came from the Commander-in-Chief in France. After the
battle of Neuve Chappelle, Douglas Haig blamed the workers’ fondness for drink for
the shortcomings in industrial productivity. ‘The best thing, in my opinion’ he argued,
‘is to punish some of the chief offenders . . . Take and shoot two or three of them, and
the ‘‘Drink Habit’’ would cease I feel sure. These sub-people don’t care what the
King or anyone else does – they mean to have their drink.’28 Officer Caven of the 4th
Guards Brigade of the British Expeditionary Force wrote to Lloyd George pleading
for action:
You must do something to hit everybody rich and poor. Prohibit drink, stop
racing and professional football – till the War is over so every man and
woman in England at once feels the bite and grip of the war . . . for God’s sake
turn every soul on to making shells and so shorten the war by months and save
tens of thousands of us. Call back from the Army all skilled shell makers you
want. Their services as such would be treble their value in the field –for in the
latter case they can be replaced – in the former not.29
Lloyd George had much political capital to spend, with many supporting his
expose of the ills of drinking and the ‘virtue’ of his cause. C.P. Scott wrote:
I was delighted, as I should fancy most other people were, with your Bangor
speech – particularly with what you said about restrictions on the sale of
intoxicants. The present partial and haphazard restrictions imposed by the
police or the military can have a little general effect, but I believe the nation is
perfectly prepared for a little compulsory temperance and that the Government
might go a long way in that direction during the war without the slightest
risk.30
Lloyd George was ready to act.
Yet the working class fought back. On 23 March, The Times published a letter
signed ‘Working Class’, protesting against the implication that the working classes
were greater sinners than others in the matter of drink:
28 G. DeGroot, Blighty, p. 75.
29 Lloyd George Papers, LG/5/7/21.
30 T. Wilson, (ed.), The Political Diaries of C.P. Scott 1911-1928 (London, 1970), p. 122.
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Lloyd George’s magnificent good sense has for once forsaken him. The
working classes feel that the aristocracy of England is thoroughly playing the
game in this war, but they feel that the merchants, shippers, and manufacturers
are out mostly for self. This may be a harsh judgement. But we have to take
the facts as they are. No class will be more loyal than the working classes to
any common restrictions affecting all alike. They will resent being pilloried
for special treatment . . . Will the aristocracy not give us another lead? If the
principal social and political clubs in London voluntarily agreed, and that
quickly, to accept the same limitations with regard to the hours at which drinks
may be served as the Chancellor of the Exchequer proposes for workingmen,
it would do much to make the movement a national one.31
Another ‘worker’ equated Lloyd George’s actions to those of the total prohibitionists,
and was scathing regarding the lack of understanding of the working environment of
many industrial sites:
I think the total prohibitionists are making a very grave mistake in attempting
to force their views on the county. There are thousands like myself who,
though not teetotallers have never lost an hour through the abuse of drink –
but, on the contrary – working side by side with total abstainers – have found
they could simply ‘leave them’ when it has come to an emergency . . . To
deprive such of their accustomed modest allowance is the most certain way to
defeat the ends the prohibitionists claim to have in view . . . you cannot
persuade me that the man who has been used to a ‘tonic’ or two a day will
prove a better workman, a better timekeeper or a more loyal citizen through
having his accustomed allowance forcibly ‘kicked off’.32
Clearly some felt they were being singled out for unnecessary special treatment
indicating that behind a supposedly ‘national movement’ old class hostilities had
continued long into the war. Mr Appleton, General Secretary of the General
Federation of Trade Unions, argued that ‘complete prohibition is a much more
sensible proposal . . . all classes should, in my opinion, receive the same treatment’.33
Lloyd George’s speech also set workers against employers. On 3 March 1915
more than one newspaper carried a letter from the chairman and the general secretary
of the Boilermakers’ Society, in which the employers’ statements about drunkenness
among its ship workers were challenged:
31 The Times 23 March 1915.
32 The Daily Mirror 12 April 1915.
33 The Scotsman 31 March 1915.
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The tales told by the Shipbuilding Employers’ Federation are the same old
misrepresentations, exaggerations and contradictions that we have heard from
them many times. They are the tales they usually give us instead of money . . .
We are therefore grieved that the Chancellor . . . should have come to
conclusions and permitted himself the grave statements which he made . . .
The wholly unjustifiable attack of the shipbuilding Employers Federation will
do more that all the drink in the country to diminish output.34
Disagreement as to the true extent of drinking and its effect upon productivity
permeated contemporary debate. To some, Lloyd George merely spoke the truth. An
article in The Spectator commented, ‘in a word he [Lloyd George] drew attention to
what we all know, but what a good many people will not say because they prefer the
rule of humbug to the rule of truth – that we waste a great deal too much energy as a
people on strong drink.’35 Yet the evidence presented was contradictory, underlining
the manner in which anecdotal evidence and broad generalisations were used to
justify legislation supposedly based upon empirical truths. Assumed conclusions were
reached without an objective and scientific examination of their cause.
The evidence is certainly inconclusive. One police report from Colchester
noted:
During the evening I visited a number of public houses and hotels in the centre
of the town. I found them well filled, though not overcrowded, with privates
and non commissioned officers, but, without exception, the bars and bar
parlours were occupied by an exceedingly orderly and sober lot of men and in
no house did I see a man the worse for drink . . . I only saw three privates who
could be termed the worse for drink, but they were by no means incapable.36
This report was not exceptional. Turner has argued, after reviewing the material sent
to Lloyd George relating to absenteeism, that ‘there is little to convince a disinterested
observer that drinking had a serious effect on munitions production and shipping’.37
Distillers of the time not surprisingly felt that the evidence to support the accusation
34 J. Grigg, Lloyd George from Peace to War 1912-1916, p. 234.
35 The Spectator 24 April 1915.
36 Lloyd George Papers, C/5/12/11.
37 J. Turner, ‘State Purchase of the Liquor Trade in the First World War’, p. 597.
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was ‘thin to the point of non existent’.38 Brewers were particularly disturbed by the
turn of events. The Brewers’ Society reminded Lloyd George of the ‘absolute
impossibility of prohibition’.39 Yet Lloyd George, in a private letter to Lord
Northcliffe said that it was possible to produce ‘overwhelming evidence’ of the
negative effect of drinking in industrial areas. 40 This begs the question, why did he
not make this public in order to present a stronger case?
Lloyd George’s action suggests he wanted a ‘national conversation’ on the
issue. Thanks to his machinations, The Times reported that ‘on all sides it was
admitted that the Drink Question was one of the most pressing problems of the day’.41
It may not have been the direct intention of Lloyd George’s speech, but the
implication created, perhaps by the reaction towards it, was that the workingman
hampered the war effort due to his uncontrolled drinking. As an editorial in The
Times suggested ‘sober workmen will feel that a stigma has been cast on the general
class of workers which is certainly not justified by the facts’.42 In a question riddled
with prejudice Lloyd George did nothing to alleviate the arguments of rival factions.
He succeeded in creating a public debate over the issue which would hopefully aid in
curbing alcohol consumption. By 12 April 1915 he had received a quarter of a million
letters on the subject with newspaper coverage continuing to proliferate and the desire
for a solution all the stronger.
38 R.B. Weir, ‘Obsessed with Moderation: The Drink Trades and the Drink Question 1870-1930’,
Institute of Social and Economic Research Department of Economic and Related Studies University of
York, Reprinted from the British Journal of Addiction, Vol. 79 1984, p. 101.
39 Brewers and Licensed Trade Retail Association, MSS.420, Box Number 1, Minute Book 4, 7 April
1915.
40 C. Hazlehurst, Politicians at War, p. 211.
41 M. Murray, Drink and the War, p. 96.
42 The Times 3 May 1915.
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Figure 13: A picture published in the Manchester Guardian showing the
numerous letters written to Lloyd George on this subject.
In an attempt to lessen the apparent class hypocrisy on 30 March 1915 Lloyd
George succeeded in persuading the King to abstain from alcohol during the war. The
King proclaimed that he had given up drink ‘so that no difference shall be made . . .
between the treatment of rich and poor in this question’. Buttressed by assurances
from Lloyd George of further declarations of personal enforced sobriety from ‘judges,
Cabinet Ministers, Clergy, the Medical profession, Great Manufacturers and if
possible the Trade Union Leaders’ the King’s letter was published, the first step on a
campaign aimed at encouraging declarations of personal abstinence. 43
43 Lloyd George Papers, C/5/6/12.
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Figure 14: A cartoon that appeared in The Daily Mirror showing how drink had
become a popular topic of conversation.
Unfortunately for the King no such further declarations, aside from Lord
Kitchener and Lord Haldane in government, emerged. The shining lights of British
society were not keen on practising what they preached. This dereliction of duty did
not escape censure. The National Review commented that the failure of Asquith to
follow the King and take the pledge had ‘naturally aroused comment’.44 Given
Asquith’s fondness for the odd tipple this is unsurprising. Some were quite vitriolic in
44 E.S.Turner, Dear Old Blighty, p. 87.
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their refusal to join the King. F.E. Smith, the Conservative M.P., and renowned
hedonist, told Lloyd George ‘My dear George, next time you see His Majesty I hope
you will tell him, with all respect, that he isn’t going to put a key on my wine
cellar.’45
In his memoirs Lloyd George attacked the failure of others to join the King in
abstaining: ‘this attitude on the part of the nation’s legislators helped to prevent the
King’s pledge from becoming the starting point which King George and his advisers
had hoped it might prove for a big voluntary movement of national sobriety’.46 He
neglected to mention that he, in this case, had been the King’s principal advisor.
Also, given that Lloyd George was turning his mind to state-based solutions to the
drink problem, it seems strange that he would implicate the King in a movement
based around self-denial.
In his war memoirs he went on to state that ‘unfortunately the King’s example
was not adopted widely enough to make any deep impression on the problem itself . .
. it remained, therefore, to reinforce this initial impulse by statutory powers.’47 The
evidence suggests that Lloyd George was hitting out in all directions at the drink
problem. This resulted in huge inconsistencies. Lloyd George himself was a very
moderate drinker but, like most of the cabinet, never renounced a tipple, leaving a
moral vacuum at the heart of the proposals. This discrepancy caused much outrage
and vitriolic sentiment from commentators. Arthur Mee wrote:
Will it be believed, we may wonder, when the historian comes to write the
story of these times, that in the spring of 1915 the destinies of Britain were in
the hands of men who saw these things, who knew them well, who were
warned – not once nor twice, but many times – that our Armies and Fleets
were in peril through drink, but who listened to the warnings and did nothing?
45 Ibid. p. 87.
46 Lloyd George, War Memoirs, p. 330.
47 Ibid. p. 330.
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. . . The House of Commons kept open its bars defiantly . . . to patronise, at
the bars of parliament, this trade that the King had banished from his house.48
Lord Roseberry also lambasted Lloyd George: ‘this agitation is saturated with
humbug and hypocrisy. The working man is to be reformed and regulated, but most of
the reformers are laying in good stocks of liquor to provide against the evil day of
prohibition.’49 This lack of moral leadership is more surprising when one considers
Lloyd George’s further discussion of the issue in his memoirs:
There was sound wisdom in the scheme for the workers habitually
complained, and with all too good reason, that while their employers and the
members of the so called upper classes were eternally lecturing and rebuking
them for drinking, they were themselves freely and often excessively enjoying
the alcohol which they sought to deny to their employees.50
The fact that in his memoirs he condones upper class drinking yet only attacked
working class drinking in his speech at Bangor at the time suggests that it was the
working class specifically that he sought to blame. The moral duplicity he displayed
in not rejecting alcohol indicates Lloyd George’s hypocrisy over this issue.
Nevertheless, in the public sphere the King’s pledge apparently did have an
effect, albeit a temporary one. The Daily Express drew attention to the new sobriety at
the palace:
At dinner their majesties usual beverages are burgundy and champagne in very
small quantities but varieties are provided for guests. In regard to the
household nothing alcoholic whatever can be obtained inside for all the cellars
are firmly fastened and any one bringing intoxicants within the precincts will
subject himself to instant dismissal. Throughout the palace lemonade, ginger
beer, soda water, barley water, fruit drinks and plain water hot and cold are
served at the tables in place of the former supply of hock, claret, chablis, port,
burgundy, champagne and liquor brandy while there is a large increase in the
consumption of tea, coffee and chocolate.51
His pledge interlinked abstention and patriotism with the unmistakeable implication
being that if the sovereign had chosen to abstain then surely everyone should follow
48 A. Mee and J. Stuart Holden, Defeat or Victory?: The Strength of Britain book, pp. 14-15.
49 J. McEwan, (ed.), The Riddell Diaries 1908-1923 (London, 1986), p. 105.
50 Lloyd George, War Memoirs, p. 329.
51 The Daily Express 17 April 1915.
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suit. Nevertheless it had a detrimental personal effect as it led the King to eat more
resulting in unnecessary weight gain.52
The pledge provoked a clear reaction from many. One patriotic columnist
wrote ‘the nation must realise that the situation is even graver than is commonly
supposed. It is a situation which demands the self-sacrifice of every individual and of
every interest. In that self sacrifice the King has furnished a lead which none of his
loyal subjects will decline to follow.’53 A ubiquitous commitment to follow the
King’s example emerged: one man confirmed that, due to the actions of the King,
‘We are all becoming tee total nowadays.’54 In a letter to The Times a Mr R.
Burbridge wrote:
As illustrating the great influence of the King’s example in deciding to forego
alcohol during the war, I am sure it will be of public interest to know that
today all our employees who have meals on the premises have unanimously
offered to give up alcoholic drinks for the future. I have no doubt that large
masses of workers all through the country will act similarly, and also that
employers will encourage this national movement toward temperance
wherever the desire for abstinence is manifested.55
52 G. Cassar, ‘Kitchener at the War Office’ in Hugh Cecil and Peter Liddle, (eds.), Facing
Armageddon: The First World War Experienced (London, 1996), p. 39.
53 Dundee Courier 1 April 1915.
54 Dundee Courier 7 April 1915.
55 The Times 7 April 1915.
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Figure 15: This cartoonist predicted that everyone would follow the King’s lead.
His sarcastic handling of events draws attention to the paucity of taste to be had
from water and its place in the social habits of society.
The proliferation of declarations of sobriety, which followed the King’s example,
should come as no surprise, as the British working man was, in general, proud of the
monarchy and very deferential. As one contributor to The Spectator wrote:
In the days of chivalry it would have been treachery for those who stood
nearest the King not to have responded to his summons when the country’s
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safety was threatened. I do not claim that such a situation has exactly been
reproduced today, but a resemblance exists that is uncomfortably striking.56
Indeed, the position of the King was unquestioned by all classes; innate patriotism
predominated. As one publican commented ‘the average man will be half ashamed to
be seen patronising drinking places’.57 Some companies sought to profit from the
King’s abstinence. Wrigley’s urged customers to ‘follow the King’s lead’ and ‘avoid
alcohol’ by chewing gum. Recipes for ‘good’ drinks made out of fruit, ‘oranges,
apples and the rest’, together with lemonade and barley water appeared in the press.58
Thus, whilst the movement did not perhaps evolve as Lloyd George had expected, it
was still useful in persuading topers to think about their drinking habits in a way
which previously they had not. It is a shame the campaign did not gain added impetus
from others whose example would have deepened the implicit moral shame that
accompanied drinking. Despite his failure to sign up to the pledge, Lloyd George, in a
letter to his nephew, outlined his anger at those who failed to take up the matter:
Great pity that the bulk of them are not deprived of pub services by
prohibition. Altogether should the House of Commons, who failed to give an
example, and those of status had followed their king in this matter and done
their duty it would be far greater service to their country at these times than
most of them can possibly do otherwise. [In Welsh] Shame on them!59
Whatever the intricacies of the drink debate the evidence shows that the drink
issue was a divisive affair. The power of the social panic which drink facilitated is
measured when one assesses those who contributed to the debate. The King, the
media, parliament, the cabinet, high society, and the church all had a say. The issue
was contentious, and one that needed a solution, yet it was difficult to do so since
precise information on the nature of the problem had yet to be presented to the most
56 The Spectator 18 December 1915.
57 The People’s Journal 10 April 1915.
58 The Daily Mirror 13 and 14 April 1915.
59 Lloyd George Papers, C/23/2, 23 April 1915.
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important participants of all – the public. Seeking to dampen the popular hysteria, The
Times declared:
The question of drink in connection with the production of war material is
getting a little out of perspective . . . To magnify a single point until it assumes
monstrous proportions and blocks out everything else is the certain road to
failure. The problem is to increase the production of war material, but it is in
danger of disappearing from view in a cloud of controversial dust about the
age long subject of drink. Mr Lloyd George’s striking remark about fighting
three enemies of whom the worst is drink may have led to certain confusion. It
puts drink, which can only be fought in a metaphorical sense, on the same
plane with the enemy whom we are really fighting.60
The editorial reveals the panic now entrenched in the public mind. The problem was
out of perspective as essentially the shortage of shells was a manpower and
management problem rather than a drink problem.
Stung by criticism that his views concerning drinking were based on little
more than speculation, Lloyd George attempted to dissipate dissident voices by
ascertaining the true extent of the drink problem through a review of drinking habits.
Under the auspices of Reginald McKenna, Lloyd George took counsel from
plainclothes investigators who had been sent to northern munitions and shipbuilding
areas to discover the veracity of claims regarding the impact of drink on productivity.
Lloyd George was told that these men found a ‘deplorable state of things’ on the
ground.61 Evidently, behind the chimera of a united industrial sector, drink was
sapping productive energies.
The Board of Trade simultaneously set about inquiring into the same
phenomenon with their evidence used by Lloyd George when he presented the
Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) to parliament on 29 April 1915, and on 1 May,
presented a white paper entitled ‘Report and statistics of bad time keeping in
60 The Times 3 April 1915.
61 National Archives, Cabinet Papers, CAB 37/127/23, McKenna’s report ‘drinking in the shipbuilding
trades’, 1 May 1915.
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shipbuilding, munitions and transport areas.’ Shadwell, who found the evidence much
more convincing than the accounts relied upon previously, wrote:
It was more comprehensive, detailed and precise than previous utterances on
the subject, and it made a great impression. It proved beyond all possibility of
denial the prevalence of drinking habits in certain districts, chiefly in the
Northern shipyards and in naval transport areas . . . which brought the standard
of efficiency not only below a possible maximum, but below the normal
level.62
There was, however, no real consensus of opinion. Various interested parties
criticised the method of investigation undertaken. Labour members of Parliament,
upon presentation of the DORA bill, stated that:
Evidence has been sought only from employers and officials, that is one sided
and unfair, we know the workers, why was not our help and knowledge called
for? We should have pointed out that ‘broken time’ was due to more than one
cause, to bad weather, to sickness, overstrain, insufficient rest and food, delays
of material, inefficient labour replacing the efficient men who have enlisted, as
well as to drink.63
They had a point. No matter how the social investigations were undertaken the level
of impartiality, due to the middle class environments from which the investigators
originated, was always likely to be circumspect. To see the effect of drinking on work
as it was, or as the section of those who disagreed with the report would have liked to
believe, was always going to be difficult. Given what has been said about class
presupposition, how was someone who had never worked on an industrial site
expected to understand conditions and the dreadful monotony of industrial work? In
The Scotsman Mr Will Thorne, Labour M.P. and General Secretary of the National
Union of Gas Workers and General Labourers, made clear that he ‘was not prepared
to admit all that Mr Lloyd George had said’ as he had ‘spoken with men who were
teetotallers and who had worked eighty or ninety hours a week on the production of
war munitions’ who had told him that it was ‘a physical impossibility to work on
62 A. Shadwell, Drink in 1914-1922, p. 21.
63 H. Carter, The Control of the Drink Trade, p. 72.
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through these hours without special sustenance’.64 Despite Lloyd George’s assertion
that ‘there was no charge against the working classes of the country’, there was
undoubtedly a necessity to establish the existence of a drink problem amongst the
working class to justify legislation aimed at curtailing such activities.
Turner contends that the McKenna inquiry, to an extent, was prejudiced from
the start since, briefed to find out about drinking habits, it would ‘require a
superhuman objectivity on their part not to conclude that drink was the root of all
evil’.65 The situation was farcical in some ways. First, there was no real agreement on
whether a drink problem really existed. Furthermore, the evidence gathered to
illustrate the real existence of such a problem was criticised not just in terms of its
inaccuracy, but also due to the method by which it had been gathered. An admiralty
minute submitted to Churchill concurred with this criticism stating ‘the very worst
form of evidence on which to ground a general indictment against the ordinary labour
of the country is ex parte statements made by its employers’.66 Nevertheless the
government’s information oiled the cogs of political reform of the drink problem,
increasing the political capital that Lloyd George utilised to implement change.
Perhaps the most damning verdict of this whole procedure though came from the
mouth of Lloyd George himself who, according to Christopher Addison, said that ‘the
idea that slackness and drink, which people talk so much about, are the causes of
delay, is mostly fudge.’67
Lloyd George was willing to cash in this political capital but faced a battle
spending it as he wished. Clearly the question occupied a great deal of his attention.
Asquith, somewhat contemptuously, wrote to Venetia Stanley that ‘Lloyd George is
64 The Scotsman 22 March 1915.
65 E.S. Turner, Dear Old Blighty, p. 599.
66 Lloyd George Papers, C/3/16/25, Churchill to Lloyd George 7 April 1915.
67 J. McEwan, (ed.), The Riddell Diaries 1908-1923, p. 74. Entry of 10 April 1915.
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now off thinking of anything but drink’.68 Foremost in his thoughts was state
purchase of the entire liquor trade, a monumental legislative feat if it could be
implemented. The government chief whip somewhat jealously wrote that ‘Lloyd
George has got a very big scheme on hand and, as usual, he will probably get his own
way.’69 This confidence in the Chancellor’s ability was on this occasion awry. A less
flattering assessment came from Asquith who thought that Lloyd George had
‘completely lost his head’ on the issue, with his mind oscillating ‘from hour to hour’
between ‘the two poles of absurdity, cutting off all drink from the working man –
which would lead to something like a universal strike – or buying out the whole liquor
trade of the country and replacing it by a huge state monopoly’.70
Lloyd George set about negotiating with various interested parties in order to
establish the cost and realistically appraise the likelihood of state purchase. An initial
report from Sir William Pender estimated the cost of state purchase initially to be
£320 million but this was reduced to £225 million. A cabinet committee chaired by
Herbert Samuel was also established to consider the monetary costs of such a
project.71 After negotiations with the Conservatives and members of the trade, and
with support from a section of the temperance movement, the state purchase scheme
evidently seemed a viable possibility.
The Tories favoured the idea of disinterested management and some form of
action being taken on the drink issue with many within the trade favouring a buy out
68 J.A. Spender and Cyril Asquith, Life of Lord Oxford and Asquith (London, 1932), p. 139.
69 John Gullard to Elsie Osborne 11 April 1915, Cameron Hazlehurst, Politicians at War, p. 211.
70 Asquith, Memories and Reflections (London, 1928), p. 71. The historian Marvin Rintala claims that
Asquith cannot be considered ‘disinterested’ as he was ‘an alcoholic . . . part of the drinking problem
faced by Britain in the First World War and no part of the solution to that problem.’ Rintala contends
that Asquith’s ‘alcoholism’ was an important factor in his political demise. See M. Rintala, ‘Taking the
Pledge: H.H. Asquith and Drink’, Biography, Vol. 16, No. 2, p. 10.
71 The committee was comprised of Herbert Samuel M.P. (Chairman), Lord Conlaffe, Governor of the
Bank of England, Sir John Simon M.P., Sir John Bradbury, of the Treasury, Sir William Plender, Sir
John Harmood Banner M.P., Sir Edward Coates M.P., Sir Thomas Whittaker M.P., and Philip
Snowden M.P.
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that guaranteed sufficient financial compensation as opposed to facing a continued
battle to make ends meet during the war. Further impetus was given to the cause by
the ‘surprisingly generous’ terms that were suggested as payment to Brewers by
Samuel’s committee.72 Asquith was less convinced believing that the purchase
scheme ‘will ruin our finances.’73 In the days before the advent of coalition
government, Conservative support was advantageous and on this occasion it was
forthcoming. As serious action was now required, the trade would, according to Bonar
Law:
Come to us as a Party telling us that they are ruined and expect us to oppose it
. . . If we do not oppose what the government suggest we shall be bitterly
attacked by the Trade which will have a great deal of support in our own party.
On the other hand, if we do not oppose the proposals of the government we
shall certainly offend a large section of conservative opinion which has
become a little hysterical on this subject.74
The hysteria surrounding the drink problem was a factor driving reform. Bonar Law
opted to support state purchase and disinterested management buttressed by a belief
that the reform would cause the Liberals difficulties in dealing with the ‘opposition of
the teetotal fanatics’.75 The trade was not universally in favour of the measures,
despite the financial security that state purchase could potentially guarantee. As The
Times argued:
There is a general feeling in the licensed trade that all sense of proportion is
being lost and that for the remedies which are being suggested there is not the
slightest justification . . . The acting secretary of the Brewery Society states
yesterday that it seemed incredible, especially when all parties were agreed
that there should be a political truce, that any proposal involving hundreds of
millions of pounds could be carried through when the nation was engaged
upon the greatest war in history . . . the people interested in the licensed trade
are inclined to resent ‘the manner in which temperance advocates are
exploiting the necessity of the moment in the interests of the cause they have
at heart.’ They declare that it is a breach of the political truce at a time when
72 J. Greenaway, Drink and British since 1830: A Study in Policy Making, p. 96.
73 G.B. Wilson, Alcohol and the Nation, p. 121.
74 J. Greenaway, Drink and British Politics, p. 97.
75 Ibid. p. 96.
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the friends of the trade are fighting the country’s battle abroad and cannot
therefore defend them at home.76
The two extremes of the drink debate were united in their hostility to the measures.
Ironically some temperance workers let it be known that state purchase would be akin
to a ‘partnership with the devil’.77 Their particular preference for prohibition excluded
the prospect of any progressive temperance reforms being seen to be in the interests of
the nation. The National Union of Brewery Workers were unlikely allies, albeit for
different reasons, calling the measures the product of ‘a colossal outburst of
misguided fanaticism’.78 Reports circulated that people were ‘stocking up on beer,
wine and whisky in case prohibition being enacted’.79
Progress towards state purchase floundered when it was discussed in cabinet
on 15 April. At this meeting Asquith spoke against state purchase and was apparently
pleased that Lloyd George accepted his comments with relative calmness. Four days
later the issue was again discussed in cabinet, after which Asquith declared the ‘Great
Purchase folly’ to be as ‘dead as Queen Anne’.80 ‘Lloyd George’s idea of
nationalising the drink trade came to nothing to the distress of one section of the
public, who thought that a great opportunity was missed, and to the joy of another
section’; recalled the contemporary chronicler C.S. Peel.81 The costs of purchase had
proven too prohibitive for the cabinet to accept, alternatives necessarily had to be
sought.
The Daily Mail doubted Lloyd George’s ability to find an alternative and also
questioned the rationale for his action: ‘We recognise Mr Lloyd George’s honest
76 The Times 15 April 1915.
77 The Daily Graphic 14 April 1915.
78 Dundee Advertiser 2 April 1915.
79 St Andrews Citizen 17 April 1915.
80 H.H. Asquith, Memories and Reflections 1852-1927: Volume Two (London, 1928), p. 74.
81 C.S. Peel, How we Lived then 1914-1918: A sketch of social and domestic life in England during the
War (London, 1929), p. 63.
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intentions throughout but the truth seems to be that this drink question has become
such an obsession with him that he is unable to see facts in their true proportion.’82
Others were harsher. The Brewers’ Gazette wrote that ‘it is difficult to equal the
muddleheadedness of this type of idiot: to suggest that you can cure an ‘‘appetite’’ for
drink by buying up the licenses of publicans is like insisting that you will destroy a
taste for beef by killing all the butchers.’83
The relative ease with which Lloyd George set about drawing up alternative
plans either indicates his ideological non-commitment to the idea of state purchase or
a pragmatic acceptance that the plans were unworkable and he would be better off
attempting to create some form of compromise. As Beaverbrook commented ‘one
may marvel at, if one can hardly admire, the light hearted way in which Lloyd George
picked up this vast new plan as one might pick up a sovereign and then dropped it
again as quickly as if the sovereign had turned out to be a hot potato.’84 The Wine
Trade Review noted that it had been ‘the sharpest crisis that has ever arisen in the
history of the trades and manufacturers concerned, it arose so suddenly, loomed dark
and heavy for a week or so, and then collapsed’.85
Turner argues that the scheme was never an end in itself but merely a means to
‘creating a public impression of great emergency to justify such radical schemes as
the Treasury Agreements.’86 Whilst agreeing with this interpretation it is necessary to
stress that the commotion caused by the drink problem was not solely created by
Lloyd George but, as can be seen from the previous chapter, was evident from the
very first days of the war and had been a social problem for the past century. The
debate about state purchase had made the issue even more newsworthy but this played
82 The Daily Mail 30 April 1915.
83 The Brewers’ Gazette 10 June 1915.
84 Lord Beaverbrook, Politicians and the War, p. 69.
85 The Wine Trade Review May 1915.
86 J. Turner, ‘State Purchase of the Liquor Trade’, pp. 603-604.
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upon already existing fears rather than conjuring up new totems of social discontent.
If the controversial issue was cost then from the earliest discussions concerning state
purchase it would have been apparent that this was likely to prove prohibitive.
Therefore it is confusing as to why Lloyd George would pursue the matter. One could
argue that he truly believed in the legislation, seeing it as evidence of his ability to be
seen to achieve tangible results in government, or that he desired some form of
resolution to the drink problem and was not particularly bothered by what form this
took. Regardless of which interpretation is closer to the truth it did not take long for
Lloyd George to come up with his ‘ingenious substitute’ plans.87
On 19 April the cabinet concluded that the best option was to pursue a dual
policy of higher taxation on spirits, wines and heavy beers together with the
implementation of government control of pubs and breweries in certain areas
considered to be of importance to the war effort. These plans were seemingly less
popular than those for state purchase. Fearing the financial burdens of a trade lull
during the war and the threat of temporary restriction and control on offer, brewers,
such as George Younger, sought to harness their natural base of support within the
Conservative party to obstruct the full implementation of these new proposals.
Meanwhile on 29 April Lloyd George announced the plans to the Commons,
articulating his new plans for control and promising a rise in liquor taxation at the
next budget. So high were these proposed levels of taxation that one commentator
described them as ‘stillborn’,88 whilst Shadwell, in hindsight, described them as
‘amounting to partial prohibition’.89 Duty on spirits was to be doubled, wine duty to
be quadrupled and surtaxes placed on higher strength beers. Alcohol taxation was
recognised as an important facet of government finance and as such its revenue
87 H.H. Asquith, Memories and Reflections, p. 73.
88 St Andrews Citizen 8 May 1915.
89 A. Shadwell, Drink in 1914-1922, p. 20.
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potential was regularly tapped. These measures, though, in the climate of spring 1915,
were seemingly proposed as a means by which the state could try to influence the
consumption of alcohol by making drink prohibitively expensive; added revenue
would be a bonus. With state purchase at the time a non-starter, increased taxes
offered a partially tenable form of indirect control to the state.
However, both the trade and the Conservative party opposed these measures.
Bonar Law faced calls within his party to oppose the legislation. Lansdowne wrote to
Bonar Law: ‘I wish we had more information as to the facts – I rather resent action
which is in effect a plea of guilty to a charge of national insobriety.’90 A visiting
deputation from the National Trade Defence Association told Law that ‘we do not see
that we are called upon to make sacrifices which to many of us will amount to
absolute ruin for no good whatsoever’.91 Bonar Law subsequently informed Lloyd
George that support for the increased liquor taxation would not be forthcoming from
the Conservatives, saying that ‘the Tory party is so much in the hands of the trade that
they must oppose these (tax increases) root and branch’.92 In the debate on the
legislation on 4 May the vehemence of this opposition was made clear when
Conservative backbench M.P.s voiced their hostility to higher tax. Further antipathy
to the measures came from Irish representatives who argued that economically
important beer imports into Britain would suffer if these taxes were passed. John
Redmond warned ‘if this proposal is carried out, no one who is acquainted with the
trade will deny that Dublin stout and porter will be entirely put out of the market in
this country.’93 Trade hostility was understandably fervent. The Brewers’ Society
90 Bonar Law Papers, BL 117/1/6, Lansdowne to Bonar Law 3 April 1915.
91 J. Turner, ‘State Purchase of the Liquor Trade’, p. 605.
92 H.H. Asquith, Memories and Reflections, p. 75.
93 Hansard 11 May 1915.
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believed that ‘no case for the taxation proposals had been made’.94 One distiller
regarded the tax increases ‘as those of a temperance fanatic. The working classes were
to be most severely hit whereas the man who could buy champagne and wine was
practically not touched at all.’95 B.T. Hall, secretary of the Working Men’s Club and
Institute Union, believed that Lloyd George had missed the point entirely:
Recent restrictions . . . are not dictated by public necessity, but by an energetic
minority of fanatics . . . What is wanted is a little more confidence in the
character and self respect of the people, and a little less of the Prussian method
of compelling men to do or refrain from doing certain things at the dictation of
a few persons who arrogate themselves to the position of supermen.96
Some workers suggested that excess wages would more than cover the proposed price
hike. One worker commented that:
They might have some effect if there had been unemployment and a
consequent shortage of cash but the fact that all kinds of workers are earning
more money and adding it more steadily than they have ever done before
seems to have been overlooked. The addition of the price of spirits can easily
be met by the surplus wages.97
Indeed, these increased wages had been a source of the original discontent, as more
money was believed to be going toward drink. One ‘observer’ in Lloyd George’s
white paper suggested that ‘they [the workers] have not been educated to spend their
wages wisely and the money is largely wasted, for they have few interests and little to
spend their wage on apart from alcohol.’98
Negotiations took place but there was not much room for compromise. Only
the proposed prohibition of the sale of spirits less than three years old survived.99 The
trade approved of this measure describing it as ‘an infinitely better measure, more
94 Brewers and Licensed Trade Retail Association records, MSS. 420, Box Number 1, Minute Book 4,
30 April 1915.
95 Dundee Advertiser 1 April 1915.
96 The Daily Telegraph 1 May 1915.
97 Dundee Advertiser 10 May 1915.
98 The Daily Telegraph 3 May 1915.
99 The Immature Spirits Act which Lloyd George described as an ‘insignificant but quite useful little
restriction.’ The act created a shortage of whisky during the war.
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knowledgeable and restrained, than might have been expected from a government
which so recently was responsible for drink proposals that were insincere, based upon
ignorance and prejudice, and inherently unsound.’100 As The Scotsman opined, ‘any
idea of forcing abstinence upon the people by prohibitive taxation has had to be
abandoned’.101
Despite the furore over the issue, the special areas scheme was passed without
the open hostility which had met the taxation proposals and went into legislation via
changes to the DORA regulations on 18 May, paving the way for the formation of the
Central Control Board. In proposing this legislation Lloyd George sought to draw a
line under events by stating that ‘of all the perplexing and disagreeable tasks that has
fallen to the lot of my ministry, I think the attempt to provide a solution to the drink
difficulty is about the worst . . . To agree upon facts is bad enough, but to agree about
a remedy is impossible.’102 An alternate solution had thus been found to deal with the
‘crisis’ of the preponderance of drink in the manufacturing industries. Lloyd George
played a prominent role throughout eventually arriving at the compromise of control
in certain areas. Turner has argued that state purchase was ‘not a temperance
measure’, that the idea was ‘based around false premises about a social problem’ and
he questions whether it ‘was all symbolic activity, designed and presented by a master
showman to convince the British people that the war could be won.’103 Nevertheless,
in essence, the possibility of state purchase in 1915 paved the way for the compromise
of the scheme of control. It made the formation of the CCB, as Henry Carer observed,
seem ‘mild by comparison’.104
100 The Wine Trade Review May 1915.
101 The Scotsman 7 May 1915.
102 Hansard 29 April 1915.
103 J. Turner, ‘State Purchase of the Liquor Trade’, p. 615.
104 H. Carter, The Control of the Drink Trade, p. 135.
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Chapter Four: Restrictive or Constructive? The Early Stages of the Central
Control Board
The Central Control Board came into being on 19 May 1915 with the passing
of the Defence of the Realm (Amendment) (No.3) Act, 1915. The Order in Council
establishing the Defence of the Realm (Liquor Control Regulations), giving the CCB
actual powers and defining the functions, constitution and power of the Board, was
applied on 10 June 1915. The Board was established for the purpose of ‘controlling
the sale and supply of intoxicating liquor in naval, military, munitions or transport
areas, where such control should be found expedient for the successful prosecution of
the war.’1 This was a historic moment for drink control in Britain. For the first time a
government body with real power had been established to deal explicitly with the
question of alcohol consumption, focussed upon national efficiency. The parameters
in which the Board could act were apparently firm but the perception of them, as we
shall see, was open to interpretation. These criteria meant that the CCB could not
enact change simply for reform’s sake. As Lord D’Abernon, Chairman of the Central
Control Board, later recalled ‘[the actions of the Board] constitute the first attempt to
deal with the drink traffic solely on lines of national efficiency, any other aspect of the
problem having been barred by the terms of reference’.2 Thus, much of the action
taken by the Central Control Board, under the auspices of ‘national efficiency’, was
reformist in nature for the simple reason that social reform was in the best interests of
increasing national efficiency.
As we have seen, the Edwardian concept of ‘national efficiency’ was founded
upon primarily middle class concerns. Drinking contributed towards inefficiency and
the working class supposedly drank more than any other class. The social habits of the
1 The Defence of the Realm (Liquor Control) Regulations 1915.
2 A. Shadwell, Drink in 1914-1922: A Lesson in Control, p. ix.
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working class were centred on the pub, were visible and permeated much of the urban
fabric of British society. Criticisms of the middle and upper classes unproductive
pleasures were less common. Their social habits were not subject to such intense
scrutiny and thus caused less concern. Puritanical introspection was not considered a
character trait of the middle and upper classes. For years, various ‘concerned’ groups
had agitated for reform to no avail. The war gave the arguments of these progressives
a new impetus to deal specifically with the institution of the public house. An assault
on the traditions of the public house may have been justified in terms of national
efficiency, but the consequences were perceived in such a way that it was apparent
that this was an attack upon the working class as a whole. The boundaries between
efficiency and persecution were blurred, yet drew attention to the fact that British
society was intensely divided by class attitudes which the war had temporarily
obscured.
This chapter details the first steps taken by the Board to reduce drinking. It
argues that the Board did seek to act solely in the interests of national efficiency but
that broader societal preconceptions of working class behaviour and a distrust of their
moral commitment to the war influenced its action. The reaction to many of the
Board’s decisions show that these issues divided classes and indicates how sociability
was conceived as an intrinsic aspect of class identity. Members of the CCB frequently
denied that class was a factor taken into consideration, but actions speak louder than
sanctimonious rhetoric. By investigating the actions of the Board the eventual
culmination of many pre-war temperance schemes is evident.
On 9 June 1915 the Scottish Licensed Trade Defence Association (SLTDA)
met in Edinburgh. These meetings had been common in the pre-war years, but on this
particular occasion the air was rife with discontent and disappointment. The meeting
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sheds light on the concerns of the trade and exemplifies the perpetual distrust that
existed between the trade and temperance factions. As The Scotsman, reporting on the
speech by the President of the Association, noted:
Their position as a trade was that whenever it could be shown that any
disability that was imposed upon them was going to further the prospect of
victory, or was going to shorten the war by a single day, they were perfectly
prepared to bear that disability and suffer loss. But they thought there had been
too much made of drunkenness by the extreme section of the state – (applause)
– and that it was not really drunkenness that was causing delay in the
production of munitions of war so much as the want of patriotism on the part
of a large section of the people. He thought it was also, to some extent, a want
of patriotism on the part of the extreme temperance party – (hear, hear and
applause) – in that on no account whatever would they allow the liquor traffic
to assist by the own efforts, in helping the government. (Applause).3
Feeling that their patriotism had been slighted, the trade was not afraid to sulk over its
treatment. The President’s comments illustrate that old hostility between the divergent
factions of the drink discourse perpetuated into the war. The speech indicates the
desire and willingness of the trade to cloak itself in patriotic clothing and comply with
the wishes of the government, but also exemplifies an issue which was to rankle
throughout the conflict – the issue of fairness and equality of sacrifice. The trade had
difficulty in altering longstanding perceptions of conduct and overcoming the natural
enmity that existed between those who wanted drink banned and those who normally
prospered from it. The Central Control Board, if it was to be successful and enact
substantial change, would have to work through this thicket of prejudice, working
with both extremes who, at various points, had hindered any resolution to the drink
issue.
To be sure, the SLTDA was only a pressure group, and one amongst many,
but its opinions still had to be considered. Others, such as Thomas Whittaker, believed
that armed conflict gave the temperance movement a great opportunity to strike
3 The Scotsman 10 June 1915.
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‘whilst the overshadowing issues of the war are accustoming the people to restricted
liberties’.4 Some saw through this opportunism. The Daily Express noted that ‘it is the
vehement denunciation by the cranks of the ordinary enjoyments of human life that
have made the public houses of this country mere drinking dens’.5 Nevertheless, the
CCB would have to frame its actions in terms which were suitable for all parties
concerned. It was to prove a difficult task but one willingly undertaken in the interests
of a much greater cause, that of winning the war.
Lloyd George, upon assent being given to the bill creating the CCB, declared
that the Board was to ‘comprise representatives of the admiralty, the war office, the
home office, employees of labour, labour organisations and men of rather wider
interests’.6 Whilst being subject to the jurisdiction of the government in terms of
member selection, the Board was otherwise an autonomous body with complete
power to implement reform. It was also independent of Parliament, an issue that was
later raised to question both the legitimacy and accountability of the CCB. Critics
pointed out that the Board ‘is not itself representative, and its attributes, and certainly
its methods, are rather those of a secret conclave than of a responsible authority’.7
Before considering the Board’s policies it is pertinent to consider its most prominent
members.
The Board was composed of an array of individuals from a variety of
backgrounds. Lord D’Abernon, otherwise known as Edgar Vincent, was asked to
preside over the CCB and readily accepted. He had had an eventful career.
Throughout his life he had been a financier, diplomat, former Conservative M.P. and
unsuccessful Liberal candidate and had a good administrative background, as
4 B. Glover, Brewing for Victory: Brewers, Beer and Pubs in World War Two (Cambridge, 1995), p. 2.
5 The Daily Express 10 April 1915.
6 Hansard 10 May 1915.
7 H.J. Jennings, ‘New Drink Regulations’, Fortnightly Review January 1916, p. 178.
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demonstrated by his role as financial advisor to the Egyptian Government and
afterwards as Governor of the Imperial Ottoman bank at Constantinople. Sydney
Neville, who was later a member of the Board, wrote of D’Abernon that ‘with his
long experience in difficult public problems [he] was an ideal chairman for an
organisation such as the CCB. His indeed was a magnificent presence.’8 Neville also
wrote that D’Abernon ‘held decided views on drink and especially on the public
house, which in many ways matched my own’.9 D’Abernon was an imposing, and, in
private, charismatic figure. Margot Asquith described him as ‘one of the four best
looking men I ever saw’.10 Sir Collin Scott-Moncrieffe agreed, describing Lord
D’Abernon as ‘beautiful . . . like a son of the Gods’.11
8 S. Neville, Seventy Rolling Years, p. 98.
9 Ibid. p. 98.
10 M. Asquith, The Autobiography of Margot Asquith: Volume Two (London, 1936), p. 129.
11 M.A. Hollings, (ed.) The Life of Sir Colin-Scott Moncrieff (London, 1917), p. 157.
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Figure 16: Lord D’Abernon, aka Edgar Vincent, Chairman of the CCB.
D’Abernon’s ‘beauty’ was an attribute that he apparently made good use of,
with his extra marital affairs earning him the laudatory nickname ‘the Piccadilly
135
Stallion’.12 Sir Robert Vansittart described him as having ‘something more than an
eye for a pretty girl, excellent company, one of those Britons who contrive to be
cosmopolitan in culture and insular in outlook’.13 It seems that it was perfectly
acceptable for him to concern himself with the supposed immoral activities of others
whilst not exactly being a beacon of virtue himself. Indeed D’Abernon had a
reputation for being very self-confident. He was granted a peerage in July 1914
making him Baron D’Abernon of Esher upon the recommendation of Asquith14, who
wrote of him two months later: ‘Edgar is a curious study – fine intelligence,
undeniable charm, and the simulation of bigness without quite the reality.’15
Lloyd George’s selection of D’Abernon as Chairman of the Board is
unsurprising given that D’Abernon had links with the drink question from before the
war, having served on the Home Counties’ Trust from 1909.16 This was an
organisation that believed in reforming the physical layout of the pub, and the goods
offered for sale, in order to engineer reform within the individual customer. His
expertise thus lay in the constructive and reformist aspect of public house reform. The
necessity of required improvements in national efficiency gave D’Abernon the ideal
opportunity to practice what he had preached. He was sure that the ‘phenomenon of
intemperance could be controlled by skilful legislation’.17 This chance, as we shall
see, was pursued with some vigour.
Philip Snowden was another prominent member of the Board. He was a
fervent socialist, a devout teetotaller and a prolific journalist who espoused his views
12 Richard Davenport-Hines, ‘Vincent, Edgar, Viscount D'Abernon (1857–1941)’, Oxford Dictionary
National Biography (September 2004) www.oxforddnb.com.
13 G. Johnson, The Berlin Embassy of Lord D’Abernon 1920-1926 (Basingstoke, 2002), p. 21.
14 D’Abernon had close links with the Asquith’s. He was godfather to Violet Asquith’s daughter,
Cressida Bonham Carter. Lady D’Abernon was godmother to Raymond Asquith’s daughter, Helen.
15 M. Brock and E. Brock, H.H. Asquith: Letters to Venetia Stanley (London, 1982), p. 240.
16 An organisation which favoured the expansion of food sales in public houses. See D. Gutzke,
‘Gentrifying the British Public House’.
17 Lord D’Abernon, ‘Preface’ to H.M. Vernon, The Alcohol Problem (London, 1928), p. vi.
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at meetings throughout the northwest and through his writing. He originated from a
working class background, was largely self-educated and had a distinguished career in
the civil service. Elected in 1906 as the Labour M.P. for Blackburn he became a
socialist figure of nationwide renown. In 1908 he published an important work on the
drink issue, Socialism and the Drink Trade.18 In July 1914, disillusioned by
disagreements with Labour contemporaries, Snowden embarked upon a worldwide
lecture tour during which he focussed primarily upon temperance. He was a member
of the Committee which had reported upon state purchase in March 1915 and was a
prominent advocate of this cause. As one historian has argued ‘[he] accepted a seat on
the Board motivated more by his dislike of drink than by the desire that this body
might prevent the consumption of alcohol impairing the war effort’.19 As a devout
teetotaller any opportunity to tackle the demon drink was readily acceptable to him
and it is unsurprising that Snowden stepped into the breach. Yet rather than follow the
extreme policy of many teetotallers, he thought it better to apply existing liquor laws
to the letter, and seek to provide working men with counter attractions to the public
house.20 He thus complemented the ‘progressive’ body of opinion within the Board.
John Hodge was a further prominent Labour activist on the Board. A
distinguished Trade Unionist, he was elected a Labour M.P. in 1910. With the
outbreak of war he became an exponent of the extreme patriotic tendency within the
Labour Party, arguing for the suspension of traditional union practices and
vehemently opposing strikes. In 1916 he was made Minister of Labour by Lloyd
George. He was on the Board predominantly as a representative of the Trade Union
interests. His role was to preserve the relationship with the working man, whose
social habits were to be reviewed by the CCB.
18 P. Snowden, Socialism and the Drink Question.
19 K. Laybourn, Philip Snowden: A Biography 1864-1937 (Aldershot, 1988), p. 69.
20 C.E. Bechhofer, Philip Snowden: An Impartial Portrait (London, 1929).
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Employers were also represented. William Lever was a prominent industrialist
and soap manufacturer with a keen interest in philanthropy and a fervent belief that
commercial efficiency was a service to humanity. Drawing upon his own experience
of the management of canteens in his industrial career, he was primarily concerned
with the provision of canteen facilities for workmen, which often entailed long visits
to principal centres of production to discover what changes needed to be made.21 His
presence is again indicative of the importance ascribed to the constructive aspect of
the Board’s work.
The membership of the CCB was drawn from across the political spectrum.
Waldorf Astor had been the Conservative M.P. for Plymouth since 1911 and was also
a newspaper proprietor: he owned The Observer and had a keen interest in social
reform, supporting the Lloyd George budget of 1909 and the National Insurance Act
of 1911. During the war he was primarily concerned with waste in army management
and in armament factories. Thus he was ideally suited to advising the Board on the
effect of alcohol upon the efficiency of factories within the country. In December
1916 he became Lloyd George’s parliamentary private secretary and was a member of
the prime minister’s ‘garden suburb’ of advisors.22 Others who joined the Board at its
outset included Neville Chamberlain, at the time a leading figure in Birmingham local
government, and whose father, Joseph, had been a prominent advocate of public
house reform; Richard Cross, an expert on licensing law and keen supporter of the
nationalisation of the drink traffic; Colonel John Denny, who represented industrial
interests; Sir George Newman M.D., in charge of the medical aspect of the problem;
and Sir John Pedder, at the time Assistant Secretary to the Home Office who acted as
21 W.P. Jolly, Lord Leverhulme – A Biography (London, 1976), p. 159.
22 See J. Turner, Lloyd George’s Secretariat (Cambridge, 1980).
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Chairman in D’Abernon’s rare absence.23 He was also responsible for the text of the
various orders being ‘a typical civil servant of the highest class.’24 Other members
included R.R. Scott, principal clerk to the Board, and W. Towle, who had great
experience of providing social services as hotel manager of the Midland Railway. The
Secretary, J.C.G Sykes was, according to Neville, ‘a charming and lovable personality
with a whimsical humour and a great capacity for analytical detail, together with a
placid temperament when faced by emergencies.’25
The Board at its conception numbered thirteen people. Expectations were
high. The Scotsman described it as ‘the largest social experiment of our time’.26 The
reaction to its formation was generally supportive. Brewers greeted ‘the Central
Control Board with satisfaction’ though were wary that the temperance faction would
use ‘every endeavour’ to hijack the organisation ‘to its own ends’.27 The Brewers’
Gazette commented that despite:
The very drastic and comprehensive powers of the Board . . . it will require
from the people of many classes, large sacrifices of habit and custom, if not of
money. But this sacrifice is asked in the name of patriotism by a government
representative of the whole nation.28
Within the first few weeks of the Board’s existence D’Abernon was already
convinced of its value to the nation. Amidst a debate beset by muddle, he proposed
himself and the CCB as the best chance of redemption. In a statement to the press
indicative of his undoubted self-confidence he wrote:
This is pioneer work worthy of great expansion . . . The drink problem has
baffled politicians of every party. That some reasonable solution of its more
pressing difficulties may be found by a non-political, non-prohibitionist and
non-teetotal board in this critical junction in the country’s history must be the
23 Cross died in June 1916 due to a swimming accident.
24 S. Neville, Seventy Rolling Years, p. 98.
25 Ibid. p. 100.
26 The Scotsman 14 August 1915.
27 The Brewers’ Gazette 13 May 1915.
28 The Brewers’ Gazette 24 June 1915.
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hope of all whether politicians, social reformers or the humble man in the
street.29
The statement testifies to D’Abernon’s desire to uplift the Board’s actions from the
intransigence of the drink discourse to a new level of impartiality concerned simply
with efficiency.
John Greenaway argues that a ‘feature of the CCB evident from the outset was
its independence from the ‘‘vested interests’’ of the Drink Question: the Temperance
organisations and the Trade.’30 Whilst true to an extent, certain members of the CCB
had long been involved in the resolution of the drink problem. For example, Lord
D’Abernon’s participation in pub reform organisations, and Snowden’s devout
temperance beliefs, indicates that there were clear opinions already held on certain
aspects of the drink question amongst members of the Board. Many of the individuals
described above had been chosen for this specific reason. Indeed, so attached were
some of the members to certain drink policy that the Licensed Victuallers’ National
Defence League protested that ‘two thirds of the members of the Control Board are
men whose personal views on the drink question in relation to the public house as a
national institution are known to be of such a nature as to influence their judgement
adversely to the public house system on the issues submitted to them.’31 The
Licensing World and Licensed Trade Review, whilst being pleased that the
government had appointed a Liquor Control Board, were not:
Very much struck with the particular appropriateness of the several
appointments, or the special fitness for the position of those who are to
constitute the new body. At all events, when we look down the list of names
we cannot feel, as we ought to have been able to do, that the work is in the
hands of men who have a practical and impartial knowledge of the public
house.32
29 HO 185/253, D’Abernon statement to the Press, 24 August 1915.
30 J. Greenaway, Drink and British Politics since 1830: A Study in Policy Making, p.98.
31 H.J. Jennings, ‘The New Drink Regulations’, p. 179.
32 The Licensing World and Licensed Trade Review 29 May 1915.
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Nevertheless, D’Abernon made clear that this organisation was going to deal with the
drink issue as no other organisation had done so before, free from bias and
preconception. In reality, the likelihood of complete impartiality was slim, especially
when the Board had been constituted to reduce drunkenness. Thus, whilst it is true
that there was no direct influence from temperance organisations and the trade at the
outset, those involved with the CCB were, despite the rhetoric, predisposed to certain
solutions.
The CCB met weekly and from its offices on The Strand in London sought to
regulate liquor sales in regions important to the war effort. D’Abernon admitted to a
temperance deputation that he hoped to reduce drunkenness in the UK by 50 per cent
in two years.33 Upon application by either the Ministry of Munitions, the War Office
or the Admiralty, areas deemed to be in need of liquor regulation were immediately
surveyed by a team of investigators. These teams were composed of naval, military
and civil authorities, and representatives of the employers and workmen in the
locality, who all gave their opinion as to the necessity of CCB intervention.
Temperance and religious organisations could give evidence separately if they
wished, though their opinions were unlikely to be surprising or innovative. These
local investigations then reported back to the CCB which, after approval by the
Minister of Munitions, acted upon their recommendations. The Board decided what
precise regulations were required, though these very rarely differed in terms of
content, and fixed the geographical boundaries of the control order. This consultative
procedure aimed to prove the necessity of the Board’s actions to doubters. No order
was made without consideration of the rights of license holders or the convenience of
the public. Some, however, were critical of this process, noting that ‘the inquiries
33 HO 185/313, For Chairman, 26 October 1915.
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were largely conducted by chief constables committed simply to doing whatever the
Board considered fit to suggest’.34
The first order, passed in July 1915, covered Newhaven where stories of
soldiers’ insobriety before setting off for France had caused outcry. By September
1915, fourteen areas had been placed under the jurisdiction of the CCB including ten
areas in England and Wales, three in Scotland and the London area. Most of these
areas were ports, such as Southampton and the North East coast area, indicating that
shipbuilding areas and those naval bases involved in war and mercantile activities
were the greatest concern for the authorities.
The selection of areas chosen for control was not without controversy,
especially given that there was no recourse to appeal with regard to the Board’s
decision. Those with business interests related to the trade, unsurprisingly, readily
expressed their discontent that their area had been chosen for control whilst a
neighbouring area had not. As Edgar Sanders reported to Lord D’Abernon on 18
October 1915:
At Bristol I find that there is a feeling that there was no reason why it should
be selected as against Bath or Gloucester, or indeed that the country district
surrounding Bristol should have been chosen as against the remainder of
Gloucestershire or Somersetshire . . . it is necessary to encourage the feeling
that areas have not been selected haphazardly.35
Moreover, brewers seemed perplexed as to why some areas had been chosen in the
first place. The Home and Southern Counties District noted that a deputation had
visited Portsmouth on 8 November 1915 but, despite D’Abernon’s view that
Portsmouth had a ‘clean sheet’ with regard to drunken behaviour, the area came under
restriction on 22 November.36
34 The Scotsman 16 August 1915.
35 HO 185/253, For Chairman: Sanders to D’Abernon, 18 October 1915.
36 Brewers and Licensed Trade Retail Association, MSS. 420, Box Number 249, Home and Southern
Counties District Report 1916.
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To allay criticism, and with an appreciation regarding the value of control, a
constant stream of control orders was issued. By the end of 1915 a further ten areas
had been placed under the jurisdiction of the CCB resulting in about half the
population of Great Britain living under the new conditions.37 Each of these orders
was very similar in character with discrepancies only occurring where particular local
circumstances dictated. The Board’s policy was to take repressive measures in order
to ensure that the act of drinking was made more difficult and the product itself, in
some forms, less intoxicating. The sale or supply of intoxicating liquor, for
consumption on or off premises, was restricted to two and a half hours in the middle
of the day, and to three, and in some cases two, hours in the evening. These
restrictions applied not only to pubs, but to clubs, restaurants, grocer’s shops,
refreshment rooms, hotels and theatres also. This was a massive reduction in opening
hours as pubs previously had been open normally from 6 a.m. to 11 p.m. in most
British towns, and from 5 a.m. till 12.30 a.m. in London. Off sales were forbidden
after 8 p.m. or 8.30 p.m. to limit the opportunity for continual drinking after the pub
had closed. These changes meant that if an individual was to engage upon a long
drinking session he or she would, at the very least, have to be well organised. Public
houses, however, were allowed to remain open in the curtailed hours for the purpose
of serving non-alcoholic drink and food. This was to encourage the growth of the idea
of the pub as a place of socialisation where alcoholic drink did not necessarily have to
be consumed. On a Sunday, hours were reduced even further by enforced closing at 9
p.m. Minor differences applied to certain areas, for example, in Scotland on a
Saturday the pub was to open only from 4-9 p.m. to prevent men from visiting the
public house straight after being paid.
37 The full list of areas placed under the jurisdiction of the board and the date on which this occurred
can be seen in The Fourth Report of the Central Control Board.
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This major curtailment of pub opening hours was designed to limit the
opportunities of the working class to indulge in liquor and to ensure that the worker
remained efficient as ‘early morning and late evening drinking made for broken time
and inefficiency in industry.’38 By offering alternatives to the pub, the Board wanted
workers to socialise elsewhere without drink. By closing pubs in the afternoon, and
coordinating opening hours with meal times, the Board sought an end to the habit of
‘soaking’, the contemporary description for what has become in modern parlance
‘binge drinking’, although some critics argued that the shortening of hours would
merely result in the ‘concentration of drinking in a shorter period.’39 To some,
however, the implications of these measures were clear. The Daily Express argued
that:
It would be absurd not to admit that the curtailment of public house hours is in
effect, a limitation of the personal liberty of the poor. The well to do are not
dependent for their drink either on licensed houses or clubs. The man with a
wine cellar and the man whose friend has a wine cellar may still have a drink
whenever they will . . . Nothing would be worse than to prevent the poor
wasting their pence while you leave the rich free to waste their pounds. There
is a suspicion that the new order is a mere puritanical dodge to use the war to
restrict freedom.40
Others, such as ‘one parched citizen of St Andrews’, noted that ‘the horrors a war’s
brought home to everybody now’.41
Furthermore ‘treating’, the custom of buying drinks in rounds was prohibited
by the CCB, together with credit sales. The Board also regulated the transport of
alcohol within designated areas. Despite rhetoric disavowing the implications of the
CCB’s acts this legislation sought to reform the customer of the public house which
was predominantly the working class male. To be sure, pubs in more upmarket areas
attracted customers from a similar social background but it was in the industrial
38 H. Carter, The Control of the Drink Trade, p. 138.
39 The Scotsman 16 August 1915.
40 The Daily Express 30 November 1915.
41 St Andrews Citizen 22 August 1915.
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centres of Britain that most attention was initially paid. The message was clear from
those interested in the resolution of the drink problem: if Britain was going to win the
war then the working man had to be changed, he had to be made sober.
The abolition of treating was a major assault on working class custom as it
was the most popular method by which drinks were purchased. Balfour had originally
raised the idea in March in Cabinet with the caveat that ‘these suggestions may
perhaps seem at first sight somewhat fantastic, but they are in my judgement worth
consideration’.42 That he describes them as ‘fantastic’ indicates the swift change in
attitude that had occurred. What had once seemed like fantasy was now reality. One
newspaper believed that the ‘abolition of treating is perhaps the greatest revolution in
our social customs produced by the war’.43 The custom had long been criticised by the
temperance movement and the CCB agreed, believing it to be an invidious practice.
Treating was known as the ‘have another habit’, due to its tendency to encourage long
bouts of drinking, as people would not normally leave the public house until the round
had been completed. For many, though, treating was looked upon with fondness and
was an intrinsic aspect of the social experience that the pub offered. ‘Why’,
commented one old man, ‘more than half the pleasure of a dram lies in having a
friend to share it with.’44 Others saw the ban as a security measure, ‘[the no treating
order] tried to stop the social life of the pub as much as possible, because of the
possibility of people saying unguarded things, having a drink or two over the odds’
noted William Benham.45
It was hoped that by prohibiting the custom bouts of group overindulgence
would be curtailed. This was an authoritarian, yet symbolic, step, the implications of
42 CAB 37/126, Balfour Intoxicating Liquor Special Restrictions, 22 March 1915.
43 Dundee Courier 15 September 1915.
44 The People’s Journal 27 September 1915.
45 Interview with William George Benham, British officer with Hawke Battalion Naval Division on
Western Front 1915-1917, Imperial War Museum Sound Archive, Number 95 Reel 3.
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which were appreciated at the time. The Metropolitan Police speculated that the
‘prohibition [of treating] will be welcomed by the persons mainly concerned, namely,
the work people; and, further that licensed victuallers will not be indisposed to do
their best in the same direction.’46 This was an optimistic assessment, but one that
proved not entirely unfounded. The Spectator surmised that:
A remarkable fact in the working of the recent restrictive and ‘No Treating’
orders is that there have been no complaints . . . We suspect that hundreds of
thousands of men are secretly delighted to be delivered from an expensive and
senseless social tyranny . . . There can only be one explanation. People want
the order to work.47
The Daily Express was also supportive of the measure, noting that ‘exceptional
measures are necessary at exceptional times. The law against treating will doubtless
cause irritation and it is sure to entail some anomalies, but the people must put up
with them.’48
For some, however, the change brought uncertainty. Golfers at St Andrews
were unsure as to the legality of a game being played for a round of drinks.49 For
others, it provided a curious distraction to the war, as one journalist reported:
Lunch-time in the city was as convivial a function as ever. The new order gave
every one something to talk about. None bothered about Belgrade or
Ferdinand or the Censor, but every one was keenly concerned in counting the
extra number of times the cash register bell had to ring in order that each glass
of liquor supplied might be recorded as a separate transaction.50
Initial reviews were nevertheless promising. One report noted that the ban on treating
‘is generally popular and is looked on by most of the decent working men as an
excellent excuse for evading the sponging of the ordinary public house loafer’.51 By
later 1917 the apparent consequences were more definite. One report noted that the
46 The Spectator 6 November 1915.
47 Ibid.
48 The Daily Express 25 September 1915.
49 The Daily Mail 21 September 1915.
50 The Daily Graphic 12 October 1915.
51 HO 185/228, Report by Dr. Sullivan on Alcoholism on Liverpool with special reference to the effect
of the restrictive orders of the CCB, 25 July 1916.
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‘application of the order’ has ‘removed to a very great extent the pastime of ‘‘pub
crawling’’ which created groups of drinkers’.52
The Board not only meddled with behaviour within the confines of the public
house but also modified the alcoholic strength of the publican’s wares. Spirits, such as
whisky, brandy and rum, had to be diluted to 35 under proof instead of 25 under proof
only if they were to be sold. This policy was introduced to deal with the high
alcoholic strength of these spirits which were popular, and thus deemed to be more
injurious to industrial efficiency, particularly in Scotland and the North of England.
These actions stemmed from a belief that if the working man could not be trusted to
inhibit his drinking habits then the drink itself had to be altered.
The actions of the CCB thus illustrate the initial inclination towards repressive
action. The previous months, and the ensuing moral panic, had shown the necessity of
these measures and the nature of the Board’s actions are unsurprising. In order to
assess the success of these measures, a Restrictions Committee was established which
dealt with questions arising out of the successive restrictive orders and, from time to
time, suggested modifications or additions to them which appeared in later CCB
reports. Occasionally when breaches of the order appeared so serious as to defeat the
policy of control, this committee investigated and advised the Board as to whether it
was necessary to stop the sale of liquor on the premises concerned.
The Board had variable success in trying to distinguish itself from the
temperance movement. Some argued that it merely pandered to temperance advocates
by passing ‘temperance legislation’ under the guise of action in the name of national
efficiency. Discontent mounted amongst the trade. One official of the Edinburgh
Trades Council, discussing the first action of the Board, opined ‘that order is simply
52 HO 185/243 Report by Madden, 15 November 1917.
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fanatical, and is the work of temperance fanatics to further their own ends’.53 One
contributor to The Times was particularly angered by the CCB:
How long are we to endure the tyranny of so called temperance fanatics? . . .
They maintained that all crime was due to drink. The increase in the drink bill
has been marked by a startling decrease in crime. We are fighting this war in
order to call our souls our own. Those who most conspicuously challenge the
right of the state to compel military service are the first to impose a degrading
tyranny in order to advertise their own fads and nostrums. They will only
succeed in promoting the furtive use of the brandy flask and sham medicines
instead of the moderate consumption of wine or beer.54
These accusations contained a kernel of truth as the legislation implemented mirrored
temperance proposals to deal with the drink problem. The fact remained that any
attempt at controlling the consumption of drink was by its very nature temperate
action. Only by repeatedly stating that their actions were in the interests of efficiency
could the Board attempt to disassociate themselves from the broad and emotional
appeals of the temperance movement.
This task was made all the more difficult by various reports concerning the
favourable reaction of social reformers in extolling the benefits of control. Thomas
Whittaker wrote that ‘to the social reformer the actions of the Central Control Board .
. . may prove to be the starting point of a new departure in the effort to grapple with a
most difficult and fundamental social problem’.55 The Times reported that ‘social
reformers had welcomed the new Central Control Board order’.56 Lord Leverhulme
wrote about ‘another wide and equally well founded public sentiment; a suspicion that
some members of the Board, in particular Lord D’Abernon, were choosing to
overlook the nature of the original directive to the CCB that national efficiency for
war purposes and not social reform was the object of their mission.’57
53 The Scotsman 16 August 1915.
54 The Times 5 October 1915.
55 T. Whittaker, ‘The Work of the Central Control Board’, Contemporary Review, March 1916, p. 19.
56 The Times 22 November 1915.
57 W.P. Jolly, Lord Leverhulme – A Biography, pp. 160-161.
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This distinction is important. The implementation of social reform had clear
political connotations. Radical liberals, and the progressive element within British
society, had supported radical reform prior to the outbreak of war and, thus, they were
interlinked with, and an intrinsic part of, this particular course of action. The Board,
however, had been ordered to act solely in the interest of national efficiency. The
delicate divide between the two was blurred given that most social reform was
conducive to benefiting the efficiency of the nation. Those who believed that the CCB
was acting in the interests of social reform could point towards its intervention in the
social fabric of the public house, whereas those who appreciated the benefits to
national efficiency could point towards improving productivity and reducing crime.
The Board contended that:
There is no ground for the assertion that general social reform has been aimed
at. At practically every conference Lord D’Abernon, or the member of the
Board presiding in his absence, has commenced the proceedings with the
statement that national efficiency for war purposes, and not social reform was
the object of their mission.58
As the CCB took on more constructive work these accusations became more ferocious
and harder to deny, but deny them they did.
Whilst the CCB tried to distance itself from the pre-war drink debate, the
sniping which continued was all too familiar. When the Bishop of Croydon alleged
that ‘measures of reform and restriction called for in the interests of the nation’ were
being ‘systematically opposed’, a spokesman for the trade responded by drawing
attention to Lord D’Abernon’s comments that ‘wherever the Board have made orders
the trade in the localities affected have carried out these orders loyally, and done their
best to conform to the new regulations in force’.59 Rumours and exaggerations were
common. The trade believed that ‘in the matter of publicity, the advocates of
58 HO 185/253, For Chairman, 18 January 1916.
59 The Times 16 November 1915.
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intolerant teetotalism enjoy a marked advantage . . . scarcely an utterance is made
even by the veriest non-entity, without its finding a prominent position in the columns
of the antiquarian press’.60 Prohibitionists, in contrast, believed that the press was
engaged in some sort of conspiratorial silence over this issue, as they were supposedly
under the control of the trade due to the finance accrued from liquor advertisements.61
Some trade unions also had to be reassured by Hodge that the regulations ‘had
not been framed with any idea of interfering with working class liberties’ but that
‘they were agreed on in the interests of the workers engaged on munitions work’.62
For some, though, this was not enough. At a Trade Union conference in Hackney on
18 November 1915, attended by over three hundred delegates, a measure was passed
demanding the withdrawal of ‘the insulting restrictions imposed by the Central
Control Board’, describing the order as ‘a direct indictment to the workers to down
tools.’63 The meeting also resented ‘the insinuation that working men are addicted to
excessive drinking.’64 This indicates that despite the Board maintaining that its actions
were not based upon ideas concerning working class indiscipline the perception of
some within the working class movement was that they had done precisely that. One
trade representative highlighted the somewhat hypocritical situation whereby ‘it is
people who do not require to use the public house for refreshment who bring in rules
of this kind’.65
This accusation was difficult to deny. Hodge frequently had to refute hurtful
accusations that he had slandered the workingman as a drunkard and a shirker.
Together with Lloyd George, who had suffered similar accusations, he issued a joint
60 The Daily Mail 18 March 1915.
61 The Spectator 4 September 1915.
62 The Times 22 November 1915.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 The Scotsman 16 August 1915.
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letter to the editor of the New Statesman that whilst there was a ‘section of the
workers who by their habits retard munitions making’ he resented the magazine trying
‘to twist this into a slander upon the whole of my fellow workmen.’66 The reality was
that the majority of workers were willing to abide by the rules, and various accounts
testify to the general acceptance of the measures. The Times noted that despite the
‘strong language that continues to come from the London Trade Unions Protest
Committee the workers as a whole are now inclined to accept the curtailed facilities
with a good grace.’67 Once again, established fears concerning the priorities of the
working class within Britain had proven to be unfounded.
Meanwhile, the portrayal of the CCB as an autocratic body was gathering
pace. There was criticism from the trade about Neville Chamberlain’s supposed
comment that during his tenure on the Board ‘I do not remember previously having
heard that the Control Board was prevented from doing anything it desired’.68 The
Brewers’ Journal commented:
As to the limitation of powers of the Board by the regulations there is really no
limitation at all. For example the Board recently desired to extend its orders to
unlicensed hotels, boarding houses and other similar places but it possessed no
power to do this. The remedy however proved to be simple. An order in
council was made conferring such powers . . . it is grotesque and absurd to
find D’Abernon complaining to the temperance council of the ‘limited powers
under which we act’.69
Hostility within the trade was clearly growing. Much anger was directed at the alleged
‘temperance under a new name’ activities of the Board and, in particular, the
influence of men traditionally antipathetic to the drink trade. As the Brewers’ Journal
asserted:
The triumvirate pulling the wires behind the CCB are Lloyd George, Addison
and Snowden. All these gentlemen are uncompromising teetotallers, and,
66 Manchester Guardian 15 December 1915.
67 The Times 30 November 1915.
68 Brewers’ Journal 15 October 1915.
69 Brewers’ Journal 15 November 1915.
151
whilst the very existence of many licensed houses is threatened, the cry of the
United Kingdom Alliance goes up in unblushing confession through the mouth
of the secretary Mr Alexander Thompson ‘the new restrictions foreshadowed
are the outcome of our insistence for the past fifteen months’.70
Criticism from this trade organisation thus centred on the temperance faction within
government exerting undue influence over the Board. Despite frequent denials it was
an accusation that was eventually to prove damaging to the CCB and its programme
of reform, particularly as one of the supposed strengths of the Board was its cold
impartiality in its consideration of national requirements.
The First Report of the CCB was produced on 12 October 1915, five months
after its inception. The report was a slim document, being only five pages in length,
but reviewed and testified to the impact of the Board’s measures upon liquor control.
The Board drew upon the collective experiences of notable figures, including chief
constables, medical officers of health, employers of labour, men’s representatives,
philanthropic associations, and the working class regarding the effects of the order
within restricted areas. Moreover, chief constables provided statistics for the number
of prosecutions and convictions for drunkenness in the four weeks prior to, and after,
the introduction of the order in an attempt to ascertain the initial success of the
Board’s measures. The Report stated:
There has been a considerable diminution in the number of both the
prosecutions and the convictions for drunkenness. The prosecutions for
drunkenness in the first eight areas scheduled in England and Wales, on an
average of the four weeks prior to the commencement of the Order in each
area, amounted to 734 per week. This figure, calculated for a period of four
weeks for each area subsequent to the commencement of the Orders for the
respective areas, has fallen to 417, a decrease of over 40 per cent. The
corresponding figures for the first two areas scheduled in Scotland are 695 and
585.71
70 Brewers’ Journal 15 November 1915.
71 The First Report of the Central Control Board.
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Of those who had been convicted, ‘a considerable proportion’, according to the
Board, were persistent offenders with ‘at least twenty or more previous convictions’.72
In effect the Board was saying that these men were beyond redemption, adding that
‘inquiry and research might usefully be made with a view to discovering some
method of treatment giving better hope of effective cure’.73 With regard to the effect
of the no treating order, the results were even more pleasing. Police reports testified to
the benefits:
When public houses have been visited, police almost invariably find fewer
people, and the tendency for these to make much shorter stays has been
observed. This is accounted for by their having to pay for their own drinks . . .
Police have experienced little difficulty, on the whole, in enforcing the Order,
and breaches of the law have been few.74
The initial prognosis was encouraging. Behaviour had been significantly improved by
the CCB’s regulations.
Anecdotal evidence from eyewitness accounts suggested a significant decline
in the analogous consequences of intoxication throughout the controlled areas. The
Report continued:
Many witnesses, speaking of their own areas, mention improved public order,
a better condition in the streets, and an improved condition of the children; and
the Board have received evidence that money which was formerly spent in
excessive drinking is now either deposited in savings banks, or used to
improve the home.75
The public health department in Edinburgh, for example, reported an ‘enormous
improvement noticeable in the city . . . almost a transformation has been noticeable in
the poorer working classes and slum districts. They are now quiet and peaceful early
in the night, whereas formerly disorder and drunkenness frequently characterised
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 MEPO 2/1645 Precis of Superintendents Reports on the effect of the Non Treating Order.
75 The Times 22 November 1915.
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them.’76 Industrial efficiency also improved. The Report stated that ‘time keeping
appears better in certain areas, and from all areas reports have been received
indicating an improved condition of the men coming to work in the morning’.77 The
orders seem to have been accepted with little of the predicted antagonism and without
any of the anticipated breaches of public order.
At a conference held in September 1915 with the Chief Constables of the
restricted areas, Lord D’Abernon confessed that ‘the results exceed my most sanguine
expectations’.78 He was, however, unable to isolate precisely the specific reasons as to
why the changes had been successful. Drawing attention to the cooperation of the
public in accepting the Board’s actions, he concluded:
All the measures appear to have done something, but above all I attribute the
ready response of the public to the action of the Board to the fact that it has
been realised that we have limited our remedy to serious evils impairing
national efficiency; that we have allowed no prejudice against any particular
class to influence our action and to the fact that the orders have been carefully
framed to interfere with no legitimate interests except in so far as it is
appeared absolutely necessary to the object in view . . . Not only have the
public acquiesced in the restrictions made, but many of them admit that they
are better both in health and in pocket for the restrictions.79
The belief that the working classes would be reluctant to sacrifice themselves for the
good of the country thus proved false. The early evidence, to the contrary, suggested
that the working class was willing to subjugate any individual desire for over
exuberance, if such a thing existed, to the public good. In St Andrews, for example,
the response had been largely positive:
In theory many of the clauses of the order are almost impossible to adequately
enforce, but in practice, the restrictions are operating very effectively. There
has been a general readiness on the part of the public to adhere stringently to
the letter as well as the spirit of the age . . . that the order has largely decreased
the consumption of liquor must be attributed to the very prevalent desire
76 HO 185/260, Working of Board’s orders: Reports of Medical Officers of Health and Employers of
Labour, 31 August 1915.
77 The First Report of the Central Control Board.
78 The Times 25 September 1915.
79 Ibid.
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among all classes to assist the government in every way possible in anything
affecting the conduct of the war. The reasons are not obvious, and no attempt
is made to explain them, nevertheless the people are willing to accept their
necessity on trust and to lend their best endeavours to complying with it. This
attitude is certainly indicative of a healthy national spirit.80
Moreover, the public apparently yearned to be led. One memorandum to Lord
D’Abernon from Edgar Sanders relating to the first restricted areas noted that ‘the
reception of the orders has been unexpectedly gratifying . . . the temper of the nation
at present is such that the people are waiting to be told what to do, then they will do it
cheerfully’.81
The report admitted that the Board had, up to 1915, concentrated upon the
‘restrictive’ nature of their work but that it attached very considerable importance to
the constructive side of its work. The report concluded with a statement that
previewed the Board’s future direction:
The Board incline to the view that excessive drinking may often be traced to
the want of adequate facilities for food, refreshment, and recreation
particularly in conjunction with long hours and overtime. The improvement of
public houses and the provision of canteens may therefore do much to render
less necessary the imposition of purely restrictive measures.82
The ‘progressive’ agenda had therefore not been abandoned or forgotten, merely
relegated behind the more pressing desire to quell the moral panic towards drink that
had engulfed the nation. Indeed, so successful were the measures that calls emerged
for the immediate extension of the system throughout the entire country. The
Spectator, a magazine that favoured prohibition, proposed that ‘the results have been
so good . . . that it is madness not to do so’.83 Accordingly, the next few months
witnessed a further expansion of the areas deemed ripe for control in order to ensure
this drive towards efficiency was both successful and enduring.
80 St Andrews Citizen 11 September 1915.
81 HO 185/353, For Chairman, Sanders to D’Abernon, 6 September 1915.
82 The First Report of the Central Control Board.
83 The Spectator 6 November 1915.
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However, opinions, as ever, varied concerning the success of the Board’s first
few months. The UKA were relatively pleased with its performance, yet still yearned
for prohibition to be enacted:
The first report of the CCB . . . is a brief account of an immense amount of
hard work of a most difficult kind, carried out, in our opinion, with tact and
discretion. We are confident that the people will never allow a reversion to the
pre-war conditions of drink selling . . . And yet – how far short of the nation’s
real needs do these regulations fall! At the best they are only a palliative – not
a cure. We wish them the fullest success, but they still leave the drink shop as
a standing menace to our national life.84
In contrast the trade remained convinced that the Board’s actions were the result of
the temperance movement’s exploitation of the conditions of war. The Brewers’
Gazette commented:
It is not simply the prerogatives delegated to this junta we have to remark, it is
the application of the despotism thus created, which induces apprehension and
rightly alarms the multitude. It certainly appears as though the industrial
classes of all grades were being experimented upon. There are, as our
contemporary The Evening Standard very appropriately says ‘unmistakeable
indications that behind these reforms is the insidious influence of the teetotal
and religious fanatic. By persistently drawing lurid and alarming pictures of
the evil effects of excessive drinking – pictures which have their only reality
in the perverted brains of blue ribbonites – they have managed to exploit the
war in furtherance of their mysterious fads, and, at the same time, they have
cast a slur upon the working classes which in times of peace would not under
any pretext be tolerated.85
The issue was thus still perceived by some in explicit class terms, with the working
class unnecessarily subject to governmental intervention based upon the predilections
of the temperance movement. Certainly some remained suspicious about the true
motives of the Board. In a supposedly ‘neutral’ opinion piece speaking for the
‘majority’ on the drink question, H.J. Jennings highlighted a reluctant acceptance of
the Board’s measures when he wrote:
If the excesses of a few foolish topers do really prevent us from getting on
quickly enough with war work, and these excesses can only be checked by
84 Alliance News December 1915.
85 The Brewers’ Gazette 30 November 1915.
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inconveniencing some millions of ordinary temperate citizens, then, in spite of
the unreasonableness of the new conditions, patriotism compels us to submit
to them, although it cannot be expected that we shall kiss the rod.86
The Board evidently still had to persuade some sceptics of the seriousness of the drink
problem and the true necessity of its measures.
Meanwhile, the issue of soldiers’ drinking habits remained a matter of
concern. Tirades from temperance activists against the continued rum and beer ration
at the front, and its impact upon fighting efficiency, clearly mirrored arguments
concerning industrial efficiency on the home front. The provision of drink was
subject to approval by divisional commanders on medical grounds when the
conditions of war were suitably ‘arduous’. Soldiers received a quarter gill (one
sixteenth of a pint) of rum a day, hardly enough to get drunk. Rum was issued in
earthenware jars marked SRD, which officially stood for ‘Special Rations
Department’, but was commonly twisted to ‘seldom reaches destination’ or ‘service
rum diluted’.87 Supplies were often hard to come by. Major J Pullan recounted how
‘in the trenches it was customary to accept a drink from those behind you as it was
easier to get supplies, but not from those at the front as getting drink was difficult.’88
However, the temperance accusation of widespread degeneracy in the trenches due to
drink were misplaced. Richard Holmes, in reviewing the British soldiers’ experience
on the Western Front, did ‘not encounter a single reliable contemporary source that
mentions large scale alcohol abuse in the trenches’.89 It seems that mythology once
more was utilised instead of the truth to propagate temperance mores.
86 H.J. Jennings, The New Drink Regulations, p. 186.
87 Richard Holmes, Tommy: The British Soldier on the Western Front 1914-1918 (London, 2004), p.
328.
88 Imperial War Museum Documents Library, Major J Pullan, pp/mer/151.
89 R. Holmes, Tommy: The British Soldier on the Western Front 1914-1918, p. 328.
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Figure 17: A British and French Soldier enjoying a drink.
On the frontline alcohol was to many a necessity. Others used alcohol to ease
nerves prior to an attack. A former Black Watch medical officer perhaps
overestimated the beneficial aspects of the occasional drink when he said ‘had it not
been for the rum ration I do not think we should have won the war’.90 Others needed
to help fight the elements. Frederick Powell, a pilot with the Royal Flying Corps on
the Western Front, recalled ‘I remember one occasion that I had a small cask filled
with rum and when ones moustache got frozen this kept me going, the effect was
immediate.’91 Temperance calls for a ban on the rum ration thus seemed to make
soldiers angry, highlighting the gap in wartime experience between the home and
military front, and exemplifying how out of touch the temperance movement had
become. Gerald Burgoyne argued that ‘all the drink cranks can say what they like
about the issue of rum to troops, and drink generally, but if instead of writing from the
90 R. Holmes, Tommy: The British Soldier on the Western Front 1914-1918, p. 330.
91 Imperial War Museum Sound Archive. Testimony of Frederick Powell, pilot with 5 and 40
squadrons Royal Flying Corps on Western Front 1915-1917, recorded 25 January 1973.
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comforts of a nice cosy room they’d put in a few days in the trenches I’m sure they’d
change their minds.’92 Ernest Shepherd, when his rum ration failed to arrive, blamed
‘newspaper agitation by cranks’ and hoped that ‘critics of the ration would come up to
the line to supply hot coffee to the troops’.93
Figure 18: This was a drawing done by a British soldier entitled ‘The Cup that
Cheers’ and it shows the happiness brought by Rum in the trenches.
The drink habits of troops were a topic of some debate. Some optimists hoped
that British soldiers would learn from his experiences on the continent and upon his
return home precipitate the birth of café culture in Britain. One correspondent wrote
that ‘when Tommy comes back he will prefer the tavern that offers him his drink in
the clean comfort of the continental café to the stuffy little ginshop bar to which he
was previously used.’94
92 R. Holmes, Tommy: The British Soldier on the Western Front 1914-1918, p. 331.
93 Ibid. p. 331.
94 The Daily Mirror 2 October 1914.
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Figure 19: Cartoon published in The Daily Mirror showing the ‘civilising
influence’ of Europe’s café’s.
The year 1915 had witnessed a phenomenal alteration in the amount of control
exerted upon both the drinker and drink itself. Although the actions of the CCB were
not solely responsible for changes in drinking habits, a definite trend of declining
drunkenness is evident. Almost immediately after the Board’s measures had been
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introduced drunkenness fell. In Liverpool, for example, the number of prosecutions
for drunkenness at work fell from 240 per week before the establishment of the
Board, to 164 after it. In the North Coast Region there was a reduction from 201
arrests in the four weeks before the Board’s order to 107 in the four weeks after. In
the Midlands these figures stood at 74 to 22 respectively. Overall, drunkenness
proceedings throughout the country had dropped from 263,515 in 1914 to 205,345 in
1915, a reduction of approximately 58,000.95 These results accrued in controlled areas
suggested that the work of the CCB was beneficial in reducing the effects of drink on
society. Up to this point nothing implemented had been ‘revolutionary’ in content or
‘progressive’ in nature but had merely built upon the supposed ‘truths’ of the
preceding eighteen months. As the UKA argued the war had proven to be ‘a rude but
efficient teacher of temperance truth’.96
For the first few months of its existence the Board had merely found its feet,
implementing fairly conservative measures to limit drinking, while establishing a
foothold from which to launch a major assault. As one reviewer stated ‘it will be a
matter of surprise to many of our readers that those abuses of what is at all times a
dangerous traffic should not long since have been checked.’97 However, The Brewers’
Gazette anticipated more radical steps: ‘we are interested spectators, and anticipate
lively happenings before the Board is much older’.98 They were correct. Thoughts
were turning to fundamentally changing the role of the public house. As The Daily
Express speculated:
When the war is over, hundreds of thousands of our men will return to this
country with a knowledge never previously possessed of the possibilities of
social life and intercourse possessed by a reasonable café system such as
95 The Second Report of the Central Control Board.
96 The Alliance Report, Report of the Executive Committee of the UKA, October 1915.
97 James Samuelson, Drink: Past, Present and Probable Future with some of its Bearings on the War
(Liverpool, 1916), p. 23-24.
98 The Brewers’ Gazette 2 September 1915.
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prevails on the continent. The sawdust and reeking atmosphere of the English
public house will disgust them. They will resent the drink up and go attitude
with which they will be met. They will be ready for the ideal public house.99
This was an optimistic appraisal but the CCB did have significant power to implement
such a radical change if it chose to do so. Snowden, despite his temperance
inclinations, still described the Board as having ‘very drastic’ powers whose members
‘were not hampered in their operations by the existing Licensing Acts, which they
were entitled to set aside where they considered this to be necessary.’100 The CCB had
been given the opportunity to enact real changes to the drinking habits of a nation.
The initial reaction to the Board’s measures had shown that the ‘patriotic spirit
evoked by the war could be used to the lasting material and moral benefit of the whole
nation’.101 The following year would see the CCB’s work broaden in context and
continue to manifest itself throughout Britain, particularly in some northern towns
where descriptions of degenerate behaviour were causing much anxiety within
government and it was here that the ‘very drastic’ powers of the Board would reach
their apothesis.
99 The Daily Express 24 June 1915.
100 P. Snowden, Philip Snowden: An Autobiography Volume One 1864-1919, p. 379.
101 H.G. Chancellor, The War and National Temperance, p. 353.
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Chapter Five: The Carlisle Experiment: Lord D’Abernon’s ‘Model Farm’
Carlisle remains a curious episode in the social history of the war and in the
history of drink control. The experiment was, as Lord D’Abernon called it, the CCB’s
‘model farm’,1 a place where ideas and plans, which had previously been nothing
more than idealistic musings, could be brought into reality. In Carlisle the Board was
able to implement its most radical agenda and the scheme reveals measures the Board
may have taken if state purchase had been instituted nationally.
Both Carter and Shadwell dedicated a chapter to the events in Carlisle, each
relying predominantly on the official reports produced by Edgar Sanders, manager of
the scheme. Thus their work, to a certain extent, corroborates the ‘official’ view of the
Carlisle project given that it was influenced by men involved with the scheme.2 David
Gutzke, in his book Pubs and Progressives: Reinventing the Public House in England
1896-1960 provides an astute analysis of the Carlisle Experiment.3 He argues that it
was an important moment in the progressive reform of the pub, with the scheme being
an ‘experimental laboratory and microcosm of the entire industry’ which provided ‘a
tested blueprint for post-war reconstruction’.4 Gutzke’s work, however, does not
signal the end of historical curiosity with regard to the history of direct control.
This chapter intends to broaden our understanding of the experiment, taking
into consideration how the scheme was run, by whom and their relation to the CCB.
Also, the veracity of some of Carter’s claims as to the reasons behind the introduction
1 J. Atkins, Drink in the Last War: A Study in Licensing Reform, p. 32.
2 Indeed, many Board members contributed to the books. J.S. Eagles to Sanders ‘I understand that
Carter has sent you a type written draft of the chapter on Carlisle. I am not very satisfied with it myself,
thinking it pretty dull, and I must try to liven it up.’ Sanders himself was asked by Carter to write the
Chapter on Carlisle but refused. See HO 190/490, J.S. Eagles to Sanders, 1 August 1917.
3 See D. Gutzke, Pubs and Progressives: Reinventing the Public House in England 1896-1960, pp. 49-
67.
4 Ibid. p. 67.
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of the scheme will be tested. How both the temperance and trade bodies viewed the
experiment will be considered too, together with an assessment of its success.
The naming of the state purchase scheme as the ‘Carlisle Experiment’ is
something of a misnomer as the first nationalised pubs were at Enfield Lock, home to
an armaments factory, where four pubs fell under the jurisdiction of the state in
January 1916, and at Invergordon, home to a naval base and more arms factories. The
seeds of the Carlisle experiment were planted as the Gretna munitions factory was
being built. From August 1915 construction began on a huge chemical factory to aid
in the production of munitions, together with the communal facilities required to
sustain such an enterprise. The countryside of this isolated and quiet border farmland
was irrevocably changed. The towns of Gretna and Eastriggs were developed to cater
for the needs of the workforce who numbered in the region of 16,500, a substantial
proportion of whom, around 11,500, were women.5
The making of munitions took place at four separate sites – from Dornock, to
the east of Annan, through to Gretna, and eastwards, across the border, to Longtown,
north of Carlisle. In total the activities of the factory covered an area of around
twenty-five miles, spanning the border area. It was a huge undertaking to develop
what was in effect an entire community from scratch in a wartime environment. By
October 1915, 5,000 construction workers were on site and by the end of 1917 the
number of construction and factory workers had steadily increased to roughly 24,000,
which subsequently placed pressure on housing facilities in the city as Carlisle had
5 Chris Brader, ‘Policing the Gretna girls: The Women’s Police Service in World War One’,
(Unpublished MA Thesis, University of Warwick, 1997), p. 4.
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only a population of around 52,000.6 Ernest Selley reported ‘houses with ten
bedrooms accommodating thirty-seven male lodgers’.7
Figure 20: The Gretna Munitions Factory – Township under construction.
The munitions workers were paid high wages and in their spare time
unsurprisingly sought to relax and enjoy the fruits of their labours, even though the
leisure opportunities in the border area were somewhat limited. As one of the workers
remarked to Ernest Selley, ‘when you’ve had dinner there is nothing to do but go out.
You can’t all sit round one fire’.8 Another ‘intelligent mechanic’ told him ‘you’re
simply obliged to go out, and Carlisle is such a dull place. There is nothing at all on
6 A. Shadwell, Drink in 1914-1922: A Lesson in Control, p. 60.
7 HO 190/459, Administration: General Management Correspondence with Eagles, 20 February 1917.
8 Ibid.
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better than the pictures.’9 Many turned to drink. One report noted that workers ‘have
multiplied the drinking population many times over’.10 This desire for leisure led the
workers to Carlisle, only nine miles from Gretna and the only major urban
conurbation within sixty miles.11 The publicans in Carlisle were to enjoy an
unprecedented custom but little did they know that it was to have a fundamental
impact on their trade and town.
The Gretna workers had significant amounts of surplus income. Whereas
before the war they had earned only a few shillings a week some were now earning
eight shillings a day.12 The Annandale Observer noted: ‘never have the wages paid to
labourers been so high’.13 Exiled from their families and away from home, many
sought solace and company in the local public houses. One report noted: ‘the
construction of the munitions factory has brought into the neighbourhood thousands
of navvies – the majority of whom are hard drinkers and are recruited from the worst
classes’. Furthermore, ‘they are most improvident and the majority of them are
immersed in liquor’.14 Evidently they took most of their money to Carlisle and often
left the greater part of it behind the counter of the city’s pubs, which, according to
Neville, were ‘mostly run by pensioners and widows quite incapable of handling the
tough customers who invaded the city every night’.15
After the evening shift the only train from Gretna to Carlisle arrived merely
five minutes before closing time. This did not deter a certain section of the workforce,
however, who often sought to bribe the train driver to arrive in Carlisle a few minutes
9 Ibid.
10 HO 185/227, Colonel David Davies to D’Abernon, 28 August 1916.
11 Carlisle is sixty miles from Newcastle, seventy miles from Lancaster, ninety from Glasgow and
ninety-nine from Edinburgh.
12 HO 185/227, Colonel David Davies to D’Abernon, 28 August 1916.
13 The Annandale Observer 1 October 1915.
14 HO 185/227, Colonel David Davies to D’Abernon, 28 August 1916.
15 S. Neville, Seventy Rolling Years, p. 101.
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early. Invariably they would rush to the nearby Boustead’s bar where the owner,
Sammy Boustead, would have between four and five hundred whiskies already
poured for them. The desire to get drunk in five minutes flat, whilst not only bringing
new meaning to the phrase ‘binge drinking’, enraged local opinion. At the weekend
the situation was exacerbated by the increased number of workers who made the trip
into town and the extended time they had available to socialise in their own inimical
style. One individual described the state of the return trains leaving Carlisle for Gretna
on Saturday nights as ‘a horrible and nauseating sight. The trains were full of men in
all stages of intoxication – some were helpless, some vomiting, and others urinating,
and the whole train reeked with the smell of whisky.’16 A reporter for The Carlisle
Evening News declared: ‘far be it from me to suggest that the navvy is not a noble
fellow. But like the clayey subsoil he often works in he can hold a great deal of
moisture.’17The liquor trade boomed, bringing what one correspondent described as
‘profit as well as notoriety’.18
The CCB was made aware of the drinking problems of the Gretna workers. In
a confidential report sent to the Board regarding the Gretna factory in September
1915, Sir Thomas Munro argued that ‘the regulation of the liquor traffic in the area in
which the factory is situated . . . would seem to be most desirable at the earliest date,
so as to secure that efficiency will be the rule from the start.’19 The idea of state
purchase of the Carlisle trade was floated by Munro. He believed there were
‘exceptionally favourable conditions’ to try such an experiment.20 Furthermore:
The financial aspect of the question should, instead of being a deterrent, be an
argument in favour of the larger proposal. The present value of the houses on
which it may be assumed that compensation would be based must be small
16 HO 190/459, Administration: General Correspondence with Eagles, 20 February 1917.
17 Carlisle Evening News 18 May 1916.
18 The Carlisle Journal 22 August 1916.
19 HO 185/213, Confidential report to the CCB on Gretna Explosives Factory. 11 September 1915.
20 Ibid.
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compared to the value that will accrue to them owing to the influx of
population. If they are acquired now, the increase in value will be secured to
the Board.21
Evidently financial gain was a distinct consideration in the event of state purchase and
the CCB believed that money was to be made from nationalising pubs.
Munro’s proposal was persuasive enough for the Public House Committee22
(PHC) to recommend ‘immediate action’ on 20 September 1915.23 The Board
immediately hired Harry Redfern, a notable architect, to value pubs within the area
and develop plans to alter the physical layout. All of this was done in December 1915,
a full six months before the scheme was announced. The idea of state management
was nothing new and had been discussed from the outset by the CCB,24 but Carlisle
provided an ideal opportunity for the Board to implement its ideas.
Meanwhile, reports emanating from Carlisle continued to provide evidence
that the city was in the clutches of a drinking epidemic. At a conference of Chief
Constables, held in London, the head of the Cumberland police, Mr Parry, noted that
‘these works [Gretna] are in course of construction and we are getting the very worst
class of navvy out there, the scum of Scotland and England are meeting there and we
21 Ibid.
22 The Public House Committee was a sub committee of the Control Board whose responsibilities lay
in controlling state owned districts. The committee consisted of Waters Butler (Chairman), Towle, P.
Snowden and Waldorf Astor with J.S. Eagles as Secretary. Sykes also attended as Secretary to the
Board. S. Neville, Seventy Rolling Years, p. 102.
23 HO 185/213, Public House Committee Minutes, 20 September 1915.
24 HO 190/501, Circulated for the Information of the Board, Alexander Part RE: State Management, 15
July 1915. See for example the following suggestion by Mr Alexander Part of the Public House Trust
made to the CCB on 15 July 1915. The Proposal read 1. Take one or more of the prescribed areas. 2.
Acquire, compulsorily, all the licensed premises in the selected area or areas under powers given to the
Board of control. 3. Close all redundant houses and all off licensed houses so far as the off licensed part
of the premises is concerned. 4. Select suitable licensed and other houses within the chosen area for the
purposes of canteens and (if necessary) let the Board of control supply the money to build such houses
according to a definite ration to persons employed in the area. 5. Form local advisory committees in
each selected area, consisting of employers and employed, whose duties will consist in regulating hours
and directing, under the direction of the Board of control, the general policy in regard to the
management of canteens.
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have already experienced considerable trouble with one or two public houses.’25 On
27 September 1915 a secret conference of delegates of local authorities was convened
by the CCB to consider what restrictions should be placed on the sale and supply of
intoxicating liquor in the area. The local Chief Constable of Carlisle, E. DeSchmid,26
reported the increase in convictions which had taken place during the final months of
1915. This figure increased from fifteen arrests in September to thirty-five in October,
fifty-nine in November, and seventy-six in December.27 At the same time he notified
the Board of the shortage of the manpower at his disposal: ‘my force has been
reduced by 50 per cent, forty of my men have enlisted. Several temporary men have
been taken on, but these are over military age and not fit to cope with the navvies.’28
Overall, though, the number of convictions for the year 1915 was 301, 9 less than the
1914 figure of 310.29 This total masks a change in the number of non-Carlisle
residents convicted. In 1914 this stood at 90 whilst in 1915 this figure had increased
to 154.30 Taking into consideration the number of men who must have left Carlisle to
fight in the war it is unsurprising that a large amount of drunken disorder was blamed
on the Gretna workers. This is apparent upon consideration of the 1916 conviction
figures, which show 964 arrests for drunkenness, 788 of whom worked in Gretna.31
The Board sought to alleviate these problems by scheduling the area to come
under its regular jurisdiction. On 22 November 1915 a drink restriction order for the
Western Border Area was passed which included the counties of Cumberland,
Westmorland and adjoining parts of Northumberland and Lancashire. Sunday closing
25 HO 185/259, Working of Board’s Orders, Conference of Chief Constables, Working of Orders in the
North East, 27 September 1915.
26 E. DeSchmid later changed his name to E. Spence on account of the abuse he received regarding his
‘German sounding’ name.
27 Chief Constable of Carlisle’s Report, 31 December 1915, Volume xxvii.
28 HO 185/253, Western Borders Area: Secret Conference of Delegates of Local Authorities convened
by the CCB, 27 September 1915.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Chief Constable of Carlisle’s Report, 31 December 1916, Volume xxviii.
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was introduced to prevent any legislative difference between areas, as Sunday closing
was enforced in Scotland but not in England. Carlisle drinkers thus suffered on the
grounds that they lived far from anywhere else in England but resided relatively close
to Scotland.
This action was welcomed: ‘the mayor of Carlisle said that no one except the
publicans complained either of the curtailed hours or the Sunday closing’.32 But this
situation did not last. Sanders reported that the scheme by the spring of 1916 was
‘resented’ and Sunday closing ‘the feature of the order disliked the most’.33 ‘What
chiefly irritates the Carlisle working man is the fact that they are singled out for
special treatment as against their fellows in the rest of England’, he noted.34 One local
paper pointed out that ‘Carlisle is the first and only English town subjected to the
inconvenience of praying with a parched throat.’35
The Board’s normal restrictions were however insufficient to meet the
demands posed by the transient drinkers of Carlisle. Conviction rates continued to
increase. In March and April 1916 this figure increased to eighty-nine and ninety-
eight respectively, not to mention those who were not arrested but perhaps should
have been.36 To add fuel to the fire, continued accounts of the alleged horrors taking
place within and outside the confines of the Carlisle public house permeated
government reports and the local and national press.
In March 1916 Edgar Sanders was sent by the CCB to review the conditions
prevailing in Carlisle. He was a member of the PHC, and his report favoured
32 HO 185/253, Sanders for the circulation of the Board, 15 December 1915.
33 HO 185/213, Sunday Closing Memorandum by General Manager for consideration of the Board, 24
October 1917.
34 HO 190/841, Sunday Closing Area.
35 The Carlisle Evening News 18 May 1916.
36 Chief Constable’s Report 31 December 1916 Volume xxviii.
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‘acquiring the licensed houses in the City of Carlisle’.37 He wrote that ‘I visited a
large number of licensed premises in Carlisle, and generally speaking, I have never
seen public houses more unsuited for that purpose. On Friday and Saturday nights
most of the houses were full to the doors, especially in the last hour before closing
time.’38 By March the Mayor of Carlisle had also become disenchanted with the drink
problem suggesting that ‘unless something is done the place will soon become
completely demoralised’.39
A report written by Sykes in April 1916 confirmed the viability of buying out
the Carlisle Licensed Trade and the suitability of the locale for such a scheme:
Newcastle, the nearest large town to Carlisle, is sixty miles away, so that the
competition of private traders can be practically eliminated by the acquisition
of the trade interest in Carlisle itself, and its immediate neighbourhood . . . The
number of licensed premises in Carlisle is understood to be considerably in
excess of the requirements, and the scheme is therefore one in which it would
be essential, alike on financial and general grounds, to close a proportion,
probably nearly half, of the existing licensed houses.40
Evidence shows that a number of locations, such as Bristol and Middlesbrough, were
considered for a trial state purchase experiment but Carlisle offered the most
compelling option.41 In fact, at the time, members of the Board viewed it merely as a
37 HO 190/405, Carlisle and District State Management scheme: Report by Sanders, 29 March 1916.
38 HO 185/253, Sanders for the Board, 21 March 1916.
39 H. Carter, The Control of the Drink Trade: A Contribution to National Efficiency 1915-1917, p. 199.
40 HO 190/437, Sykes for PHC, 7 April 1916. To this day Carlisle remains a place of experiment.
Consumer products are often tested in the city prior to any national introduction as the area is so
appropriate for experimentation.
41 HO 190/501, State Purchase and Control 1915-1918, A letter headed to the Chief Constables of
Carlisle and Middlesbrough dated 18 February 1916 read ‘As you are aware, the CCB have power to
take over and manage any licensed premises in any area . . . the Board are now considering whether an
experiment should be made with one or two larger areas and at first sight your city borough would
appear to afford a good example.’ The letter was sent to Carlisle but was never sent to Middlesbrough.
Other areas considered included Bristol in February 1917 and Rosyth HO 185/213, Cheapstow HO
185/234. Also see HO 185/263, D’Abernon’s Semi-Official Correspondence 1915-1919, Neville
Chamberlain to D’Abernon 26 June 1916 – ‘In further reference to your letter of the 19 June, I have
now made some enquiries from which it seems to me that Birmingham would be an exceptionally good
place to make the experiment of control. Out of some 2300 licensed premises, about 1800 are
controlled, and for the most part by one of four large breweries. Moreover the trade association here is
particularly strong, so that altogether the problem is very much simplified. Butler can, of course, speak
as to the attitude of the trade towards such a proposal, if I were a member I should jump at it, but I
should expect that there would be a tremendous outcry, with a great show of indignation, that
Birmingham should have been picked out for ‘penalisation’. Figures will be produced to show that
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precursor to state management on a national scale. As Lever wrote to Addison: ‘The
principle might be tried in Carlisle first before applying the same to the whole
country.’42 This was a brave prediction. Carlisle was a risk as the CCB would have to
implement successful reforms to have any hope of introducing state purchase
nationally.
This evidence broadens our understanding of the reasoning behind the
introduction of state management in Carlisle. Carter suggested that it was solely ‘the
inadequacy of the Board’s ordinary plan of control to meet the extraordinary local
situation which impelled the Board to employ another method of grappling with a
problem of unique acuteness and complexity.’43 This is true, but he neglects to
mention, or perhaps was not aware of (given that he was not a member of the Board
until January 1916) the machinations that had occurred concerning the introduction of
the scheme. Carlisle was best suited to this reform as there was an evident drink
problem and its isolated location meant that an experiment could be conducted with
fewer variables than elsewhere.
The desire for some reform was acute, not only within governing circles but
also amongst local opinion makers, by the spring of 1916. As The Carlisle Journal, on
the release of the Second Report of the CCB, noted:
[The report] ‘unanimously testifies to the beneficial effects of the restriction
orders’ and that the police reports from the scheduled areas ‘without exception
record greater sobriety and a general improvement in conditions.’ That is a
statement which will be read with amazement in Carlisle which is certainly a
conspicuous exemption to this rosy condition . . . the people of Carlisle will
welcome the adoption of any means which will provide a remedy for the
Birmingham is exceptionally sober, and the Board will be asked what right they have to treat her as
though she were the reverse.’
42 HO 190/501, Letter sent 1 May 1916. Also at a CCB meeting Lever reported that ‘the scheme was
being worked on right lines which could without difficulty be applied to the whole country.’ HO
185/229, 19 September 1916.
43 H. Carter, The Control of the Drink Trade, p. 199.
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present state of things and are awaiting with keen interest the Board’s decision
on the question of taking over the licensed houses in the city.44
After a committee composed of CCB members had visited the city in June 1916,
noting that the ‘main evils were congestion, structural defects, concentrated drinking,
excessive spirit drinking’,45 state management of the pubs in the city was announced
later that month. A prototype experiment was underway; the Board finally had its
opportunity to create a model licensing district.
The ‘Carlisle Experiment’ was not restricted to the immediate confines of the
city but stretched far beyond into much of the surrounding area. The entire direct
control area was divided into two administrative sections to allow for the differences
between the licensing laws of England and Scotland. Each section was under the
control of a general manager and each had a Local Advisory Committee (LAC) which
provided information for the PHC, which made decisions from London. Edgar
Sanders, a licensing judge from Liverpool who had conducted some work for the
Board previously, was appointed manager of the Carlisle scheme. His office was on
Castle Street and from there he oversaw the rapid purchase of the city’s pubs and
breweries. Sanders did not have baronial control over the scheme, however, as he was
in constant touch with the CCB, and in particular Lord D’Abernon. D’Abernon
wanted to present an austere version of state purchase that was successful, but also
economical, as he knew critics were ready to expose mistakes and wasteful
expenditure by the Board. D’Abernon was so intent on presenting an image of
efficiency that he even expressed concern to Sanders about his ‘palatial offices’.46
44 The Carlisle Journal 9 May 1916.
45 HO 190/488, Papers Relating to Carlisle before the start of the Carlisle Office, Committee of the
Board visit 14-16 June 1916.
46 HO 190/779, D’Abernon to Sanders, 11 August 1916.
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Figure 21: The ‘Palatial Offices’ of the Central Control Board, 19 Castle Street,
Carlisle.
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The Carlisle Local Advisory Committee was drawn from a varied number of
groups within the local community. The President was the Earl of Lonsdale, with
Scott, Butler and Towle representing the CCB. Mayor W. Gibbings represented the
Carlisle Watch Committee, Benjamin Scott, J. Dove and J. Burn represented the
Carlisle Licensing Committee, and F.W. Chance was Chairman. The Committee met
monthly and dealt with issues arising from the scheme in a supervisory and
developmental capacity, providing guidance, advice and assistance to the CCB. The
workload was heavy due to the need to keep London informed whilst also running the
scheme locally.47
The reaction to the announcement of the scheme was mostly supportive but
some remained cynical. An article originally appearing in The Globe, and reprinted in
the Brewers’ Journal, described the prospective future of the public house under
government management in a somewhat sarcastic manner:
Since our pastors and masters are going into the licensed trade, it behoves
members of the public to begin thinking of adapting themselves to the altered
conditions of things. The private bar will now be a government department,
administered, not by civil, smiling barmaids, but by civil service clerks who
have got their positions by competitive examination. No longer can the thirsty
customer slam his coin upon the counter and cheerfully demand a pint of
bitter. He will have to wait until young gentlemen behind the bar have finished
their conversation; and then, after being coldly inspected, will be required to
full up a form. Retiring to a corner with a pen, ink and Form OK 71832
(Public Refreshments Supply), he will spend an exciting hour and a half in
filling in the various particulars required, with, of course, his reason for
wanting ‘Beer, Bitter, Pint, One, of.’ Having sworn to his signature, the
customer now sits down and waits while his application is scrutinised by
higher officials, endorsed and filed. The required beverage is then issued, by
which time the customer has either died of thirst or the closing hour has
come.48
The trade was clearly suspicious of government intervention. State purchase would
bring unnecessary regulation and bureaucracy to the normally relatively unregulated
47 See HO 190/503, Complete List of the CCB, 18 June 1918.
48 Brewers’ Journal 22 June 1916.
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public house, where social custom, rather than state regulation, usually dictated
behaviour. The Carlisle Licensed Victuallers’ Association recounted their ‘everlasting
regret’ that the Board ‘backed up local brewers who were anxious to sell, local landed
gentry, prominent business men and the teetotal party, like an avenging army, entered
the English gate of your old and honoured city’.49 Clearly the association saw the
Board as some sort of conspiratorial conglomeration of interests antipathetic to
working class life, intent on attacking the working man’s pub. It claimed the Board
had merely ‘advertised Carlisle as the most drunken city in Great Britain’.50
Yet, despite some negative comment, the experiment, as The Carlisle Journal
concluded:
Offered an opportunity for progress to be made in the resolution of the
problems caused by drink. The Carlisle scheme is a bold experiment and the
slight opposition which has been offered to it may be taken as a tacit
acknowledgement that no more feasible and practical alternative can be
devised for alleviating a condition of things that is admittedly both deplorable
and intolerable.51
Moreover, the CCB could not afford to waste this opportunity. The stakes were high.
As another local paper noted: ‘if the Carlisle experiment ends in disappointment and
failure, the case for drastic legislative action will be vastly strengthened’.52 The author
was presumably thinking about prohibition.
The Board wasted little time in acquiring the various strands of the licensed
trade of Carlisle. Included in this were hotels, breweries, maltings, blending and
bottling stores, wine and spirit merchants, shops and offices. The purpose was thus
not solely confined to reducing the number of public houses but allowed for a much
more extensive management of properties relating to the alcohol industry. In total
49 HO 190/482, Licensed Victuallers Association General Correspondance.
50 Ibid.
51 The Carlisle Journal 23 June 1916.
52 The Carlisle Journal 20 October 1916.
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there were 120 pubs in Carlisle and 4 breweries.53 The buy out was not undertaken in
one fell swoop. The process began in July and was not completed until October of that
year. Some in the trade were hostile to the takeover though a general acquiescence to
the Board’s scheme existed.54 Meanwhile, further reports in the summer of 1916
underlined the extent of the drink-related problems facing the CCB. A concerned
Colonel David Davies commented in August 1916:
The conditions under which liquor is sold and consumed on these premises are
deplorable; crowded bars, parlours, staircases, and passages render proper
supervision impossible, with the result that there has been a certain amount of
drunkenness . . . it is necessary to push on rapidly with the reconstruction of
existing premises, and to improve sufficient accommodation to tide over the
period of congestion during the next four or five months. The navvies have a
custom of drinking beer and whisky or rum together, and as they usually have
their drinks before their meals, this habit seriously affects their efficiency as
workmen. 55
Pubs in the areas surrounding Carlisle had to be taken over in order to prevent navvies
from taking a short trip to nearby Maryport, in order to enjoy drink in an uncontrolled
premise. This area was the last purchased after the acquisition of the Maryport
brewery in late 1916. In total this meant the state purchase region extended to an area
of around 500 square miles containing a wartime population of approximately
140,000.56
The process of buying pubs continued over the summer. By September
Sanders was able to report ‘good progress is being made here and we have now taken
over all the houses.’57 The Board in total bought out 4 breweries, 195 ‘on’ licenses
53 For a review of Carlisle pubs prior to state purchase see Steven Davidson, Carlisle Breweries and
Public Houses 1894-1916 (Carlisle, 2004).
54 HO 185/222, The Jennings Brothers of Cockermouth and the Maryport Brewery were unconvinced
of the legal justification of the Board purchasing their pub. In a climbdown on 7 September 1916 they
claimed that they ‘wished to help the Board in their work for what is considered to be the national
interest. For that reason they would be prepared to come to a reasonable agreement for the acquisition
of the Board of the premises and interests which they desire to take over.’ This indicates how the
process of the CCB buying pubs could be slowed down.
55 HO 185/227, Colonel David Davies to D’Abernon, 28 August 1916.
56 H. Carter, The Control of the Drink Trade, p. 203.
57 HO 190/779, Correspondence between Sanders and London Office, 4 September 1916.
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and 20 ‘off’ licenses. By August 1917, sixty-six ‘on’ and eighteen ‘off’ licenses had
also been suppressed as redundant or undesirable.58 The pubs closed were those
deemed to have been incapable of meeting the criteria of a reformed public house and
those in dubious geographical positions, such as in back streets, which made police
supervision all the more difficult. In total the Board paid £900,000 in compensation.
The CCB also sought to reduce the consumption of spirits: the vice of choice
to the hardcore drinker. The sale of spirits was prohibited near the Gretna factory and
in the surrounding village public houses. The weekend was made a spiritless zone
with the complete prohibition of ‘on’ spirits and the arrival of ‘spiritless Saturdays’. It
was not a well-liked policy however. Carlisle was the only English city where it was
applied and the workers were unhappy at being denied the liberty common to fellow
workingmen throughout the land.
Other actions taken by the Board against spirits included a reduction in the
number of off licenses selling spirits from 101 to 18 and the attempted eradication of
the custom, noted above, of buying beer and spirits together. This was an arbitrary
measure as customers could still buy spirits but it meant going to the bar again, and
presumably after a few beers the idea was that this became a less enticing prospect in
a crowded pub. Furthermore, as an alternative to higher strength alcoholic drinks,
‘munition beer’, which had a strength of 2 per cent, was widely available by April
1916. ‘It smells like beer, it looks like beer, and tastes like beer, the only difference is
in the headache’, noted one member of the Board.59
The creation of ‘reformed’ public houses came to symbolise the progressive
nature of the Carlisle experiment. This involved the alteration of existing premises to
new specifications aimed at alleviating the drink problem and the establishment of
58 H. Carter, The Control of the Drink Trade, p. 206.
59 The Annandale Observer 14 April 1916.
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purpose-built pubs which provided food and leisure facilities to the expanding
workforce who lived in the area. Gutzke has written that state managed pubs were a
‘laboratory for evolving an entirely new public house with food as the centrepiece’
which ‘embodied progressives’ belief in pragmatism and experimentation’.60
The Board’s records show that every detail of their construction was carefully
considered to ensure that these ‘model’ public houses fulfilled these idealistic beliefs.
These model public houses were to be ‘a place of refreshment for the body and mind
alike’ and a physical institution of the reformist musings of the previous years. By
creating a simple and straightforward environment organisers hoped that the
behaviour of the customers would reflect the austerity of the new pub. Interestingly,
The Carlisle Journal saw the scheme as:
A practical test of the theory of those temperance reformers who have urged
that by opening houses where no inducements were offered to customers to
drink for the sake of drinking, and where other refreshments including food
were supplied at modest prices amid comfortable and pleasant surroundings, a
marked reduction in the consumption of intoxicating drink and consequently
of drunkenness would ensue.61
The paper noted, however, that this scheme was not universally popular amongst the
temperance party as this reform ‘may make the public house more attractive and
would have the effect of increasing instead of diminishing the sale of drink’.62 It was a
distinct moment at which either one or the other of the temperance wings, prohibition
or reform, would be proven correct.
A vast amount of building work was immediately undertaken. Ironically one
wonders if increasing the number of working navvies in Carlisle contributed to the
problem. The goal of this construction work was the creation of better public houses
and the extension of food provision. The CCB placed much emphasis on the link
60 D. Gutzke, Pubs and Progressives, p. 67
61 The Carlisle Journal 14 July 1916.
62 Ibid.
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between a good diet and sobriety. In Carlisle the pubs served only drink and the
restaurants and cafés could not cope with the extra custom from the influx of workers.
Therefore, the Board sought to create new restaurant/bars and encourage the sale of
food in pubs where liquid refreshment dominated.
Figure 22: The Gretna Tavern as it stood in 1917.
180
Figure 23: The Gretna Tavern in 2006, now a TSB bank.
The Gretna Tavern, the first ‘food tavern’ opened by the Board, was a showpiece
model pub designed to highlight the work undertaken in Carlisle. It was opened on 12
July 1916, within a month of the CCB taking over at Carlisle. It was a symbolic
moment as on the same day six existing public houses were closed. As the first
‘reformed pub’ in Carlisle its opening received a great deal of press attention. The
Carlisle Evening News reported that:
Considerable structural alterations have been carried out in the interior to fit
the building for its future use as a model Government Refreshment house. In
the long room which was formerly used as the Post Office Public Counter
there is a stand up bar at which local beer and stout can be obtained but no
spirits. The large department at the rear used for letter sorting has been
transferred into a handsome café with tables at which refreshments will be
served including tea, coffee, cocoa, soup, a good meal, Welsh rarebit, a plate
of ham and egg etc will be served and there will be facilities for writing,
reading and smoking, also to hear some music and to have a rest.63
63 Carlisle Evening News 12 July 1916.
181
Figure 24: The restaurant in the Gretna Tavern 1917.
The restaurant had a capacity of 180 and food could be purchased from 7.30 a.m. until
9 p.m. Alcoholic drinks could only be purchased between 12 noon and 2.30 p.m. and
from 6 p.m. till 9 p.m. Hopes were high that this model tavern heralded a new dawn in
the social life of Carlisle and perhaps of the pub in general. Indeed, it was a
momentous moment in the control of the drink problem, as Lord D’Abernon, at the
opening of the Gretna Tavern, underlined:
The licensed houses I think have been found by common experience to be
inadequate to the necessities of the case, and not only inadequate in
accommodation but also in a large measure to be unsuitable . . . I am told by
those who have been able to compare the facilities afforded here and there that
we need not fear any unfavourable contrast. It is obvious that in any
experience of this kind it is necessary to replace the small hole and corner
premises where a very large trade is now done, necessarily without adequate
supervision, by more commodious, more healthy surroundings, where
reasonable refreshments, including particularly non alcoholic refreshments and
solid food may be obtained under agreeable circumstances. Every endeavour
will be made to improve the character of the business done.64
64 The Times 13 July 1916.
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He was aware, however, that customs could, and would, not change overnight. The
Gretna Tavern was utilised as a showpiece for the Board’s endeavours and its success
was paramount to the cause of the reform of drinking behaviour. In July 1917 King
George V and Queen Mary visited the tavern. The Carlisle Journal reported that ‘the
King appeared to be very favourably impressed with the working of the tavern. ‘It
was’, he remarked, a ‘modern club house for the working man, and a decided
improvement on the public house’.65 One wonders if D’Abernon had provided the
script.
Figure 25: The King and Queen visit the Gretna Tavern July 1917.
The provision of food at the Gretna Tavern was successful. By April 1917
food constituted 77 per cent of the total sales.66 Selley noted:
I had the place under observation for a week. On Saturday afternoon the
dining hall was crowded almost to excess. Also the bar was well filled.
Among those taking meals were a large number of navvies. I had my meal in
the company of such men. Many were having coffee or tea with their dinner,
65 The Carlisle Journal 22 May 1916.
66 HO 185/9, Carlisle details and accounts.
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others were drinking ale. Most of them had a very substantial meal, as large
numbers of them look upon this meal as the meal of the week.67
As the showpiece pub of the reformist movement, the Gretna Tavern was often the
subject of acrimonious debate. It was, however, just one of the main projects
undertaken by the Board and its opening precipitated a gust of social reconstruction.
From the spring of 1917 attention turned to food provision within existing
public houses. In total, nine ‘reconstruction schemes’ were completed in the first year,
in pubs primarily best suited to supplying food. As an incentive to managers, the pubs
could stay open during the day just to sell food and non-intoxicating drinks with a
commission equal to 75 per cent of the gross profits being paid to the manager. This
was a popular move as new refreshment rooms emerged. In Carlisle, the Pheasant Inn
reported a ‘good business’ in food. At Annan, the Globe public house was reopened
as the Globe Restaurant and proved immediately popular with the navvies.68 All the
pubs aimed to provide hot meals at cheap prices. New cooking facilities were
introduced and proved popular. Selley reported that:
The canteen at Gracie’s Banking successfully meets a very great need. The
building contains a large café where excellent meals can be obtained, a
spacious beer hall, with ample provision of games. A cinema is attached to the
premises, and in the summer a fine bowling green will be available for the
men.69
This alteration in emphasis within the pub encouraged a broader clientele. As ‘one
moderate drinking man’ said of the London Tavern, ‘you can take the missus there
and have supper, and have a glass of beer with it. Jolly fine.’70 The Brewers’ Gazette
noted that the model public house now ‘replaced mere drinking shops by sanely
managed houses of refreshment to which even an Archdeacon might take his wife and
67 HO 190/459, Ernest Selley, Administration General Management correspondence with J.S. Eagles,
20 February 1917.
68 H. Carter, The Control of the Drink Trade, p. 211.
69 HO 190/459, Ernest Selley, Administration: General Management correspondence with J.S. Eagles,
20 February 1917.
70 Ibid.
184
daughters – a procedure hitherto denied to the common publican by the cast iron
methods of the Licensing benches.’71
New social facilities, such as billiard tables, newspapers and writing materials,
were an important adjunct to the food provided. They were introduced to make the
pub more of a general social space and to offer a distraction from alcohol
consumption. Space for such facilities was made within pubs by the removal of
unnecessary barriers to create a more enlightened and visible public area. It was
further hoped that a spacious interior would limit nefarious behaviour. Together with
the introduction of comfortable furnishings, the idea was to improve the salubrity of
the public house. As the chairman of the local trades council, who was in favour of
the Board’s work, suggested:
When men cannot get a drink in comfort they invariably consume more. If
there are tables and chairs where men can sit down and drink at ease and read
their paper, or have a ‘‘crack’’ with their pals, and take time over it, there is
less danger of excessive drinking.’72
The external appearance of public houses also changed dramatically. Drink
advertisements were banned, bottles removed from windows, and many pubs were
painted. The changes were so great that ‘many strangers remarked upon the difficulty
in distinguishing the public houses in the main streets’ which, after all, was the
intention.73 For some temperance advocates, however, new items of interior design,
purchased to educate the working class, were simply too much too soon:
The external appearance of the houses is all that can be desired, and I have
nothing to do but praise the general scheme. The internal decorations, on the
other hand, while good from the point of view of the advocates of the
impressionist school, are, in my judgement, quite beyond the comprehension
of the average public house customers. The black ceiling at the London
Tavern, the impressionist prints after the style of those on the Metropolitan
Railway, the plaster bas reliefs in the Room at the Working Girls Club, are
71 The Brewers’ Gazette 1 March 1917.
72 HO 190/459, Ernest Selley, Administration General Management correspondence with J.S. Eagles,
20 February 1917.
73 Report of the General Manager 31 December 1917.
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examples of what I mean. To me they may convey the sense of much that is
beautiful, to them they do not appeal greatly. Some good coloured and black
and white prints, such as are supplied for elementary schools, would be far
more suitable . . . You cannot suddenly lift men and women from squalor to an
appreciation of impressionist art. It can only be a very gradual process.74
Figure 26: Harry Redfern.
The architect chosen to design and implement this scheme of reform in
Carlisle was the aforementioned Harry Redfern. His job was to manifest physically
the ideas of the CCB within the remaining public houses of Carlisle. His commission
was what many architects would consider to have been a dream - a project with a
74 HO 185/227, Temperance Legislation League visit to Carlisle (Mr Harvey), Report 3 to 7 July to
1917, The Carlisle Public Houses, Structural Alterations.
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large amount of finance available, supported and funded by a government department
together with an opportunity to create an architectural legacy, not only for a city, but
for a way of life. Redfern had previously undertaken work for both Oxford and
Cambridge Universities and had experience of restoring ancient buildings. By
creating a simple and homely environment it was hoped that the behaviour of the
customers would reflect the atmosphere of the new pub. An architectural review of
Redfern’s work noted, ‘Redfern swept away all snugs, those bastions of covert
Victorian sexuality, confronted the perpendicular drinker with more and more seats,
and hung tasteful prints and engravings to provide a suitable ambience.’75 One
barman reported that ‘there’s no privacy now. If a woman wants a drink she has to go
where she’s seen, and she doesn’t like it.’76 In Gracie’s Banking pub, Redfern
removed the stand up bar entirely, relying instead on waitresses serving drinks.
D’Abernon believed the ‘appearance of the houses wonderful and the order inside
excellent’.77
75 C.H.B. Quennell, The Good New Days (London, 1935), p 81.
76 HO 190/459, Ernest Selley, Administration General Management correspondence with J.S. Eagles,
20 February 1917.
77 HO 190/455 R. Burrill, who acted as the Chief Clerk of the Carlisle Experiment, to Sanders, 25 June
1917.
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Figure 27: A ‘unique’ feature within one of the reformed Carlisle Pubs.
Redfern was also not averse to more radical experimentation, particularly when one
considers the Crescent Inn on Warwick Road. Today it stands as it did ninety years
ago, though it is now known as the ‘White Horse’. Redfern sought to bring a small
piece of the Mediterranean to Carlisle by building this pub in a Spanish Moorish style.
One author described how:
There is a balcony over the main door and someone has remarked that all the
Crescent needs to finish off its visual appearance is a dark haired senorita
clasping castanets, and a gay young toreador standing in Warwick Road
serenading her with his guitar while she tosses blood red roses at his feet.78
The pub was designed to enlighten the cultural atmosphere of the city. What the
workers made of it is a matter of conjecture.
Redfern was successful in creating several model pubs, both during and after
the war. It was testament to his ability that Lord Amulree remarked at the Institute of
British Architects in 1932 that ‘Mr Redfern will leave behind him a monument more
78 J. Hunt, A City Under the Influence: The Story of Half a Century of State Pubs (Penrith, 1971), p.
35.
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enduring than bricks and mortar. He has captured the spirit of the Border City, and
designed different types of houses which are a tribute to his artistic and professional
skill.’79 His designs also left a positive impression upon visiting temperance
enthusiasts:
Viewed as models and experiments for the guidance of the state in dealing
with the Liquor Problem on national lines they are of great and permanent
value, and the architects, and others who have been responsible, under the
board, for carrying out the work, deserve the greatest credit. The work will be
an enduring monument to their enterprise and right conception of what is
needed in the interests of great social reform.80
In 1920 visiting Labour party members wrote that the houses ‘possessed a certain
dignity and beauty’.81
Having bought out the breweries of Carlisle, the CCB was also in charge of
beer production in the area. In order to ensure beer quality the Board hired an expert
from the University of Birmingham’s school of Malting and Brewing to monitor the
beer on sale. His report was encouraging:
During the course of my inspection I visited a large number of public houses
in both Carlisle and Longtown for the purpose of examining the character of
the draught ales being served to the public . . . I am able to report that the
beers as a whole were satisfactory.82
Others had a more candid viewpoint:
In the days of my indiscretion it was an article of faith with me that while
some beers were better than others, there was no bad beer. I have drunk of the
State Brew of Carlisle, and I now know that there is bad beer. I paid four
pence for a glass of something wet. My first thought was that the Germans had
poisoned the wells. My second that it would be a social service to poison the
brewer . . . it was muddy, flat and almost tasteless.83
79 Ibid. p. 37.
80 HO 185/227, Report by Temperance Legislation League after a visit to Carlisle.
81 P. Talbot, ‘The Case for the State Control of the UK Brewing Industry and its extension in 1920 and
Beyond’, Brewery History: The Journal of the Brewery History Society, Number 116, Autumn 2004.
82 HO 190/449, Adrian J. Brown, British School of Malting and Brewing, University of Birmingham,
to Chairman Public House Committee, 8 February 1917.
83 The Carlisle Evening News 4 December 1916 reporting on an article in The Sunday Chronicle
entitled ‘The truth about Carlisle Pubs.’
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One suspects this criticism came from a bitter member of the trade. His view was,
according to one Board member, the exception: ‘I am pleased to report that the
complaints we have as to the qualities of our ales and beers are very few.’84 The
Board continued, however, to monitor the beer on sale. After all, a pub with bad beer
was unlikely to make money or attract custom.
The vast majority of pre-direct control pub management staff were kept on by
the Board but were given new directives by which to manage their pubs. Most notable
was the introduction of ‘disinterested management’, a concept borrowed from ‘the
Gothenburg scheme’, a cause celebre of the progressive movement.85 As Sanders
described:
In nearly all cases, those persons who were licensees before the Board took
possession have become the salaried managers under the Board. They have no
interest whatsoever in the sale of intoxicants, the amount of their wages for the
future depending in no way upon this part of the trade. On the other hand,
licensees have been encouraged to provide food and to push its sale together
with that of non-intoxicants.86
The scheme paid the managers a set salary. The manager was thus under no pressure
to sell his wares to customers in order to boost his earnings. His livelihood was
guaranteed so the pressure to sell that last drink to someone already intoxicated was
thus lessened. As The Carlisle Evening News observed: ‘unmercenary managers now
rejoice more over the sale of one small lemonade than of several pints of beer’.87
Those publicans who did not act in line with the Board’s directives were swiftly
moved on, though not without some acrimony. For example, records show that on 22
November 1917 the manager of the Jovial Sailor Inn, who apparently was ‘most
84 HO 190/1, Martin Beaty to Edgar Sanders, 26 February 1917.
85 For a discussion surrounding the origins and implications of this scheme, see D. Gutzke,
‘Gentrifying the British Public House’, International Labour and Working Class History, No. 45,
Spring 1994, pp. 29-43.
86 HO 190/434, General Manager Report to the local committee as to the position of Carlisle upto 31
October 1916.
87 The Carlisle Evening News 18 May 1916.
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unsatisfactory’, was given notice to quit by 1 December due to ‘unreasonable
behaviour’. He refused to do so, and the house was ‘closed for business on the latter
date’. 88
The CCB monitored and managed the performance of its managers to ensure
the successful implementation of its directives. Monitoring fell to members of the
Board, who would go into pubs and anonymously watch proceedings, subsequently
reporting back their findings. The local police forces, as before, were responsible for
the enforcement of the CCB’s directives, adding further to their already heavy burden
of work.89 Regular progress reports and transgressions were reported to the Local
Advisory Committee and upwards to the CCB itself.
Newspaper reporters, temperance workers, trade representatives and social
reformers would regularly travel to the north to witness the work being undertaken in
Carlisle. The scheme was very newsworthy and, from the outset, a popular point of
conjecture in the press. Some commentators were keen on drawing swift conclusions.
In November 1916 a deputation was sent by the Liverpool Licensed Victuallers’
Association to study the conditions prevailing at Carlisle under the CCB’s scheme.
The Association was uncomplimentary about the project:
More men were to be seen drunk during this one evening that would be seen in
Liverpool in a month . . . The scene at the station about 9 p.m. when the
workmen’s trains were leaving was indescribable. It was like a free fight to get
into the station, and the crowds of drunken and half drunken men were herded
and packed together like wild beasts . . . Conditions existed that would not be
tolerated by any self respecting licensing bench in the country.90
88 HO 190/472, Reports sent to General Manager, 22 November 1917.
89 Chief Constable of Carlisle’s Report, 31 December 1917. As De Schmid reported ‘the year has been
one of exceptional difficulty, as apart from the shortage of the regular members of the Force, the great
increase of drunkenness, and the influx of thousands of workmen, an enormous amount of extra work
has been thrown on the police, particularly on the HQ staff, in carrying out the numerous DORA
regulations, special work in connection with the CCB, dealing with the registration of Aliens, the
issuing of ID books, regular visiting of Enemy aliens, inspection of Registers kept by hotel and lodging
house keepers, reports re local suspects and a very large number of enquiries for other police forces.’
90 Cumberland News 22 November 1916.
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Indeed, the trade viewed some of the action taken in Carlisle as arbitrary and
representative not of a scheme of control but a crooked manifestation of temperance
ideology introduced without proper consultation.
Some temperance societies, of the prohibitionist persuasion, were also quick to
record their disenchantment. In October 1916, in the annual report of the UKA, the
committee ‘placed on record its strong protest against a measure which, for the first
time, in our history, has put the state into the position of a maker and vendor of
intoxicating liquors.’91 So powerful was the prohibitionist view that any dilution of
this position, even if temperance proposals were being introduced, resulted in
discontent.
One of the most prominent episodes in this hostile dialogue over the Carlisle
scheme was a pamphlet produced by the Reverend Wilson Stuart entitled The Carlisle
and Annan Experiment in State Purchase and Liquor Nationalisation published in
mid-1917. Stuart was a convinced prohibitionist and his pamphlet ardently criticised
the undertakings at Carlisle but was presented as if it were the work of an impartial
investigative journalist. The pamphlet called into question whether anything within
Carlisle had actually been changed by the Board, thus setting in motion a pamphlet
war. In a section entitled ‘Carlisle Public Houses Still Unreformed’, Stuart presented a
familiar picture:
In the many Control Board public houses in Carlisle and District I saw the
same old liquor advertisements – many of which could be removed without
the extraction of a tin-tack. There is the old total absence of anything but
liquid refreshment of the ordinary public house kind, there is in many of them
the same poorly dressed, ill-kempt, foul mouthed blaspheming crowd of
drinking men and women – with barmen and barwomen presiding, who were
there before the Board came; in others there are the same flashy questionable
women drinking and smoking cigarettes. The language and low life in some of
these places is indescribable.92
91 Annual Report of the United Kingdom Alliance 1916.
92 Wilson Stuart, The Carlisle and Annan Experiment in State Purchase and Liquor Nationalisation
(London, 1917), pp. 7-8.
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Stuart clearly wrote with an agenda. He sought to undermine the argument that direct
control was a suitable substitute to overall prohibition by attacking the Board’s claim
to have ‘civilised’ the public house. He argued that nothing had changed in Carlisle,
and that the government was profiting from the evils of drink. He also questioned
whether a public house could ever be truly reformed:
The Gretna Tavern with its relative respectability, has just got a few clients
and has not touched the general drinking of Carlisle. As to combining drinking
of alcohol with eating, whether in ‘Gretna Tavern’ or at ‘Gracie’s Banking’,
Annan, it is for all practical purposes non-existent . . . The drinking of Carlisle
is still swilling, and the eating is teetotal eating.93
That his evidence was anecdotal did nothing to blunt his ever-sharpening sword. Not
content with commenting on the unchanged situation in Carlisle, Stuart showed the
reader the supposed Armageddon-like scenes within the Cathedral city. The pamphlet
incorporated ‘twelve sketches of striking scenes in Carlisle’. These pictures are
contrasted with quotations, such as that from Percy Alden M.P. that ‘the CCB has put
an end to the drunkenness which for a time so disgraced the munition work in
Carlisle’, and sought to highlight the differences between the supposed reality of the
situation and the ‘official’ picture of Carlisle.94
93 Ibid. pp. 9-10.
94 Ibid. No Page Number.
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Figure 28: The Cartoons taken from Stuart’s pamphlet.
Stuart also criticised what he saw as the disingenuous spin placed on the drunkenness
statistics by the CCB. He argued that the Board’s restrictions had not yet produced
any appreciable diminution in the number of convictions. Quoting the Cumberland
News of 4 November 1916 he claimed:
These figures [of convictions for drunkenness] disclose three distinct
movements: - a steady decline in the early months of the war, a rapid rise from
October 1915, to June, of this year; and a pronounced decline afterwards.
These movements are explainable without reference to the operations of the
Control Board . . . There was an invasion of many thousands of navvies, who
are as a class intemperate; latterly, as the constructional work has reached
completion, these navvies have been disappearing and giving place to skilled
workers whose tastes and habits are more restrained. The fluctuations in the
population are thus in themselves sufficient to account for the rise and fall in
the list of convictions; and the table, therefore, affords us no reliable data to
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judge of the benefits which have flowed from the purchase operations of the
Board, which began in August.95
This is a curious argument to make as Stuart had earlier discussed how the navvies
still drank to their hearts’ content in Carlisle. Nevertheless, he recounted a few more
scenes of drunkenness, the theme being one of moral outrage, then concluded with a
summary of his arguments:
1: The Board’s constructive methods . . . employ much labour, are very costly,
and have added to the congestion of the other houses.
2: There has been enormous expenditure of public funds on a most contentious
experiment, and after six or seven months operations, men and women
engaged on work of national importance are still grievously incapacitated by
drink.
3: All the new model houses have failed to attract the drinker from the old
purely drinking houses.
4: The scores of ordinary public houses are mostly full of people, and are such
as they were before. There is no eating and no attempt, by advertisement of
food or provision of it, to encourage or build up a trade in victuals. The
publican, barmen, and bar women are the same. The habits and morals of the
habitués are the same.
5: The attempt to rehabilitate the public house in the public estimate will, I
fear, promote drinking habits in those who have not before visited public
houses.
6: Drink, in the six or seven months of the Board’s operations, as much pushed
as it ever was.
7: The Board’s ideal, and the new houses have utterly failed to attract old
drinkers.96
This list usefully summarised concerns and accusations levelled at the scheme.
Stuart’s work should be considered as prohibitionist propaganda. To be sure
there was, as with all propaganda, some basis of fact in his attacks. The CCB could
not be expected to curtail drinking completely and undoubtedly drunkenness was still
in evidence on the streets of Carlisle but his pamphlet confirmed to those who
believed in prohibition their self-righteousness and sought to change the mind of those
who were more neutral.
95 Ibid. p. 14. Quoting the Cumberland News 4 November 1916.
96 Ibid. pp. 19-21.
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Stuart’s pamphlet riled the Board and those sympathetic to its work.97 The
Earl of Lonsdale wrote: ‘I most certainly think that some steps should be taken as
regards Mr Wilson Stuart’s pamphlet. I am afraid that I do not quite grasp from the
booklet what really is at the bottom and is the foundation for the statements made in
it.’98 Speculation soon arose as to the origins of the pamphlet given its damaging
criticism. Sanders wrote: ‘I understand that the money for this campaign is being
found by the extreme prohibitionist party, who desire to utilise this in their opposition
to state purchase and control.’99 Waters Butler was even more condemnatory in a
letter to Sanders: ‘the treatment you are receiving from these fanatics is an illustration
of what the licensed trade has had to suffer for many years, and I trust no effort will
be spared to expose their unjust tactics.’100 Sanders replied: ‘My own opinion is that
we should now ignore him . . . In reality I think he has done us a considerable service
as a good many people in Carlisle realise the work that has been done by the Board
during the last year.’101
Others came to the aid of the CCB. Bramwell Evens, a Wesleyan Minister,
wrote a pamphlet that disagreed with most of Stuart’s conclusions. He made clear that
the ‘writing of this pamphlet is purely voluntary’ and ‘I am neither under obligation to
the Control Board (I was not even aware who most of them were), nor am I controlled
by the Prohibitionists.’102 Entitled The Truth about Direct Control in Carlisle, it dealt
immediately with Stuart’s work in the opening paragraph:
So strong is the feeling among our citizens who have read the [Stuart’s]
pamphlet as to its misleading, insinuative and unfair statements, that I feel the
general public should be acquainted with the real state of affairs by one who
97 Stuart later joined the UKA in August 1919.
98 HO 185/352, Earl of Lonsdale to Cartmell, 3 June 1917.
99 HO 185/352, Sanders to Butler, 30 May 1917.
100 HO 190/463, Butler to Sanders, 12 June 1917.
101 HO 190/463, General Administration: Correspondence with Waters Butler 1916-1917, Sanders to
Butler, 13 July 1917.
102 G. Bramwell Evens, The Truth about Direct Control in Carlisle (Westminster, 1917), p. 13.
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has not merely visited the city, but lived here in pre-control Board days and
through the whole period of control.103
He argued that Stuart was unrealistic in his expectations of the scheme:
No Control Board by its mere assumption of power miraculously sobers a
town in a day. Its legislation and policy leave the tastes of the people
untouched. Had the Control Board policy been the desires of the populace, a
miraculous sobriety would have been possible. But the Board commenced its
work and extended it for seven months amidst the very class by whom drink –
and plenty of it – was deemed a necessity. It is no wonder, then, that the
statistics for drunkenness after six months show only a decline in convictions
(as compared with the former half year) and not a total abolition of
drunkenness. It is to the credit of the Board that any substantial diminution of
drunkenness occurred at all.104
Evens went on to recount the successes of the Board’s work, notably the disinterested
management scheme, the reduction of licenses, the reconstruction of public houses,
the prohibition of spirits and the end of mixing drinks. He then assaulted the
underlying theme of Stuart’s work:
The whole tone is that of one who is delighted to find supposed weaknesses in
the Government scheme and to exaggerate them until its reforms seem of little
importance. His anxiety is not so much to help the country to a solution of the
liquor problem as to show that this government experiment is contrary to his
own pet theories.105
He concluded with a rebuttal of many of Stuart’s claims. One example should suffice
to illustrate the nature of his riposte. Replying to the accusation that the ‘beginning of
Direct Control synchronised with the exodus of the heaviest drinking class (the
navvies)’ Evens noted that this statement was ‘completely at variance with the real
facts’:
This is the most serious blunder Mr Stuart has made . . . he was content to take
press and hearsay evidence instead of sifting out the truth for himself from the
only authority who had a right to give it. This authority I now quote. Sir
Edward Pearson (Ministry of Munitions) states ‘The number of workmen
employed on construction work was practically the same at the end of 1916 as
at the end of June . . . I should say that the number of labourers coming from
103 Ibid. p. 1.
104 Ibid. p. 6.
105 Ibid. p. 12.
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Carlisle all through remained fairly constant.’ This is the final word on the
subject.106
Overall, Evens, himself a minister, who was not particularly fond of drinking, could
clearly see the benefits of a system of control:
No longer will the drink traffic be in the hands of ‘profiteers’ but earnest
temperance and social reformers will have a voice in the conducting of this
trade . . . I am far from urging that this experiment in the Carlisle area is the
ideal. But I do claim that considering we are dealing with a ‘Trade’ into
which, by its very nature so many abuses can creep, we have found the best
method.107
Employing one of Stuart’s sources, Evens points to an article in the Cumberland
Evening News, which was less than flattering about Stuart’s pamphlet. The article
read:
Criticism of the Carlisle ‘experiment’ . . . was to be expected, but if it is to be
helpful it must be applied in a different spirit to that which animates the
Reverend Wilson Stuart, of Birmingham . . . we take the strongest exception to
his conclusion that conditions in the city are worse since the Board became the
sole victualler than they were before.108
Meanwhile, the Carlisle experiment was paying. The reforms were profitable with
yearly profits exceeding expectations.109 From 1916-1918 the scheme made £107,392
profit. Sanders let it be known, however, that it was ‘unwise to announce profits’ and,
despite questioning from Colonel Gretton as to the financial status of the CCB, little
monetary information crept into the public domain.110 This profit was a fillip to those
seeking the introduction of nationwide state purchase as this monetary gain contrasted
to the economic loss that was generally predicted by critics. Sanders admitted to
Astor: ‘we have put into operation all the reasonable and generally accepted
temperance proposals made in the last half century, and can show that this is possible
106 Ibid. p. 16.
107 Ibid. p. 28.
108 Ibid. p. 29. Quoting the Cumberland News 29 May 1917.
109 HO 190/472, Sanders to Scott - The financial results are coming out splendidly, and I think the 15
per cent mentioned by Lord D’Abernon will, in practice be nearer 17 per cent on a capital which I
estimate at between £750,000 and £800,000.
110 HO 185/213, Public House Committee Minutes, 13 March 1917.
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not only without financial loss but with a considerable margin of profit to the state.’111
D’Abernon, however, castigated Sanders for using such temperance terminology. An
open admission that the Board had merely implemented temperance proposals would
have caused great controversy if it had been publicised, as it would have confirmed
what trade activists had been claiming throughout the war.
Certainly it seems that the people of Carlisle generally accepted the scheme,
be they long-term residents or visiting workers. One report noted: ‘on the whole men
acquiesced in the new regulations without open complaint. As one navvy said to me,
‘‘we’ve got to put up with many things nowadays as there is a war on’’ . . . In Carlisle
itself the Board has attained a measure of success under very difficult
circumstances’.112 Indeed the ready acceptance of the measures is testament to the
working class’ desire, not only for victory, but to make sacrifices to ensure this
victory. As one man reluctantly accepted: ‘I suppose they have taken over the pubs in
order to make us teetotallers.’113 No significant backlash against these new premises
was apparent. This acceptance belied accusations that the working class could not be
trusted. So long as beer flowed there seems to have been a general ambivalence as to
whether it flowed in a state run or private pub.
In terms of arrests for drunkenness the CCB can be considered successful in
reducing this criterion of measuring insobriety. From 953 convictions for drunkenness
in 1916 the figure was reduced to 320 in 1917 and to 80 in 1918.114 The decline in
drunkenness was accompanied by reports of order being restored to the streets of the
city. Sanders, in his annual report of 1918, wrote:
111 HO 190/493, Sanders to Astor, 16 September 1918.
112 HO 190/459, Ernest Selley Report, 20 February 1917.
113 Ibid.
114 P. Talbot, ‘Accounting for the Nationalised Brewery (1916-1974) and the Public Good’, Journal of
Finance and Management in Public Services, Volume 4, Number 2, p. 6.
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The improved condition of the streets, especially at night, is a fact which
impresses itself upon residents and visitors alike. Although the streets are
unduly crowded, especially on Saturday nights, the sight of a drunken person
is very exceptional. Any person who lived in Carlisle through the years 1916
and 1917 will testify to the greatly increased order and quietness in the streets
of the city since the work of the Board began to take effect and especially
during the last three quarters of 1917.115
Historical reviews have commonly agreed that the scheme was a success,
lessening conviction rates whilst also showing the potentiality of reform. The area
covered by the scheme totalled some 369 licensed premises, 321 of which were taken
over by the Board. This was a considerable administrative achievement made even
greater when one considers that Sanders and his colleagues were acting under wartime
duress. To create an administrative body from scratch and run the scheme
successfully in the space of twelve months must be considered an impressive
achievement.116
Interestingly, the scheme proved some temperance theories. As Sanders,
seeking to place the Carlisle scheme in historical perspective, wrote:
It is the first piece of constructive licensing reform undertaken with the
prestige and authority of a government department. It has shown that the
liquor trade can be carried on, subject to reasonable regulations without
detriment to the well being of the community, and without undue interference
with the liberty, tastes and preferences of the large mass of the adult
population . . . Above all it has offered a new solution of the problem of
intemperance.117
This lesson was taken onboard by the international community. In 1918 press
representatives from across the world visited Carlisle to view the work of the CCB
115 HO 190/473, Copies of Reports, General Manager from Carlisle 1918-1919.
116 The accounting techniques used at Carlisle were so innovative that academic research has been
carried out on them. See P. Talbot, ‘Costing the State Pint 1916-1974,’ Journal of Finance and
Management in Public Services, Volume 5, Number 2, December 2005.
117 HO 190/497, Sanders’ address to the Durham Citizens League on State Management of the Liquor
Trade in Carlisle, 14 November 1919.
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and were impressed enough to write of the scheme as a distinct alternative to
prohibition, both in the United States and Canada.118
Carlisle had been an interesting experiment but had it made a significant
difference? Whilst the decline in arrests for drunkenness was commendable there
were similar declines in other areas not under the direct control of the Board. Indeed,
the fact that the Carlisle area did not witness a significantly greater reduction in
drunkenness than other privately run areas suggests that the reform undertaken had
had limited effect.119 It will, alas, be impossible to come to a full-proof conclusion as
to the value of the work of the Carlisle scheme. Perhaps the most fair-minded review
of the experiment was made in 1919 by Theodore Carr, a parliamentary candidate for
the Carlisle constituency:
I have come to the conclusion, and I think it is the conclusion that a great
many people are coming to very quickly, and that is that the Control Board
have done some real good in this great temperance cause, and if we want to
encourage real true temperance, we must in this matter as in politics, in social
questions, and in general industrial matters, try and combine and do all we can
to avoid taking an extreme course. A gradual and satisfactory improvement in
the conditions of the country can only be brought about by every possible
force joining hands.120
118 HO 190/863, The Carlisle Journal 17 September 1918, ‘The opinion expressed by one of the
speakers and shared by many of the others was that if prohibition in the States were to fail Carlisle had
provided an alternative which they were prepared to recommend to the American people.’ Canadian
Press Representatives stated that ‘although prohibition had been adopted in Canada, they regarded it as
a wartime measure only, and the methods adopted in Carlisle offered a most interesting possibility for a
future scheme in the dominion.’
119 See W.J. Irving, State Purchase of the Drink Trade and the Sale of Drink under Government
Management in Carlisle, Comparing the years 1913 and 1922 Carlisle shows a reduction of sixty per
cent in the number of convictions for drunkenness. Forty-three of the eighty-one county boroughs show
reductions as great or greater than Carlisle, thirty-seven are worse than Carlisle’s percentage reduction
but this does not take into consideration the hardcore navvy drinker.
120 HO 190/437, Theodore Carr speech, July 1919.
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Chapter Six: ‘Helping our weaker sisters to go straight’ - Women and
Drink during the War
This chapter will show that perceptions of female drinking were a key
component of the moral panic surrounding the drink issue. During the war it was
believed that an increased number of women were drinking larger amounts of alcohol
than ever before. Contemporary evidence differs with regard to the scale of the
problem, making it difficult for the historian to come to definite conclusions. Indeed,
much evidence is simply contradictory. What is known for certain, though, is that
female drinking became emblematic of the broader desire to regulate certain sections
of society for the supposed benefit of the war effort. The intricacies of this debate
illustrate the shaky ground on which so much drink policy was founded.
During the Edwardian period women were still defined in terms of their
relationship towards men. Women’s prime role in life was still regarded as
motherhood. The woman was the domestic hub of Edwardian family life, central to
the existence of the family unit and thus of Edwardian society. Any movement outside
of this domestic sphere encountered suspicion. Thus it was with despair that many
moral commentators became conscious of women drinking in Britain during the war.
As early as 1900 concern was increasing over female intemperance due to the
protestations of disparate groups of temperance workers, eugenicists, social reformers,
imperialists and the medical profession.1 Women had always drank in the pubs of
Britain forming between 25-30 per cent of pub customers prior to the war, but in the
context of war this drinking was interpreted as definite evidence of the disintegration
1 See D. Wright and C. Chorniawry, ‘Women and Drink in Edwardian England’, Historical
Papers/Communication Historiques 1985, pp. 117-131, D. Gutzke, ‘The Cry of the Children: The
Edwardian Medical Campaign against Maternal Drinking’, pp. 71-84, Joanne Woiak, ‘A Medical
Cromwell to depose King Alcohol: Medical Scientists, Temperance Reformers and the Alcohol
Problem in Britain’, Histoire Sociale Social History, Volume XXVII, November 1994, pp. 337-365.
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of the family, which would lead to defeat in war and the moral collapse of the nation.2
This attitude ensured that when women drank moral condemnation and uproar
inevitably followed. In August 1915 The Times reported the concerns of clergy and
police in areas of the East End about female drinking, stating that the ‘problem of
open drunkenness among women was serious and was increasing’.3 Murray argued
that ‘everything tended to urge the women into the public houses. They had plenty of
time and plenty of money and they [the women] were all very worried.’4 Furthermore,
women were deemed to be incapable of handling drink to the same extent as men. The
1896 Commission’s Minority Report had concluded that ‘it is a lamentable fact that
when a woman becomes intemperate she seems to have less power of self-control
than a man.’5 The removal of men into the army and the resultant perceived reduction
in the standard of parenting led to, as one commentator argued, ‘an increase in the
proportion of children born of parents less fit and possibly less temperate . . . a
lowering of the national standard, both physical and moral, is inevitable.’6 Alarmed
social workers wrote to The Times that women who insisted their children were
starving were ‘all the time puffing into our faces fumes of whisky, gin and the like.’7
Worries increased due to the number of women filling industrial vacancies. 8
Darwinist anxieties were rife.
This disquiet over women’s drinking angered Sylvia Pankhurst, who saw it as
condescending towards her gender. In her autobiography she reflected:
2 D. Gutzke, ‘Gender, Class and Public Drinking in Britain during the First World War’, Histoire
Sociale/Social History Volume 27, Number 54, (1994), p. 368.
3 G.P. Williams and G.T. Broke, Drink in Great Britain 1900-1979 (London, 1980), p. 53.
4 M. Murray, Drink and the War: From the Patriotic Point of View, p. 38.
5 David Wright and Cathy Chorniawry, ‘Women and drink in Edwardian England’, p. 129.
6 H.G. Chancellor, War and National Temperance (Living Age, 1916), p. 350.
7 G. DeGroot, Blighty: British Society in the Era of the Great War, p. 237.
8 By mid 1914 more than 2 million women were employed in British factories, and by July 1918, that
figure rose to nearly 3 million according to the 1919 Report of the War Cabinet Committee on Women
in Industry. C.A. Culleton, Working Class Culture, Women and Britain 1914-1921 (Basingstoke,
2000), p. 1.
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Wartime hysterics gave currency to fabulous rumours. From press and pulpit
stories ran rampant of drunkenness and depravity amongst the women of the
masses. Alarmist rumour mongers conceived most monstrous visions of girls
and women, freed from the control of fathers and husbands who had hitherto
compelled them to industry, chastity and sobriety, now neglecting their homes,
plunging into excess, and burdening the country with swarms of illegitimate
infants. Living amongst the poorest, and constantly journeying to the working
class areas of provincial towns, I witnessed nothing of this alleged
phenomenon.9
Pankhurst questioned the moral panic that had emerged over women drinking at this
time. Relating the criticism to overall hostility towards women, she suggested that
rumour mongering was another falsehood aimed at inhibiting women from living a
fulfilling life. Whether a woman was drunk or not was largely a question of
perception. Those who wished to see female drinking as testament to the collapse of
moral virtue would do so regardless of the reality, whereas those less obsessed by the
idea would see no great divergence from pre-war female drinking customs and
patterns. As one chief constable, quoted as part of an inquiry into ‘excessive drinking
among women in Birmingham’, noted: ‘people who investigate this subject have in
many cases no previous experience of such investigations, they are naturally shocked
at scenes at which they are unaccustomed and therefore tend to exaggerate and to
confuse rowdyism with intoxication.’10
The trade refuted the idea that more women were drinking to excess. This was
illustrated by a reported speech by Mr F.G. Gardiner, Chairman of Directors for the
Public House Trust:
Since the question of drinking among women has been prominently before the
public for some time he had thought it desirable to make some inquiry into the
matter in what he regarded as authoritative quarters. The best opinion he had
been able to obtain was that there was no excessive drinking among women
since the war broke out (applause). He would like to point out that women of a
certain class were being visited by other women, and it was quite possible that
9 Sylvia Pankhurst, The Home Front: A Mirror to Life in England during the First World War (London,
1987), p. 98.
10 HO 185/238, Drunkenness among Women and Young People.
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the fact of drinking that took place among that class at any rate was being
brought more to the public notice that it would otherwise be.11
Panic though, once begun, was hard to contain. Swept along by a tide of popular
anxiety the very concept of women drinking to excess threatened established gender
roles. In a war fought to preserve Victorian certainties this was a substantial shock to
the system. Gender and class prejudices fused easily.
The early months of the war witnessed sustained moral criticism of female
drinking, with purveyors of moral panic highlighting the drunken female as the
archetypal representation of the decline in moral virtue. Given the undoubted
‘masculinity’ of the public house, the presence of women in the bars of Britain (in
seemingly unprecedented numbers) caused much consternation about the state of the
nation, intensifying anxieties about gender identity in the process. The notion that
women could enjoy drink supplanted established conceptions of the female’s place in
society. An appreciation of pleasures outwith the context of the home was perceived
as a distinct threat to the orderliness of society as a whole. The Edwardian fixation
with masculinity ensured that the absence of a male influence was identified as a
suitable explanation for the spate of female insobriety. As temperance campaigner
Mrs Alan Bright noted, ‘women who drank before, now drink more and what is
infinitely sadder, young wives, many of them mere girls, to whom alcohol must have
meant nothing at all, now take it because they are dispirited or lonely, or without
resource.’12 The Countess of Warwick shared this view:
A certain number of women of all classes have been drinking more than is
good for them, and since the war broke out the working women’s temptations
and the opportunity to indulge them have grown side by side. The majority of
working women are as sober as the majority of every class, but though there
are thousands of temperate women, they are matched by thousands of
11 The Scotsman 19 December 1914.
12 Steve Humphries and Richard von Emden, All Quiet on the Home Front: Life in Britain during the
First World War (Headline Book Publishing: London, 2003), p. 235.
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intemperate ones, the number has grown apace, and I feel that they should be
saved from themselves.13
Others, who saw in the descriptions of female drunkenness the familiar over
exaggeration of anti-drink polemicists, disputed these accusations. Anna Martin, in
the Nineteenth Century Journal, argued:
There was doubtless a considerable increase in the number of women
frequenting public bars after the outbreak of war, but the phenomenon was not
understood and was therefore mishandled. No tattle of evidence has ever been
adduced to show that women, previously temperate, were taking to dissolute
ways, and the indignation felt by the wives of the reservists was natural and
great . . . The piteous picture, which forms such a prominent part of the stock
in trade of temperance propagandists, of the good, king husband coming home
from his day’s toil and finding his wife dead drunk on the floor, is largely an
affair of their own imaginations . . . Among the mass of printed matter
lamenting and denouncing the intemperance of married women, one searches
in vain for any intelligent and detailed study of its causes.14
Some critics, unconvinced about the scandalisation of female drinking, argued that
with men absent due to military service it was bound to appear as though there were
more women drinking.15
Despite some cynicism, the CCB had to take this problem seriously because it
was so newsworthy. Middle and upper class reformers feared that working class
women were incapable of controlling their temptation to drink. This anxiety was
increased by concerns regarding the appropriate policing of women drinkers due to
the number of police serving in the armed forces overseas. Some moralistic working
class women also lamented the failure of their social superiors to behave properly.
Females from the middle and upper class often drank but did so in the confines of
13 Countess of Warwick, A Woman and the War (Chapman and Hall Ltd: London, 1916), p. 23.
14 The Brewers’ Gazette 9 December 1915, quoting an article that appeared in The Nineteenth Century
Journal, December 1915.
15 An argument which Gutzke correctly contends has its limits, given that the level of drunkenness
declined amongst women as well as men and that deaths due to cirrhosis of the liver declined for the
entire population. See Gutzke, ‘Gender, Class and Public Drinking in Britain During the First World
War’, p. 372.
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their own home, drinking wine or spirits.16 This compared unfavourably with working
class women who often drank beer or stout at pubs.17 Examples of female over-
exuberance are found in numerous correspondence pages of the period. One
contributor to The Spectator wrote:
Competent observers tell us that there can be no question but that drinking is
spreading among women. They have got the money, they have got the leisure
and they have got the kind of worries and anxieties which drive people to seek
relief in drugs and intoxicants.18
Rifleman H.V. Shawyer, upon returning from the front, noted the newfound
phenomenon of the high spending and heavy drinking munitions girl. He wrote:
I was sent to the convalescent depot at Sutton Coldfield where they
rehabilitated wounded soldiers to get them fit again for the Front. Birmingham
city I liked, but I regret I was not at all impressed with the men folk. The
munitions lassies – the girls in overalls and clogs – were always good
company, or so I found them. The moment they found out a soldier was from
the convalescent depot, then that soldier was point blank refused to be allowed
to buy a round of drinks. I felt damned embarrassed when I walked into a pub
with ‘Tich’ one night and called for two drinks. Some factory girls were also
present and when I put my hand into my pocket for cash to pay for my order
one girl forestalled me saying, ‘you keep your money, Corporal. This is on us’
and with no more ado she pulled up her frock, turned back her stocking from
under the flashy garter, and produced a roll of notes big enough to choke a
cow. Many of the girls earned ten times my pay as a full Corporal, and they
said so, and they were generously big hearted where we were concerned.19
Women buying beer was something that men had to quickly come to terms with, even
more so when women were buying men beer.
Female drinking challenged traditional gender identities. Female workers
enjoyed monetary independence due to a combination of greater disposable income
and new separation allowances, whose use in such a ‘wasteful’ manner brought much
criticism. Critics argued that more money meant more drinking. As one munitions girl
wrote ‘in self defence’, she believed this cultural anger stemmed from ‘a tyrannical
16 D. Gutzke, ‘The Cry of the Children: The Edwardian Medical Campaign against Maternal Drinking’,
The British Journal of Addiction 79 1984, pp. 71-72.
17 Ibid. p. 72.
18 The Spectator 4 September 1915.
19 Lyn Macdonald, 1914-1918: Voices and Images of the Great War (London, 1988), p. 145.
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attitude about the place of the working classes.’ 20 The Woman’s Dreadnought
commented ‘some people cannot endure the thought of a working woman having a
few shillings to spend.’21 Some women spent their money on drink but away from the
limelight of the pubs. A report on drinking conditions among women and girls in
Woolwich and District concluded that ‘very few [munitions girls] of these call at any
of the public houses, and then only get a glass of stout.’22 Prior to the war concern had
been raised about the impact of Grocers’ Licences, which allowed women to buy
alcohol away from the judgemental confines of the pub. Some used their newfound
freedom to try to escape the prying eyes of the state. This did not always succeed, as a
report from one policewoman in Grantham, notes:
A Defence of the Realm regulation gave us power to go in the women’s
houses and to see if the girls were in bed, and to see who was in the house. We
found that women were getting large quantities of drink and entertaining the
men in their houses instead of being out on the streets . . . that was doing more
harm than if the women had actually been in the public houses and in the
streets where people could see them. We turned hundreds of soldiers and girls
out of these houses, and reported it to the military authority and to the Chief
Constable, with a result that the order restricting women was taken off.23
C.S. Peel believed that the whole ‘trouble was not very tactfully handled’ and that the
idea of police supervision of women ‘roused the indignation of the public and was
quickly abandoned.’24 Public house drinking was the real concern.
The CCB began an inquiry into women’s drinking habits as a consequence of
the publicity given to female drunkenness. In October 1915 the Board appointed a
committee of women under the chairmanship of Mrs Louise Creighton25 to inquire
20 C. Culleton, Working Class Culture, Women, and Britain 1914-1921, p. 58.
21 G. Braybon, Women Workers in the First World War: The British Experience (London, 1981), p.
147.
22 HO 185/241, Report on Drinking conditions among women and girls in Woolwich and District, May
1916.
23 C. Culleton, Working Class Culture, Women, and Britain 1914-1921, p. 143.
24 C.S. Peel, How we lived then 1914-1918: A sketch of social and domestic life in England during the
War, p. 61.
25 Louise Creighton (1850-1936) was a social activist and writer of popular history. She argued against
female suffrage. She was heavily involved with the National Union of Women Workers (NUWW), a
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into the alleged excessive drinking amongst women and to suggest what action, if
any, was required in the interest of national efficiency. 26 The members of the
Women’s Advisory Committee (WAC) were chosen largely from among the
representatives of the working class or those in close in touch with them.27 The
Committee’s conclusions were surprising, and did not accord with widespread
preconceptions concerning female insobriety.
The WAC passed its report to the Central Control Board for consideration
after holding fourteen meetings and receiving evidence from thirty-two witnesses.
Enquiries had been undertaken in twenty-eight special districts, on sixteen occasions
through special committees appointed by branches of the National Union of Women
Workers, a predominantly working class organisation.28 Their conclusions placed the
blame for the perception of rising female insobriety firmly at the feet of those who
had enjoyed a drink prior to the war, not on a new breed of degenerate wartime
female drunkards, contrary to widespread expectations. The report stated:
It seems certain that drinking amongst women has increased since the
beginning of the war, and that this increase was worse during the excitement
of the earlier months of the war, but that the increase has been mainly amongst
those who drank before . . . Many of them are the wives and dependents of
casual workers who have now enlisted. They live in slum districts. Many of
them have no decent standard of life and no domestic habits. Now suddenly
they have more money to spend than they ever had before, and at the same
time the restraint, such as it was, exercised by their husbands is removed.
There is no need for them to be at home to prepare their husband’s dinner.
They are excited and eager for company and talk. It is for the most part these
women who are now drinking to excess and by their conduct bringing
unmerited reproach on the great majority of soldiers’ and sailors’ wives.29
non-political organisation of middle class women dedicated to improving the lives of working women.
She believed in the sanctity of the role of women in family life, seeing church work as an extension of
this. She also served on the venereal disease commission of 1913. James Thayne Covert, Oxford
Dictionary National Biography, www.oxforddnb.com.
26 HO 185/258, Women’s Advisory Committee Reports and Correspondence.
27 HO 185/258, D’Abernon’s letter to the Duchess of Marlborough, 11 October 1915.
28 HO 185/258, WAC Reports and Correspondence, 26 February 1916.
29 HO 185/258, WAC Reports and Correspondence, WAC Report, 20 February 1916.
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The report, however, confirmed many suspicions. The women of the slum were seen
as incapable of controlling themselves when faced with the temptation of alcohol. The
evidence offered in support of these accusations was anecdotal with no vigorous
statistical proof offered. Yet the absence of domestic habit, and the consequent
corruption of all that was female, seemingly loosened the inhibition to drink to excess
amongst those who had already enjoyed a tipple. According to the report, those who
had always been a hindrance to the community were now merely drinking more, a
view corroborated by a separate inquiry conducted in Lambeth.30
The report also implicated women in higher social classes. ‘The increase of
drinking during the last ten years, has not, however, been only amongst the women of
the poorer classes’, the report continued, ‘there has also been an increase among
women in all social classes. But as the women of better position for the most part
drink in secret, it is not possible to get direct evidence of their numbers.’31 Indeed,
later in the report the admission was made that ‘neither have we felt it our province in
this report to consider in detail the case of women of the middle and upper classes
who are given to intemperate habits, but we do not forget their existence.’32 As a
result, the behaviour of the working class woman was placed under a scrutiny which
the middle and upper class female was not. The report thus acknowledges its own
failings.
Despite the report’s class bias it indicated that reports of female insobriety had
been overstated. One superintendent of district nurses in Leeds argued:
The charge of drinking amongst women has been much exaggerated and is a
great injustice to the great mass of women of the working class, who are sober,
30 See HO 185/353, For Chairman, ‘Enquiry into alleged increase of Excessive drinking in certain
districts in the Borough of Lambeth,’ 18 December 1915. The enquiry concluded ‘we are of opinion
that the increase of excessive drinking referred to above has been mainly confined to women living
under degraded conditions and inclined to excessive drinking in normal times.’
31 HO 185/258, WAC Report, p. 2.
32 Ibid. p. 15.
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steady, and are leading good lives during a time of great anxiety, stress and, in
many cases, grief.33
The report also testified to the success of the no treating order and to the reduction in
hours of public house opening: ‘streets are now quiet and orderly at night, where
terrible noise and disorder used to prevail at closing time. People are able to get to
sleep and the children get to bed earlier.’34 Moreover, the report argued that the
increasing number of women with expendable income due to war work, who were
blamed for the increase in female insobriety, had exercised self-restraint. The report
stated:
Though their opportunities for over indulgence have been largely increased by
the uncontrolled possession of more money than they had before . . . the
committee have received no evidence that women and girls who did not drink
before have taken in any considerable numbers to drinking to excess in
consequence of the war or the receipt of allowances. There is much evidence
of improvement in the homes and in the condition of the children, and of wise
spending on the part of the great majority of those in receipt of war
allowances.35
Despite this upbeat conclusion, the report nevertheless ended with a tirade against
drink that could have come from the most ardent temperance activist:
Drink interferes with the efficiency of our workers, and with the quantity of
their output in all industries. Drink threatens the health and well being of the
children in whom the future of the country depends . . . Surely this is the time
to make an appeal to the true patriotism of the nation to consider how, without
regard to the interests either of trade or personal wealth and comfort or of
party politics, this tyranny of drink can be destroyed by wise and far reaching
measures, which shall make for the true efficiency and well being of the
nation.36
Thus, even when the Committee had concluded that there was no discernible increase
in drinking amongst women in general the symptoms of moral panic remained
apparent. The CCB was desperate to avoid this overreaction and outburst of
temperance rhetoric, in complete contradiction to the evidence gathered. It is
33 Ibid. p. 3.
34 Ibid. p. 3.
35 Ibid. p. 8.
36 Ibid. p. 16.
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unsurprising that neither the report nor its conclusions found favour with D’Abernon
and his colleagues.
After submitting the report to the CCB, Mrs Creighton was disturbed to find
that it would not be published. She made it clear that she
Had never understood that the report would be confidential and that some of
the members would not have worked as they did if they had thought the report
would not be published . . . Mrs Creighton’s main point in pressing for
publication of the Report is to clear the character of women from the charge of
drinking commonly brought against them.37
It is a mystery why publication was such an issue to her. One can only speculate that
it was a matter of personal pride or reputation. But this was not the end of Mrs
Creighton’s troubles. The Restrictions Committee of the CCB added to her woes by
lambasting her report:
The restrictions committee . . . are by no means convinced that the conclusion
at which Mrs Creighton and her committee have arrived is well founded . . .
The Restrictions Committee feel sure that the Report as it stands contains, and
fear that any modified Report would also contain, many statements which
would give occasion for hostile criticisms likely to be detrimental to the policy
and future activities of the Board.38
The Board was clearly concerned about its credibility if the report was made public.
To a certain extent the results of the WAC questioned the raison d’etre of the CCB as
a whole. If there was no discernible increase in drinking then some of the CCB’s
future plans could be affected. Moreover, it alerts the historian to the fact that
preconceptions were more important to the Board in guiding policy than an ardent
examination of evidence.
Mrs Creighton was clearly angered by the Board’s criticisms of her report. In a
letter to Lord D’Abernon in April 1916 she made clear her displeasure:
It was useless under the circumstances to go through the criticisms,
particularly as Mr Sykes at last told us plainly that to accept them would not
37 HO 185/258, Report of Restrictions Committee on WAC.
38 Ibid.
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be sufficient to make the Board agree to the publication of the report, that they
would not do that unless the fundamental basis of the report was changed, as
they would not accept our conclusion that there was no considerable increase
of drinking amongst women who did not drink before . . . the Board does not
put any confidence in our work, and that because our conclusions are not such
as expected it refuses to publish them . . . You yourself have followed the
course of our work and as far as I could gather from my interviews with you,
have approved of its method and intentions . . . No other member of the Board
has even come near our committee or gave us any indication of what the
Board wanted from us.39
Her protestations came to nought. The report remained unpublished, although its
conclusions were discussed by the Board within the Second Report of the CCB, which
sought to dispute the ‘prominence’ attack of some critics by pointing out that drinking
women were more numerous ‘not only actually but relatively to the population.’40
Creighton’s report highlights the difficulty for historians in attempting to
disentangle contending evidence about women’s drinking. For example, the
aforementioned investigation of female drinking conditions at Woolwich concluded
that:
A great many smartly dressed Woolwich girls throng the Beresford Square
House after 8 o’clock drifting from house to house, and consuming ports and
spirits. In the present diluted state they seem little the worse for this kind of
amusement, but it is a habit they have acquired, the danger of which will be all
the more evident should liquor after the war return to its old strength.41
Another inquiry conducted by the CCB at Birmingham found that ‘evidence . . . did
not point to any recent increase of drunkenness or indeed of excessive drinking
amongst women.’ 42 The Board was receiving contradictory evidence. The WAC
report was based largely upon anecdotal evidence and lacked any substantive material
to prove its veracity to the Board. Furthermore, the rejection of the report’s
conclusions indicates that the CCB saw female drinking as a ‘problem’ and wanted to
39 HO 185/258, Mrs Creighton to D’Abernon.
40 D. Gutzke, Pubs and Progressives: Reinventing the Public House in England 1896-1960, p. 53.
41 HO 185/241, Report on Drinking conditions among women and girls in Woolwich and District, May
1916.
42 The Third Report of the Central Control Board: Appendix Report of Special Investigation in the
Birmingham District. See also HO 185/238, Drinking among Women and Young People.
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act upon it irrespective of any opinions to the contrary. Taking some form of action to
modify female drinking behaviour was part of their overall strategy to control
drinking throughout Britain. This rationale for action would have been undermined if
the report had been made public.
The problem of women drinking thus remained high on the agenda of the
CCB. Some temperance activists, such as F.B. Meyer, proposed closing public houses
to women so that money would be saved for home and children in order ‘to make it
easier for our weaker sisters to go straight’.43 The Board, however, rejected the option
of imposing more serious restrictions on women than men as Labour representatives,
together with women’s social and industrial organisations, argued that this would be
iniquitous and merely create further discontent.44 Furthermore they also discounted
the requests of the Chief Constables in Newcastle, Durham, and surrounding towns, to
ban female drinking in the evening to deal with the ‘growing evil’ of female
intemperance.’45 As Neville recalled, ‘in the old days few decent women would go
into a public house at all . . . now they were walking in bold as brass, putting down
their money and calling for beer.’46 But gender differences, despite justifying the
CCB’s actions, were not to be a determining factor in its policymaking.47
43 The Times 30 July 1915.
44 H. Carter, The Control of the Drink Trade: A Contribution to National Efficiency 1915-1917, p. 168.
45 D. Gutzke, Pubs and Progressives, p. 66.
46 S. Neville, Seventy Rolling Years, p. 108.
47 For example, in February 1917 the Carlisle Local Committee rejected a proposal to increase the
drinking age for women to 21. See HO 190/458, Correspondence with Mr Sykes.
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Figure 29: Young female workers bottling beer in an unknown brewery.
The issue of female insobriety remained contentious for the remainder of the
war. Changes in attitudes to female ‘emancipation’, in terms of their leisure activities,
could not be artificially altered by legislative means. Change in cultural perceptions
offered the only real chance for this shift to occur. Later in the war The Daily Express,
under the headline ‘sober women’, noted that the:
War has brought us compensations for all its woes and ills . . . the restriction
of public houses has doubtless been a contributory cause but the real reason
for the decline is the increase in self-respect that has come with wider
employment and greater independence. The war has added to women’s
interest and made their lives fuller. It is the idle and bored who are most likely
to drink too much.48
Much attention was paid to drinking habits of working class women but what about
the better off women? Gutzke has argued that the war saw the increasing use of pubs
by middle and upper class women for whom drinking ‘had been hitherto
48 The Daily Express 20 December 1917.
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unacceptable’.49 He argues that the CCB endorsed gender equality in drinking and
that customers of the pub broadened to include:
Single women without men, and wives with husbands fighting in Europe who
had joined the workforce because of wartime labour shortages. In London and
more broadly southern England, necessity forced them to break with the pre-
war tradition of accompanying husbands or boyfriends to pubs for a drink only
on weekends. Deprived of male companionship, affection, and a sexual
relationship, lonely women, commonly in their twenties, found solace with
other similar females in the pub. Large numbers of female patrons, far fewer
male drinkers, and publicans’ wives, standing in for husbands in uniform
abroad all made the pub temporarily respectable.50
At the same time many working class women were ostracised by the CCB’s pub
reform programme in state managed areas.51 The pub, as they had known it, was
altered by the reforming impulse of the CCB. This highlights the manner in which the
CCB targeted working class drinkers to facilitate social change.
Gutzke’s argument seems all too romantic. The pub may now have had a
broader, more genteel, customer base but it remained to many deeply unrespectable.
The ‘respectability’ of an establishment is in essence an arbitrary judgement, difficult
for historians to evaluate as numerous factors contributed to status. For example,
Neville highlighted the role of geographical differences as being influential in shaping
perceptions of female drinking. He wrote that ‘it seemed to me strange that leading
police officials [in the north] should be so troubled at what in the south was a quite
normal custom.’52 Women did drink in unreformed pubs but this made the social habit
more acceptable to some, and the problem more apparent to others. Coming to a
definite conclusion as to female drinking habits, as exhibited by the differing
viewpoints and evidence above, is problematic as attitudes to female drinking and
notions of ‘respectability’ varied.
49 D. Gutzke, Pubs and Progressives, p. 53.
50 Ibid. p. 53.
51 See Gutzke, ‘Gender, Class and Public Drinking’, p. 379.
52 S. Neville, Seventy Rolling Years, p. 108.
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But whatever ‘respectability’ might have meant, conviction figures for women
belied accusations of rampant female drunkenness during the war. A study released in
1917 showed that arrests for drunkenness amongst women decreased from 40,815 in
1914 to 24,206 in 1916. D’Abernon admitted in 1918 that although there had been an
increase of 1.5 million women working and an increase of between £150 and £200
million in the wage earnings of women, there had been a decline in female
drunkenness amounting to no less than 73 per cent compared with pre-war figures.53
The Times, a propagator of much speculative criticism concerning female drinking,
was forced to admit in 1917 that ‘there has never been so great a reduction spread
over so large a population in the same space of time.’54
Female drinking during the war was thus an issue of much contention.
Opinions differed as to its significance but it is apparent that the issue was used as a
justification to support the CCB’s policies. Views differed for political and social
reasons. Suffragettes saw the concern as condescending whereas social reformers and
temperance activists saw it as evidence of a nation drinking its way to defeat. The
‘drink problem’ was a political football and different groups had conflicting views
about how the game should be played. Concerns about class, rather than gender,
determined the Board’s policies. The CCB, in pursuing a policy of gender equality in
its pubs, particularly in state run areas, was altering the working class pub irrevocably
by bringing more women into what had previously been a male dominated social
space. A good pub for the Board, as exhibited in Carlisle, was one unlike that which
had existed prior to the war. Concern surrounding female drinking merely provided
further justification to alter the pub. Whether the panic over women drinking was real
or imagined, its consequences were felt not only during the war but after it as well,
53 Waldorf Astor Papers, WC1057, Lord D’Abernon speech ‘Public Health and Alcoholism among
Women.’
54 The Times 13 March 1917.
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when attempts were made by brewers to safeguard the developing female custom in
pubs throughout Britain.
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Chapter Seven: Reforming the Working Man
This chapter demonstrates the CCB’s broader mandate to improve industrial
performance and highlights how the ‘drink problem’ was more than just a problem of
pubs but involved an assessment of the working man’s daily routine. It will, for
example, consider action taken by the Board to modify munitions workers’ diets. The
chapter will also discuss the increasing discontent caused by the actions of the CCB
and important alterations to its membership. At the beginning of 1916 the Board was
optimistic that its policies were producing significant results in the battle against
drink. The trade had tolerated interference in its work but the extension of the Board’s
policies over the forthcoming months was to place a severe strain on this grudging
acquiescence. The extension of the CCB’s powers was seen as vindictive temperance
policy implemented under the national interest.
The personnel of the Board altered in 1916. Neville Chamberlain resigned in
February due to the pressures of his work as Lord Mayor of Birmingham. Prior to
this, Waters Butler, a prominent and much respected brewer from Birmingham, and
the aforementioned Henry Carter, had joined the Board in January. 1 Carter was
known at the time as ‘the most prominent personality in the temperance party’.2 The
CCB, which up until this point had been free of direct influence from either trade or
temperance advocates, now had what was perceived as representatives of both these
interest groups. The symbolic importance of this change was perhaps more
substantive than the results suggested, but it symbolised an attempt at a new
1 Waters Butler (1866-1939) was Chairman and managing director of Mitchells and Butlers from 1914
until his death. His company distinguished itself due to the emphasis placed upon ‘fewer and better’
public houses, the mantra which saw expression predominantly in the 1920s. Butler was elected
President of the Institute of Brewing in 1906 and as Chairman of the Brewers Society in 1907-1908. He
was made a baron in recognition of philanthropic, national and political services in 1926. Terry
Gourvish, ‘Butler, Sir William Waters, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University
Press, September 2004.
2 S. Neville, Seventy Rolling Years, p. 99.
219
consensus, a possible meeting of minds between two contradictory and entrenched
positions.
Butler was conscious of the likelihood that he would be identified as the
trade’s spokesman, and wrote to D’Abernon expressing his concerns:
I should be willing to accept a seat, but on the distinct understanding that I am
not to be looked upon as in any sense a delegate of the trade, and
consequently, in any action of the Board to which I might be Party it could not
be said that the Trade’s Representative approved of the same. A few trade
friends I have consulted, while expressing the hope that if offered the seat I
should accept, warn me of the rather unenviable position in which I should be
placing myself . . . I am prepared to face such a position as I feel sure the
meeting of the moderate temperance reformer with the broad minded brewer –
which I claim to be – should tend to bring about conditions not detrimental to
the future welfare of the Trade with which I am connected.3
He clearly hoped that a coalition of the willing, between the moderate brewer and the
forces of moderate temperance, offered the best avenue of progress to the Board in
solving the drink problem. Distrust of their intentions, though, was evident from the
outset. According to Carter’s biographer:
They [Carter and Butler] attended the first committee held after their
appointment to the Board, and found that they were welcomed very coldly.
The Board, from the first, had sought to do their work without bias or
contention, and suspected the advent of these representatives of opposing
interests. At the end of the meeting Carter went up to Butler. ‘It doesn’t seem
that you and I can do much good,’ he said. ‘They think we’re here to represent
conflicting interests. But I don’t consider I was put on the Board to run
temperance but to assist the Board in the national work it is doing, with
whatever knowledge or experience I have, and I am sure it is the same with
you.’ ‘Exactly,’ said Butler. ‘Well then,’ went on Carter, ‘let us take the first
opportunity to show this to the Board, and show them that we are not here as
enemies or rivals.’ ‘Agreed,’ said Butler.4
Their appointment marks the strengthening of the reformist influence within the
Board and a growing mutual respect between the two wings of the debate.
3 HO 185/231, Correspondence: RE Appointed Members, 26 January 1916. Butler offered his
resignation to the Brewers’ Society but they backed his appointment to the CCB. See Brewers and
Licensed Trade Retail Association, MSS. 420, Box Number 1, Minute Book 5, 20 June 1916.
4 E.C. Unwin, Henry Carter CBE: A Memoir, p. 36.
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Meanwhile, the Board pressed on with its programme. The Second Report of
the CCB, published on 1 May 1916, is indicative of the swift and substantive progress
made in little under a year. The document itself is much longer than its predecessor,
which was referred to as a ‘provisional report’, and deals with a number of concerns
merely hinted at previously. Most prominent was the interest taken in the relationship
between food and the effect of alcohol, again a familiar grievance of both the
temperance and social reform movement, and another front in the battle against drink.
While today it is unusual to find a pub that does not sell food, in the Edwardian period
this was the exception. The report states:
The evil results arising from excessive indulgence in intoxicating liquor are
frequently due, not so much to the unrestricted facilities for obtaining it, or
even to the detrimental practice of consuming it at irregular times, and
unaccompanied by a meal, as to the absence of wholesome and satisfying
substitutes, whether food or drink. A reform of the national habits in this
matter, or a reconstruction of the machinery for the provision of refreshments
throughout the country, being out of the question in an emergency period like
the present, as well as being outside the province of the Board, the Board have
taken such opportunities as have presented themselves to urge the
improvement of public houses in schedules areas and to assist in the provision
of canteens.5
By seeking to improve the eating facilities offered at public houses the Board was
attempting to change unfavourable preconceptions of the pub from that of a mere
drinking shop to a place for general socialisation, where food could be purchased
together with drink. By providing a greater accessibility to food, both at the pub and
the workplace, it also hoped to provide the worker with the energy and physical
fitness required by the munitions work of the day and thus increase national
efficiency.
From the outset, the CCB praised those who provided such facilities but
lamented that ‘a very large proportion of public houses were not fulfilling their
5 The Second Report of the Central Control Board.
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traditional function of victualling houses’.6 Two main reasons for this lack of food
provision were described: firstly, the neighbourhood of a pub might not be able to
sustain such provision thus making it unworkable; and secondly a lack of enterprise
on the part of the landlord and a desire to push the sale of drink. The Board sought to
tackle the second problem by making it clear that all extensions of licensed premises
for catering purposes would be given ‘sympathetic consideration’.7 Moreover it tried
to revise long-held preconceptions of the public house. Sanders, on his tour of the
restricted areas, had found ‘a near universal view among publicans that, except in
special houses, the customer would not regard the public house as a place for the
provision of food.’8
Henry Carter wrote that the Board’s efforts met with only ‘a modest measure
of success’.9 He placed culpability firmly on the licensee, writing:
The hope of an expansion of a food trade lay chiefly with licensees in suitable
districts who had not heretofore given much attention to this branch of
business; and it cannot be said that the Board were able to induce any
considerable number of them to cater in a promising way . . . there was a lack
of enterprise on the part of licensees. The attitude of many seemed to argue,
‘Liquor pays best’.10
Coming from a temperance man, these accusations are unsurprising.11 Yet later he
admitted reluctantly that ‘it is fair to say that not every publican who made a bid for a
‘‘food trade’’ found a public response; there were those who tried, and abandoned the
experiment simply because supply did not create demand.’12 The pub offered a
particular type of socialisation distinct from that offered by restaurants and cafes,
6 Ibid.
7 HO 185/242, Circular to Licensing Authorities in Scheduled Areas.
8 HO 185/353, For Chairman, Edgar Sanders to the Justices to Lord D’Abernon on Public Houses, 12
October 1915.
9 H. Carter, The Control of the Drink Trade: A Contribution to National Efficiency 1915-1917, p. 177.
10 Ibid. p. 178.
11 He only excludes the licensees of Cardiff who ‘made a united and determined attempt to develop the
victualling branch of their business, not altogether without success.’ H. Carter, The Control of the
Drink Trade, p. 178.
12 Ibid. p. 178.
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which had seen an increase in their custom in the previous years. Shadwell wrote that
‘the great bulk of the people who frequent the public house go there for a drink and
not for food and they know perfectly well what they want.’13 To change social habits,
and broaden the conception of the pub as an eating-place, was an unrealistic goal over
such a short time span.
A more successful initiative pursued by the CCB was the creation of industrial
canteens. Michael Rose highlights the role of P.W.Wilson, secretary of the People’s
Palace Association, in first raising the issue of canteens and industrial efficiency with
the Board in July 1915. Wilson wrote to D’Abernon complaining that 150 of the 200
firms his association had approached with regard to establishing canteens had either
ignored or refused his suggestions, adding disappointingly that some of these
rejections came from ‘those who have been most conscious of the drink evil’.14 But
Wilson believed that their position was flexible, as ‘a little tactful pressure by the
Board would greatly hasten the extension of this work.’15
Meanwhile, official concern grew over the lack of catering facilities within the
industrial heartlands of Britain. A police report reproduced in a Home Office white
paper, on shipbuilding, munitions and transport areas in April 1915, is symptomatic of
the new concern regarding the welfare of workers:
Many of the workmen take insufficient food, which not only increases the
temptation to drink, but makes the effect of the liquor taken more injurious, so
that the result is to incapacitate the workmen for the strain of heavy work . . .
reports emphasise the need for mess rooms and canteens in the yards where
the men could get good meals in comfort without having to resort to the public
house. Such accommodation is very rarely provided.16
In the climate of war these reports deeply disturbed the government. Canteens were
required due to the number of large factories being built in isolated areas, the number
13 A. Shadwell, Drink in 1914-1922: A Lesson in Control, p. 50.
14 HO 185/242, National People’s Palace Association, Wilson to Lord D’Abernon, 22 July 1915.
15 Ibid.
16 H. Carter, The Control of the Drink Trade, pp. 183-184.
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of women being employed and the fact that night shifts were becoming more of a
regular occurrence.17 Furthermore, buttressed by an improvement in the science of
nutrition, ideas concerning the diet required by a worker became less a subject of
speculation and more an obvious point of neglect, rooted in scientific fact. While the
average intake of calories in the working class family was 2,398 per head per day
during 1902-1913, the national intake per head was 3,171 calories over the same
period. This meant that the working class consumed only 76 per cent of the national
average.18 An obvious way to improve productivity was to thus to boost the ‘engine’
which powered the industrial juggernaut of the nation. If workers could be fed
properly, latent productivity, laid low by the curse of an unfulfilled stomach, would be
increased. The industrial canteen thus became an object of reform around which
welfare protagonists gathered gleefully, and none more so than the members of the
CCB.
The CCB established a committee of six members, originally entitled ‘the
Canteens Committee’, to oversee the introduction of industrial canteens in factories.19
The Committee was to approve and encourage the construction of canteens in
Munitions Factories and also advise as to their management after necessarily
inspecting the premises.20 The regulation of physical fitness by providing nourishing
food was another aspect of the CCB’s effort to reform the social habits of the working
class as a whole. The Board’s canteen policy indicates the fluid boundaries of the
remit given to the Board by the concept of efficiency. A diverse portfolio of concerns
conglomerated to form an efficiency agenda of which drinking was a ubiquitous
17 See MUN 5/95 346.1/1-13, ‘Report of the Munitions Food Committee’, 24 April 1917.
18 P.E. Dewey, ‘Nutrition and Living Standards in Wartime Britain’ in Richard Wall and Jay Winter,
(eds.), The Upheaval of War: Family, Work and Welfare in Europe 1914-1918 (Cambridge, 1988), p.
199.
19 HO 185/229, CCB Minutes of Meetings, 29 June 1915. The committee consisted of Sir William
Lever, Waldorf Astor, Towle, Scott, Snowden and Newman.
20 MUN 5/95, The Functions of the Proposed Food Section.
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polarising influence. By considering the daily physiological patterns of the working
class consumer, officials adjusted pub-opening hours in order to limit the potentiality
of drinking detrimentally affecting eating habits. Pubs were now opened only when a
consumer was most likely to be eating or after he had been eating so as to limit the
effect of the alcohol within the bloodstream. The working class individual was
regarded as nothing more than essential manpower and, like a beast of burden, had to
be managed and looked after in order to ensure productivity. The state was akin to a
devoted parent paternalistically considering the diet and health of its child. The Board
declared that it had ‘To secure the supply of proper and sufficient nourishment for the
worker in order to maintain his health, to increase his energy and output, and to
diminish or prevent fatigue and exhaustion.’21 This initiative was welcomed by the
press. The Times argued that:
The provision of canteens is a most desirable thing . . . I have no doubt that
this would soon be appreciated by the men, especially by those who live at a
distance, and would have a beneficial effect on their health and efficiency . . .
Men who live sufficiently near their work generally go home to dinner, and
those at a distance bring their own food, but if they could get it from a canteen
at cost price they would probably do so.22
Originally the canteen system was sustained by voluntary subscriptions and help from
various charitable organisations, together with a 50 per cent contribution from the
Treasury. But this initial enthusiasm eventually gave way to a realisation that
continued funding would have to be supported by more diverse sources. Thus
employers were encouraged to support the construction of canteens by being allowed
to write off some of the expenses of construction, as agreed by the CCB, from funds
which otherwise the firms would have had to pay to the state as wartime ‘excess
profits’.23 In other words, the expenditure could be treated as a trade expense
21 The Second Report of the Central Control Board.
22 The Times 29 May 1915.
23 H. Carter, The Control of the Drink Trade, p. 187.
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subsidised by government. In government-run factories the state paid the full cost of
the canteens, with the CCB given the direct responsibility for running them. Industrial
canteens thus emerged from a public/private partnership.
This lesson was not lost on Lloyd George, who as Secretary of State for War,
wrote an introduction to a pamphlet entitled Feeding the Munition Worker prepared
by the Canteen Committee of the CCB in 1916. ‘It is a strange irony’, he remarked,
but no small compensation, that the making of weapons of destruction should
afford the occasion to humanise industry . . . Old prejudices have vanished,
new ideas are abroad; employers and workers, the public and the State, are all
favourable to new methods . . . the effort now being made to soften asperities,
to secure the welfare of the workers, and to build a bridge of sympathy and
understanding between employer and employed, will [leave] behind results of
permanent and enduring value to the workers, to the nation, and to mankind at
large.24
Lloyd George evidently was not thinking simply about the production benefits of
industrial canteens but of the longer term social benefit to the community.
This pamphlet was sent to the heads of works and factories in order to
persuade them of the virtue of the cause. The booklet argued that the necessary diet
for a worker should consist of ‘a sufficient quantity of nutritive material: in proper
proportions, suitably mixed, easily digestible, appetising and attractive, obtainable at a
low cost’.25 Whilst the canteen itself ‘must be accessible and attractive, it should be
suitably constructed and equipped, the food should be varied, fresh and good, there
must be prompt service and, lastly, arrangements for payment must be simple and
convenient’.26 The canteen was to be a focal point of the factory community,
somewhere workers could come and get a good meal and enjoy the positive benefits
of socialisation away from the temptations of the pub.27 It was to be a civilising
24 MUN 5/95 346.1/100, Feeding the Munition Worker, p. 5.
25 Ibid. p. 5.
26 Ibid. p. 5.
27 Over 95 per cent of canteens were dry. Those canteens that had an alcohol licence could serve only
beer and there was a one pint limit to be served with a meal. Light beer of less than 2 per cent alcohol
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influence and a substantial contribution to the humanisation of industry marking a
development in better relations between employers and employed. This represented a
great advance in worker welfare.
The Canteen Committee produced further literature in support of its case,
visited munitions works and even built a model canteen for the National Economy
and Welfare Exhibition of 1917 in order to propagate and nurture support for their
plans. By August 1917, 710 canteens for munitions and transport workers had been
established serving over 900,000 industrial workers regularly with fulfilling cuisine.28
By 1918 a further 70 canteens had been established serving a further 90,000 workers.
By the end of the war the number of canteens had increased to 900.29 In total, canteen
establishments accommodated 990,000 workers out of a total of 2,299,000 employed
on munitions work.30 The cost of this to the government was £3.5 million but the
social benefits, at least to Sir George Newman, Chairman of the Canteens Committee,
outweighed this cost.31
was served in 25 canteens but restrictions on quantities of alcohol produced by the Food Controllers
‘limitation of output’ made the widespread application of the idea redundant. H. Carter, The Control of
the Drink Trade, p. 190.
28 150 canteens were established in the new national factories, over 500 in ‘controlled establishments’
and 60 in shipyards and dock areas until 1917. The Times 25 January 1918.
29 M. Rose, ‘The Success of Social Reform?’, p. 76.
30 H.M. Vernon, The Alcohol Problem, p. 86.
31 M. Rose, ‘The Success of Social Reform?’, p. 76.
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Figure 30: A picture taken from Feeding the Munition Worker which shows one
of the new kitchens constructed to feed workers.
Responses to the scheme suggest that the money was well spent. Predictably,
the Canteen Committee extolled the virtues of canteens. In its pamphlet Feeding the
Munition Worker, the ‘substantial benefits both to employers and workers’ of an
‘adequate and well managed canteen’ were listed.32 The direct benefits were ‘marked
improvements in the health of the workers, less sickness, less absence and broken
time, less tendency to alcoholism, increased efficiency and output’ whereas the
indirect benefits were ‘saving time of the worker, salutary change from the workshop,
greater contentment of worker, the better ventilation of the workshop and an increase
of recreation and games in spare time’.33 However, factory owners generally agreed.
The owner of ‘Brunner, Mond and Co’ wrote that ‘we are quite convinced that the
provision of a hot, well cooked and sufficient midday meal has been of great benefit
to our workpeople, both male and female, many of whom come from a distance, and
32 MUN 5/95 346.1/100, Feeding the Munition Worker, p. 27.
33 MUN 5/95 346.1/100, Feeding the Munition Worker, p. 27.
228
will therefore have contributed very largely to their efficiency for work.’34 Industrial
management also benefited. Sir William Lever wrote that ‘not only is the health of the
employees better as a result . . . the filling of vacancies when vacancies occur, or at
times when the staff is being increased, presents no difficulties’.35 The reaction of
workers was also positive. One report in The Times about the Woolwich Arsenal
Munitions factory drew attention to the happiness that canteens engendered among
the workers:
The keen whirring sound of machinery in motion ceases. From every corner
girls, gay as crocuses in their many coloured caps and overalls, run fleetly to
the staircase leading to the canteen, laughing and chattering cheerfully as they
go . . . Some bring their own food, which is heated up at the counter. Others
partake of the excellent meal provided at an astonishingly low sum. They can
do as they please in the matter. It is good to know that this is a government
canteen . . . At the Woolwich Arsenal welfare work is conducted not only with
the head, but also with the heart and the imagination, and therein lies the secret
of its success.36
Figure 31: This picture shows lunchtime service underway. It is interesting to
note that every person pictured is female.
34 Ibid. p. 27.
35 Ibid. p. 27.
36 The Times 1 September 1916.
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This upbeat view of the impact of canteens was common. Feedback from another
munitions works in Kent highlighted the multifaceted role they played in factory life:
We should like to point out that we feel the canteen has become more to the
workers than a mere place for obtaining food. We have, during the winter
season, run in the canteen on Thursday evenings a cinematograph show for the
employees, and on Tuesday evening the Works Entertainments Committee
have run a concert, both with great success. Further, various meetings in
connection with the Sports Club, etc have been held there, and we feel sure
that it has been looked upon as a great asset for their benefit by the people
here.37
This report highlights the reform of leisure habit as an analogous benefit to the
introduction of canteens throughout Britain. Others found the new drinks on offer less
enticing. One ‘working class male’, after being served cocoa with his dinner,
observed ruefully: ‘it’s a terrible thing for a man who has drunk beer for fifty years to
have to turn his mind to cocoa’.38
To some, the factory was now almost akin to the public house in its social
value. Lloyd George was convinced of the benefits:
I am delighted to see these canteens springing up throughout our workshops.
They make an enormous difference. The men should get their meals, not in the
old squalid, uncomfortable conditions, but in conditions which are in
themselves attractive and healthful . . . We are making a better country
because we have the recognition that the interests of one section of our society
are the interests of all.39
These canteens stood as a testament to progress within industry and as an
indication of the importance of workforce efficiency to employers. ‘The absence of
civilising influences from factory industry has been its condemnation in the past. The
industrial canteen aids in the destruction of this traditional approach . . . and may be
claimed as a substantial contribution to the humanisation of industry’, argued the
37 H. Carter, The Control of the Drink Trade, p. 194.
38 C.S. Peel, How We Lived Then 1914-1918: A Sketch of Social and Domestic Life in England
During the War, p. 66.
39 MUN 5/95 346.1/100, Feeding the Munition Worker, p. 28.
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CCB.40 Despite this, whilst acknowledging that workers ‘desired and used’ canteens,
Lord D’Abernon was still ‘not sure’ that employers had yet ‘fully grasped’ how
important they were ‘to national health.’41
Nevertheless, the canteen scheme progressed, despite administrative
backbiting within Government. The Finance Department of the Ministry of Munitions
was critical of the cost of canteens and established a separate Canteens’ Finance
Committee to scrutinise the budgets of national factories.42 Furthermore, the Treasury
was critical of the Board when it sanctioned five canteens between 1915 and 1917
without its permission; an accusation denied by Lord D’Abernon.43 In February 1918
the Ministry of Munitions took over the responsibility for the canteen system from the
CCB, primarily due to the general shortage of food which made cooperation with the
Food Controller essential, creating a bureaucratic rivalry between the two
organisations. As Shadwell points out, this testifies to the political distinction between
the provision of food and the drink question, even though they were interlinked by
welfare reform. The Canteen Committee was maintained in an advisory capacity.44
Beyond canteen provision, the CCB’s second report detailed further restrictive
measures that it had introduced. The Board banned the ‘Long Pull’, whereby licensees
were prevented by law from being over generous in their measures of beer to attract
custom. The canvassing of beer was forbidden, as too was credit drinking.45 Drinking
on the slate was no longer a legal option.46 Furthermore, the Board was given the
40 Samuel J. Hurwitz, State Intervention in Great Britain: A Study of Economic Control and Social
Response, 1914-1919 (New York, 1968), p. 113.
41 The Scotsman 25 January 1918.
42 M. Rose, ‘The Success of Social Reform?’, p. 77.
43 Ibid. p. 77.
44 MUN 5/95 346.1/7, See Memorandum on the relations of the Ministry of Munitions with the CCB,
January 1916-August 1917 by Mr G.H.Duckworth.
45 The ban on canvassing prevented members of the trade from soliciting business by ‘canvassing’ for
orders at people’s homes. Furthermore, it was forbidden to take money at customers’ houses for
alcoholic drink.
46 ‘Drinking on the slate’ is another term for credit drinking.
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power to close pubs that did not abide by the Board’s regulations. By the end of the
war 92 pubs in England and Wales and 86 pubs in Scotland were closed by the
Board.47 These restrictive measures, however, were beginning to raise the ire of critics
who were angered by recent events and sceptical as to the motivation behind the
Board’s ideas. Accusations that vindictive temperance activists were affecting the
Board’s work were becoming increasingly vociferous. Criticism came from all sides,
particularly as these measures had a sense of permanence which did not befit a
supposedly temporary emergency body. The Globe assessed the work of the CCB and
was distinctly unimpressed:
We warn Lloyd George and the unconcerned and uncontrolled Lord
D’Abernon that the people are becoming restless and dissatisfied. The silly
restrictions are a burden and an insult to the best community in the world, who
have done nothing to deserve such a moral strait waistcoat.48
Discontent was also increasing within the trade, Alfred Collier, a family brewer,
complained that ‘the CCB was appointed to regulate the consumption of alcohol
solely for the benefit of troops, production of munitions etc. In taking up the question
of beer hawking and making regulations to deal with it they are attempting legislation
which is quite outside the scope of their appointment.’49
Matters were not aided by the work of the CCB sub-committee known as the
‘Star Chamber’ formed by Henry Carter and John Pedder, whose job, according to
Neville was:
To ensure observation of the Board’s orders but whose methods were the least
justifiable of the Board’s activities. While breaches of the Board’s orders by
licensees were legal offences and could be dealt with by the ordinary
processes of law, the ‘Star Chamber’ method was more direct; but in my view,
indefensible. The Board had wide powers, and when information was received
to the effect that one licensee or another was not conforming, they ordered the
house to be closed on the thin pretext that it was hampering due prosecution of
the war. This arbitrary action naturally caused intense resentment among the
47 Brewers and Licensed Trade Retail Association, MSS. 420, Box Number 247, NTDA report 1918.
48 The Brewers’ Gazette 13 April 1916.
49 Ibid.
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licensed trade organisations and I have always thought had much to do with
the disapprobation in which the Board was held.50
A discussion of the Star Chamber’s work was conspicuously absent from Carter’s
review of the Board’s activities. The Brewers’ Gazette referred to the action of the
CCB as arising from ‘bigotry and tyranny’.51 Discontent within the pages of
newspapers and trade journals did not, however, transfer itself into open revolt against
the Board. The measures prompted anger but were accepted. This is testament to the
compliance of the trade. Moreover, some amongst the brewing fraternity saw
unforeseen benefits of the CCB’s restrictions. The Brewers’ Gazette noted some of
the positives in expanding the clientele of the pub:
Despite the many restrictions, which have hampered the publican in improving
his house, a good many changes are quietly going on which deserve to be
recognised. For instance, it is now possible in good houses to get other sorts of
liquid refreshment than alcoholic, served without any criticism or complaint . .
. a very large proportion of patrons of public houses and profits of public
houses in these days of motoring and cycling and open life generally is made
up of teetotallers who use these places of call and are unconsciously perhaps
fashioning them to meet the needs of the times.52
There was also some discontent within parliament. The Conservative M.P., James
Mason, complained that the Board was attempting to ‘set up during the war a
complete system of temperance reform . . . in a somewhat promiscuous and haphazard
way’.53 He further objected to this being done ‘under the cloak of military
necessity’.54 Another Tory, W. Bull, called the Board ‘utterly un-English’.55 The
Scotsman believed that the time had come for ‘an impartial inquiry into the whole
workings of the body’.56 Another M.P. John Gretton, himself a brewer criticised the
Board’s lack of accountability which gave credence to the tyrannical protests of those
50 S. Neville, Seventy Rolling Years, pp. 99-100.
51 The Brewers’ Gazette 13 April 1916.
52 The Brewers’ Gazette 22 June 1916.
53 The Scotsman 20 April 1916.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
233
opposed to the work undertaken. The Manchester Guardian, however, sought to
defuse this criticism:
The critics dwelt on the fact that the Board . . . had in reality embarked upon
vast temperance measures of a nature which the nation would not in normal
times have sanctioned without full debate and had done this without any
adequate check by parliament upon the policy or personnel of the Board or
upon the moneys expended by it. With this criticism the firmest admirers of
the Board’s work will have some sympathy . . . if the operations of the Board
were directly answered for in parliament by a responsible minister the best of
these experiments would have a surer chance of permanence and of popular
appreciation.57
One explanation for the political tolerance of the CCB was the apparent success of its
measures. The Second Report gave extensive coverage to the benefits accrued by
control. Arrests for drunkenness declined across every controlled area. In Liverpool,
where average weekly arrests had fallen from 207 in early 1915 to 118 by March
1916:
There are fewer arrests for drunkenness, people generally are more sober and
go home much earlier, more are also going to places of amusement instead of
public houses. There are fewer people under the influence of drink about the
streets, fewer street disturbances to quell, and fewer drink quarrels in the home
calling for police interference. The late hour of opening has been most
beneficial to workmen and employers, many men turn up to work in the
morning, who, if the public houses had been open, would not have done so,
the employers get better labour and the men are better for it. Dock labourers
have openly expressed their appreciation of the absence of the temptation to
drink.58
The report ended with an admission that the Board’s success owed a lot to the
communal response to the orders. Praising Trade Union leaders and the community as
a whole, the report concluded:
This increased efficiency contributes to the vigorous prosecution of the war,
and the Board’s task has been materially lightened by the patriotic manner in
which the leaders and the majority of the rank and file have cooperated with
the nation generally, in accepting the inconveniences which the Board’s
restrictive measures have necessarily occasioned.59
57 Manchester Guardian 27 October 1916.
58 The Second Report of the Central Control Board
59 Ibid.
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Accusations that the ‘people could not be trusted’ were thus refuted by the CCB’s
report. The Board recognised that the control orders would not, and could not, work
without the compliance of the general public. Self-regulation, as much as regulation
from above, evidently played a prominent part in the story of drink control during this
period. This compliance also applied to the trade. Despite the occasional tirade, the
trade acquiesced to the Board’s orders. As D’Abernon admitted in June 1916, that ‘in
the main the Brewers of England have acted loyally in carrying out the regulations
and restrictions of the Board’.60 The successful implementation of the Board’s ideas
was thus a two way process: an innate patriotism determined that interested parties
put the pursuit of war and the nation before their own personal interests and the public
generally accepted the restrictions.
60 HO 185/353, For Chairman, 26 June 1916.
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Chapter Eight: State Purchase and the Waning of the Central Control Board
In April 1916 the government passed the Output of Beer Restriction Act which
limited the aggregate quantity of beer brewed in the United Kingdom to twenty-six
million barrels for the year ending March 1917. This was a reduction of four million
gallons on the previous year’s output, by ten million gallons, or 28 per cent less, than
that of 1914.1 It is testament to the patriotism of the trade that such a cut was
accepted, especially given that further reductions were likely. This was the first act in
an extensive period of reform concerning the use of foodstuffs in the production of
drink.
For some these reforms did not go far enough. As The Spectator opined:
The brewery is wasting in the production of an unnecessary luxury the very
life of the people . . . We are no teetotal cranks . . . All we say is that when it is
certainly a question of food shortage, and may be a question of actual
starvation, it is madness, it is a crime, for the government to allow our daily
dwindling supplies of wheat and sugar and coal to go in the manufacture and
transport of drink and at the same time to allow the depletion of our manpower
caused by the employment of hundreds of thousands of men in making,
selling, and moving beer who might be doing war work.2
These accusations, however, angered the trade. The Scottish Licensed Trade Defence
Association answered accusations of waste by pointing out that the government
benefited monetarily from drinking due to taxation. Keith Hamilton, the Chairman,
noted:
One of the favourite arguments in favour of prohibition was the plea of
economy. The expenditure of £183,000,000, was described as pure waste. It
was deliberately ignored by most speakers that of the £183,000,000,
£68,000,000 at least goes to the State directly in taxation and rates,
£20,000,000 in wages, and the remainder in rent, material, interest, and profits,
of which materials constitute the largest sum. If the whole trade were
suspended today it was arguable that the real wealth of the state would lose
rather than gain by the operation. The theory of waste, carried to its logical
conclusion, would upset all the principles of political economy and the wealth
of nations. Everybody could clothe themselves in sackcloth, everybody could
1 A. Shadwell, Drink in 1914-1922: A Lesson in Control, p. 83.
2 The Spectator 23 December 1916.
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live in a five pound house, everybody under such circumstances could live on
one shilling per day; but we would then have reverted to a nation of primitive
savages from which waste (in the sense of the teetotallers) had elevated
mankind during the past ages of civilisation.3
The connection between food and drink thus became further politicised. This chapter
will consider the debate concerning the use of foodstuffs in the production of alcohol
and it will discuss a further attempt by the CCB to introduce national state purchase of
the liquor trade. It will also consider other aspects of the Board’s work from the
beginnings of 1917 until the end of the war. During this period the Board faced
virulent criticism.
Despite the restrictions introduced by the CCB, temperance organisations
remained keen to persuade the British people that drink was the cause of society’s ills.
Most prominent amongst these was the Strength of Britain Movement, formed by the
aforementioned Arthur Mee in June 1916, who has been described as ‘a one man
Temperance factory’.4 Mee was a writer notable for his Children’s Encyclopaedia and
the weekly Children’s Newspaper which aimed to educate the next generation ‘which
is going to save the world from the sins and follies and blunders of this’.5 During the
war his focus switched to the resolution of the drink problem and he used his
journalistic experience to produce reams of anti-drink agitation. The Strength of
Britain movement gained the support of businessmen, social reformers, temperance
activists and a broad coalition of anti-drink polemicists whose intention was to
implement prohibition throughout the UK. The group attempted to mobilise public
3 The Scotsman 15 June 1916.
4 Maisie Robson, Arthur Mee and the Strength of Britain Selections from First World War pamphlets
(Wombwell, 2006), p. 40.
5 Oxford Dictionary National Biography, entry on Arthur Mee by Kimberley Reynolds, (Oxford
University Press, 2004), www.oxforddnb.com.
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opinion by utilising a widespread advertising campaign through the national press.
The group also released 20 pamphlets, selling 1.5 million copies in total.6
Figure 32: A typical example of an advertisement published by the Strength of
Britain Movement.
Many of these advertisements pointed to the economic waste caused by the
consumption of drink. Aimed at eliminating waste from every aspect of British life,
the movement became a prominent fixture on the political landscape for the remainder
6 J. Blocker Jr, David Fahey and Ian Tyrell, (eds.), Alcohol and Temperance in Modern History: An
International Encyclopaedia (London, 2003).
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of the war. In essence the Strength of Britain movement was temperance repackaged
as patriotism and wartime expediency.7
The movement’s active campaign angered the trade who saw the group as
merely the new face of temperance fanaticism. The Brewers’ Gazette, after Mee had
published his propagandistic Defeat or Victory?, lambasted: ‘we have long come to
the conclusion that it is a waste of time to combat the mendacious vapourings by
scribbling fanatics. Their denunciations have so frequently been shown to be baseless
and preposterous, that it is quite superogatory to again demolish them.’8 In response
to a specific recommendation from Mee that the rum ration at the front be replaced by
hot tea served in thermos flasks, the journal accused Mee of proposing ‘insane
theories’, adding sarcastically that ‘such being the stimulative effect of this beverage
[tea] that apparently the crushing of the enemy would take place within the next
hour’.9 Mee’s friend, Kennedy Jones, who was Alfred Harmsworth’s colleague in the
founding of The Daily Mail, also made a wisecrack about him, and the potential
‘success’ of the movement, in a London weekly. Asked ‘who is going to rob the
working man of his beer?’ he replied ‘not Mee’.10 Mee was undoubtedly a divisive
figure, a champion to some, whilst to others nothing more than a temperance rabble-
rouser. One critic saw him as an ‘exponent of journalistic frightfulness’.11
The Strength of Britain’s significance is most acute when one considers the
ensuing debate concerning the ‘wasteful’ use of foodstuffs in the production of
alcohol which took place in 1917. In his book, Defeat or Victory?, Mee summarised
the case for the prosecution:
7 The UKA passed a resolution stating ‘that an effort be made to bring about a working arrangement
between the ‘Strength of Britain Movement’ and the London Campaign Committee for the promotion
of a campaign for prohibition during the war on 23 May 1917.
8 The Brewers’ Gazette 20 July 1916.
9 The Brewers’ Gazette 1 February 1917.
10 Sir J. Hammerton, Child of Wonder: An Intimate Biography of Arthur Mee (London, 1946), p. 162.
11 Brewers’ Journal March 1918.
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The brewer and distiller are destroyers of food, nothing more and nothing less.
Except by the destruction of carbohydrate foods, starch and sugar, they cannot
make alcohol . . . it is waste and worse, the turning of treasure into trash, of
food into poison.12
The renewed focus on the use of foodstuffs in the production of beer may not have
been solely due to the agitation of the group, but it is churlish to suggest that it had no
effect in contextualising the ensuing debate.
At this time, the government faced increasing problems concerning the
provision of food to Britain. Already stretched by the demands of war, the British
were further rocked by the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare by Germany
on 1 February 1917, which exacerbated Britain’s food problem. From February to
June 1917, 85,000 tons of sugar were lost, reducing the nation at one stage to merely
four days supply with meat imports also badly affected.13 Attention was naturally
focussed on possible foodstuff savings that could be made on the home front. The
continued use of wheat, barley and sugar in the production of alcoholic drinks was
criticised. Sir Alfred Booth, Chairman of the Cunard Company, remarked: ‘if we are
to maintain our armies in the field we shall before very long have to choose between
bread and beer.’14 Essentially, the submarine action turned the drink problem into a
drink and food problem. Another factor in precipitating this course of action was
increasing criticism from the US and Canada, two countries in which anti-drink
agitation was rising, concerning the justification of supplying Britain with foodstuffs
when the domestic supply was being used in the production of alcohol. Their support
came with conditions attached. It was in this context that renewed calls for state
purchase of the drink trade surfaced.
12 A. Mee, Defeat or Victory?, p. 8.
13 G. DeGroot, Blighty: British Society in the Era of the Great War, p. 87.
14 Manchester Guardian 27 November 1916.
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In 1917 H. Baynes and H.G. Chancellor began a paper urging the adoption of
state purchase by describing one of many temperance meetings they had attended:
Few things are more stimulating and enkindling than a good red-hot teetotal
meeting. I had the honour of presiding at one the other day when the
Birmingham Town Hall, which holds 3,000 people, was packed, and some 500
were turned away . . . The enthusiasm was intense, the speaking fervid, and
the vote unanimous, and one comes away from such a meeting buoyant,
confident, and optimistic, ‘carried along on the tide of a joyful and bounding
emotion,’ and saying, ‘now at last we are really going to get something done.’
And yet, after thousands of such meetings, as far as concerns a real remedy for
the great central evil, we cool down again, and the glow is succeeded by a
chill, and nothing happens.15
Lord D’Abernon hoped that he would be more successful. The CCB recommended
state purchase to Lloyd George and the cabinet in December 1916. The Board
recommended purchase partly due to its confidence in the smaller state purchase
experiment undertaken at Carlisle and its desire to extend the scheme nationwide.
Moreover if state purchase was to be enacted the Board would be given much greater
power to influence drinking habits. The Board’s state purchase memorandum read as
follows:
The successful prosecution of the war is still being hampered by excessive
consumption of intoxicating liquor. This excessive consumption is of serious
consequences to the efficiency of our fighting forces, especially in regard to
material. Looked at from another point of view it involves wastage of the
nation’s food supplies and prevents economy in the use of the nation’s
resources in the matter of sea and land transport. In the light of the experiences
which they have gained during the last eighteen months, the Board are of
opinion that the time has now come when comprehensive measures, beyond
their present powers, are necessary in order to carry to completion the work of
restriction and control which the Board were established to discharge . . . State
control has come to be regarded with more and more favour as being the
policy which offers the most rapidly effective and the best permanent solution
of the problem.16
The state purchase memorandum supported the reorganisation of the trade on
‘scientific and economical lines’, a euphemism for closing certain pubs and breweries
15 H. Baynes and H.G. Chancellor, ‘State Purchase of the Liquor Trade’, Contemporary Review, July
1917, p. 1.
16 HO 185/266, Lord D’Abernon’s Cabinet Papers 1917-1918, State Purchase Memorandum, 16
December 1916.
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as D’Abernon believed there to be ’thirty thousand public houses in excess of the
requirements either of the trade or the community’.17 The proposal was thus also
justified upon the basis that drinking was still endemic, that the Board did not have
enough power to curb this, and that purchase offered the best ‘solution’ to the
problem.
The temperance movement agreed with this diagnosis, but differed in their
attitude to prospective cures. Whittaker wrote to Lloyd George, noting that ‘if you can
solve the Drink Problem and the Irish question we shall not pass through the terrible
ordeal of this war in vain.’18 The idea of state purchase was, however, naturally
unpopular with the prohibitionist lobby who saw the government as engaging in an
ungodly union with drink sellers. Others argued against the buy out from a different
perspective: business interests were sceptical of the likely commercial gains. Some
astutely asked why state purchase was necessary when ‘at the present moment the
government have full control over the liquor interest already unless it be for the
purpose of making a huge profit for the benefit of the war?’.19
17 HO 185/262, D’Abernon to Lloyd George, 16 December 1916.
18 Astor Papers, MS1066/1/1055, Whittaker to Lloyd George, 29 December 1916.
19 The Daily Graphic 1 January 1917.
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Figure 33: ‘Temperance via alternative means’ - This photograph shows the
aftermath of a Zeppelin raid on London where an unknown pub met an untimely
demise at the hands of the Germans.
Initial plans involved a swift reduction in the number of breweries and pubs
throughout the land, supposedly without any consequent effect on profits.20 Idealistic
planning was still dependent upon financial realities. The government had to be
persuaded that national efficiency would improve by buying out the trade and that it
would be money well spent.
Despite these concerns preparations were being made for the introduction of
state purchase by early January. As the Daily Dispatch reported:
20 HO 190/874, See for example Astor to Sanders 13 January 1917: I think you told me the other day
that under nationalisation the requirements of Liverpool could be met by three out of the existing
thirteen breweries. Is this correct? How many employees do you reckon the thirteen breweries now
have on their staffs, and how many would be required under the reduction? I think you also said that
half the public houses in Liverpool could be wiped out without any inconvenience. Have you any idea
of the total number of men and women at present employed in these pubs. Could you safely reckon that
you could wipe out fifty per cent under nationalisation?
243
Word has gone forth from the highest quarter to the effect that an
‘atmosphere’ must be prepared which will facilitate the accomplishment of a
state scheme for taking over the entire liquor trade of the country by purchase .
. . The PM is strongly supported in his intention to nationalise the liquor trade.
Mr Bonar Law, Mr Balfour, Mr Long and the rest of the leading Unionists are
with him on this question. The CCB is unanimously in favour of the proposal.
The representatives of the monetary interests identified with the trade are
willing to be bought out provided satisfactory terms and plans of purchase can
be arranged . . . But the need for the creation of a favourable atmosphere arises
from the opposition which is certain promoted by the prohibitionists who
demand a ‘dry’ nation by Act of Parliament for the duration of the war and six
months after.21
The Times also placed itself firmly behind such a course of action:
The CCB who represent the government, have pursued a middle course with
uncommon success and we trust that they will continue to do so. They have
drastically diminished the facilities for drinking and checked some of the
practices which encourage it . . . Prohibition is not the only way of settling the
eternal liquor question both for the war and for the future as well. There is
state purchase and control, which is being strongly advocated on the strength
of the Carlisle experiment. It would settle many questions in the easiest way,
and has much to commend it.22
State purchase was an ambitious project but D’Abernon could never be accused of
lacking the requisite self-confidence.
Meanwhile, rumour and counter rumour filled the daily press. The Daily
Express reported that the purchase of the trade was ‘imminent’.23 But the situation
was so changeable that a few days later, on 2 January 1917, the same paper reported
that the scheme ‘will probably be postponed owing to almost insuperable difficulties
until after the war’.24 The UKA, sensing that the new coalition government could
perhaps be convinced to implement prohibition once more pushed for this:
There are no terms of guarantees that would make such a scheme easier to
control . . . the only conceivable reason for raising it now is in order to provide
compensation for the Liquor Trade . . . we say purchase would side-track the
whole movement when we are nearing victory, when in its hour of agony the
world is turning towards prohibition as a help.25
21 The Daily Dispatch 6 January 1917.
22 The Times 29 December 1916.
23 The Daily Express 29 December 1916.
24 The Daily Express 2 January 1917.
25 Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/228/1, Deputation from the UKA and the Strength of Britain Movement.
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Those involved in the drink debate donned their armour once more for the fight
ahead. The Daily Telegraph believed that, whatever happened:
The public have set their teeth quietly, but firmly, and are resolved to support
whatever action the government may deem necessary for the successful
prosecution of the war no matter what personal inconvenience or sacrifice may
be involved.26
State purchase was now high on the political agenda.
Both trade and temperance factions had a keen interest in the resolution of the
issue. On 4 January 1917 The Brewers’ Gazette warned:
If the government is not going to fundamentally interfere with the trade, the
prospect of further restrictions will be borne philosophically by it, as a
necessary evil wherewith to accomplish the one end aimed at, namely, the
speedy ending of the war . . . our trade as a whole had ever met the Control
Board in the right spirit, and so long as any regulations are improvised by it,
for the good of the country and the winning of the war, they will be welcomed
and loyally obeyed without demur or protest.27
The debate was, however, further confused by the increasing limitations placed upon
the production of beer and spirits by the food controller. In January 1917, Lord
Davenport, controller of the newly created Ministry of Food, limited beer production
to 50 per cent of the 1915 level. The Board regarded this policy as likely to cause
‘hardly less unrest than a policy of total prohibition’.28 This restriction was adopted by
the war cabinet in February 1917 and, in effect, was a further 30 per cent cutback on
the figure permitted under the Output of Beer Restriction Act of 1916, amounting to a
reduction from twenty-six million to ten million barrels. In order to eke out this
supply of beer it was brewed at a lower gravity, and after a time it was arranged that
the average gravity of all beer brewed in Britain should not exceed 10300.29 Spirits
were similarly curtailed, from twenty-eight million gallons to fourteen million. This
26 The Daily Telegraph 3 January 1917.
27 The Brewers’ Gazette 4 January 1917.
28 HO 185/264, Confidential Papers on Limiting the Consumption of Spirits, 22 January 1917.
29 H.M. Vernon, The Alcohol Problem, p. 89.
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was the beginning of a somewhat fraught relationship between the CCB and the
Ministry of Food, which began to encroach upon much of the Board’s territory.30
Figure 34: Cartoon taken from the Alliance News highlighting how the ‘drinker’
was a drain on food resources.
30 Indeed it made the Board merely reassert their favouritism of the state purchase route. The Board
admitted in a memorandum of 16 January 1917 that they had ‘no information on which to form a
definite judgement as to the necessity, from the point of view of the nation’s food supplies, for so great
a reduction as appears to be contemplated. If, however, they must assume that some reduction is
necessary and is to be attempted notwithstanding the difficulties attending its execution, the Board
desire to represent that a policy of state purchase provides at once the most effective and the most
equitable modus operandi.’ See MAF 60/100.
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Figure 35: This postcard draws attention to the risks that British Seamen took to
bring food to Britain due to Germany’s submarine campaign. Greater pressure
was placed on society to avoid food wastage.
Relations were tense. The minutes of the CCB’s meetings suggest that these
new restrictions meant certain areas would be faced ‘with an acute beer scarcity,
which in some cases will amount to famine’.31 The Board warned that ‘measures must
certainly be taken to spread the reduced volume of beer over the whole country, and
31 HO 185/265, D’Abernon’s confidential papers, Restriction of Brewing Materials, Memorandum
circulated to Board for meeting 8 February 1917.
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to do this as evenly as possible’.32 Events proved the Board to be correct as beer
shortages became a regular occurrence in the spring and summer of 1917. The
restrictions were so severe that some pubs only had enough beer to sell at weekends.33
The Board’s ‘scientific management’ of the trade was now under threat from
the harsh realities of a government department intent on savage cutbacks on the use of
raw food materials required for the making of alcohol. It is interesting to note that the
Board was worried about beer shortages. It indicates a strategy for controlling drink
rather than simply prohibiting the consumption of alcohol. The pledge to ensure the
supply of beer should have been seen by the trade as an indication that the Board was
not, as some still perceived, a purely temperance body intent on closing the nation’s
public houses.
Naturally the CCB wondered why, if the government was willing to introduce
such a prohibitive and restrictive policy through the Ministry of Food, it would not
immediately implement its favoured option of state purchase. The lack of action
seemed stupefying. To limit speculation, the Home Secretary, Sir George Cave, was
appointed chairman of a committee to investigate the financial effects of the recent
restrictions, and was authorised to announce in the Commons that the government
was ‘keeping the question of nationalisation before them’.34
The membership of the committee was confined to representatives of the trade
and a few government officials. It had no representation from the CCB as D’Abernon
thought it best not to associate with restrictions that had ‘nothing to do with
temperance only with submarines’.35 This was an interesting aside. That D’Abernon
32 HO 185/265, D’Abernon’s confidential papers, Restriction of Brewing Materials, Memorandum
circulated to Board for meeting 8 February 1917.
33 Brewers’ Journal 15 April 1917.
34 J. Turner, ‘State Purchase of the Liquor Trade in the First World War’, The Historical Journal, 23, 3,
p. 608.
35 J. Greenaway, Drink and British Politics, p. 108
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now associated himself with ‘temperance’, given the number of times that he sought
to disassociate himself from that perception, was an unusual admission. Nevertheless,
in hindsight it would have been more conducive for D’Abernon to involve himself
with the inner workings of this committee rather than to remain marginalised given
the subsequent detrimental effect on the Board’s reputation.
The drink trade thus found itself under attack on two fronts. The threat of state
purchase, on one hand, and the enforced reduction of beer production, on the other,
meant that 1917 had begun badly for drink sellers. The trade bore these measures with
stoicism, declaring that the issue was not one of temperance but of food production. In
fact The Brewers’ Gazette, after accepting Lord Davenport’s restrictions, declared
that the net effect on food supplies was unlikely to be that great:
It is neither a measure of temperance nor an experiment in social reform, but a
necessary collorary to the exigencies of the time. No doubt the restriction will
be hailed as a great achievement for the teetotal cause, but it is actually a food
restriction. Lord Davenport has estimated that his proposals will result in a
saving for the year of 286,000 tons of barley and 36,000 of sugar, but even if
this represented a direct economy in food, which it certainly does not, it is
obvious that, distributed over a population of over forty million the daily
saving cannot reflect itself in any appreciable effect on the price of food and
very little open tonnage.36
Nevertheless, the measures caused some discontent, Colonel Gretton, Chairman of
Messrs Bass, Ratcliff and Gretton, stated in an interview that he regarded the beer
restrictions as ‘very drastic’:37
They will place many breweries in great difficulties but brewers will
undoubtedly accept them as necessary to the prosecution of the war. No
consideration has been given to the general public and the beer drinker is
expected to make sacrifices which no one else is called upon to make. As there
is already a general shortage of beer, the restrictions will be greatly felt by the
public.38
36 The Brewers’ Gazette 1 February 1917.
37 The Brewers’ Gazette 27 January 1917.
38 Ibid.
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But the threat of state purchase still hung over the trade. In an attempt to force a
decision over this matter, Waters Butler, a committee member of the Brewers Society
as well as of the CCB, proposed that ‘the time had arrived to consider and come to a
decision upon the principle of state purchase’.39 He called for a general meeting of the
society so that ‘an authoritative answer could be given if the government enquired the
views of the trade’.40 Butler was in favour of state purchase but his subsequent
attempt to create a consensus among the trade was inhibited by the anti-state purchase
section of the brewing community.41
39 Brewers and Licensed Trade Retail Association, MSS. 420, Box Number 1, Minute Book 5, 31
January 1917.
40 J. Turner, ‘State Purchase of the Liquor Trade in the First World War’, p. 608.
41 Ibid. p. 609.
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Figure 36: Some breweries responded with advertisements showing that beer
was an adjunct to food production rather than a wasteful resource.
Indeed, the Brewers’ Society was unprepared to accept state control without
purchase and other brewers were simply unwilling to accept state purchase at all.42 As
a memorandum to the War Cabinet made clear:
Opinion among brewers is divided upon this question, the large brewers being
generally opposed to purchase while some of the small brewers would
42 National Archives, Cabinet Papers, CAB 24/6, GT219, Memorandum by Sir George Cave as to
progress of Liquor Restrictions.
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welcome it. The Irish licensees are willing to entertain a proposal for purchase
while those in Great Britain vigorously object to it.43
The trade was not monotholic. It had different interests with different financial
requirements. Coming to a conclusion suitable for all was difficult. The Brewers’
Gazette believed that:
The attitude of the trade is by no means clear . . . the present government is
wholly a war creation. It has no mandate whatever, from the proletariat, save
to concentrate all its energies on achieving a speedy victory over our enemies .
. . a national business cannot be swallowed up, or devoured, without a national
appeal to the people, and that, at this juncture, is an impossibility.44
Meanwhile, the terms of any buy out needed to be considered. D’Abernon was
acutely aware that the government would have to buy out the trade as though it was
producing twenty-six million barrels of beer when, in fact, it was only going to be
allowed to produce ten million that year, a discrepancy which would make purchase
negotiations all the more complex.45 For this reason, he urged the war cabinet not to
make public any decision to purchase under these conditions adding that it ‘would be
desirable to defer decision as to purchase until the committees proposed to be set up
had shown purchase to be possible on satisfactory terms’.46 How D’Abernon expected
such a decision to remain under wraps is unknown. But his intervention shows how
43 CAB 24/6, GT219, Memorandum by Sir George Cave as to progress of Liquor Restrictions.
44 The Brewers’ Gazette 29 March 1917.
45 HO 185/266, Lord D’Abernon’s Cabinet Papers 1917-1918, 7 May 1917. D’Abernon wrote that ‘I
understand Lord Milner’s intention to be that a bargain should be struck now with the trade, the
execution of the contract being deferred until after the war. But if this is done the government run the
risk that they will have agreed to pay 300 or 400 millions three or four years hence for the acquisition
of a business which will then be either non-existent, under prohibition, or largely reduced under A) the
operation of the Restriction of Output Order, B) absence of materials, C) local option. In each of these
cases the state will be bound under a contract for payment of the full price, whereas the asset acquired
will be badly damaged. It is inconceivable that Parliament would agree to such a bargain. Alternatively,
if it is pleaded that the financial obligation to pay 300 or 400 millions is justified because the trade in
alcohol after the war will return to pre-war conditions, it is extremely doubtful whether temperance
opinion will allow any such pledge to be given. There appears to be no escape from the dilemma that
the state will either be paying an excessive price for an injured property, or that it is compromising its
freedom of action in the direction of temperance by the obligation of recouping itself for an enormous
outlay.
46 J. Turner, ‘State Purchase of the Liquor Trade’, p. 609.
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important perceptions were to the implementation of purchase. Davenport’s
restrictions had made an already thorny proposal more complex.
Nevertheless, after hearing that purchase could possibly produce profit for the
state, the war cabinet authorised Lloyd George ‘to make investigations’ in Liberal and
Labour circles and for Lord Milner to begin work on a draft bill.47 The war cabinet
believed that a ‘defining statement should be made by the PM, announcing that the
government had decided in favour of state purchase’.48 The cabinet had thus taken its
first tentative steps towards purchase but Lloyd George remained silent. Turner argues
that these ‘investigations’ were necessary in order for him to ensure support for
purchase as he had done during ‘the previous drink excitement’.49 As the trade was
complicit in purchase, and the financial deal was good, the Prime Minister had only to
deal with the malcontents of the temperance cause. He did so by receiving each
prohibitionist lobby, together with a purchase deputation, in order to ‘spike the
prohibitionists’ guns’.50
The continuing ‘drift’ of the legislation was censured regularly within the
press, who were unsure as to why such a controversial measure was either taking too
long or being attempted in the first place:
The Daily Express does not understand the reason for plunging into this
controversial question in the very crisis of the war. Faced with the need of
economy and of putting its best effort into its daily work the nation is already
drinking much less alcoholic liquor that it did before the war and it will
continue to drink less.51
In May 1917, Milner submitted his draft bill to the war cabinet, with the
caveat that ‘the trouble over this question cannot possibly be avoided and delay in
47 Lord Alfred Milner (1854-1925), Minister without portfolio in Lloyd George’s war council.
48 HO 185/226, Lord D’Abernon’s Cabinet Papers 1917-1918, 7 May 1917.
49 J. Turner, ‘State Purchase of the Liquor Trade’, p. 609.
50 Ibid. p. 610.
51 The Daily Express 13 April 1917.
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taking it seems certain to render the trouble worse’.52 He advocated immediate state
control, even if the actual purchase had to take place after the war as ‘if this
preliminary control is not set up now, it is very doubtful whether the summer beer
famine and discontent can be dealt with.’53 Meanwhile, meetings between Lloyd
George and representative brewers made it seem that the government did not intend to
purchase. This caused consternation amongst interested parties but it appears that
wires had been crossed. Milner was forced to emphasise that a permanent transfer of
assets to the state was still being contemplated. The confusion surrounding the issue
led to accusations that Lloyd George should concentrate on running the war effort
rather than attempting to create a new ‘beerocracy’.54 The war cabinet warned that
‘such a policy of drift would satisfy no-one but those who advocated Prohibition
without compensation’.55
On 31 May various committees were set up by the war cabinet to work out the
financial details, a two clause bill to provide funds was approved, and the decision
made to assume control immediately after the bill was passed. A three-pronged
‘please-all policy’ had been agreed, with control, purchase and local option all
featuring in an attempt to dilute potential opposition to the plan. Milner pointed out
that the trade was to be controlled by a new cabal of brewers, licensed victuallers and
civil servants. He believed the CCB was regarded by the trade with ‘suspicion and
dislike and was not suited to do the actual control’.56 This was a strange judgement
given the Board had successfully run the only state control experiment up to this
point. Milner believed that the Board retained a symbolic role for social reformers and
52 J. Turner, ‘State Purchase of the Liquor Trade’, p. 610.
53 J. Greenaway, Drink and British Politics, p. 109.
54 The Daily Express 16 May 1917.
55 MAF 60/100, War Cabinet Papers, Liquor Restriction and Control.
56 J. Greenaway, Drink and British Politics, p. 110.
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this meant it could not be completely ‘ignored and should be fitted in’.57 But this was
hardly a ringing endorsement of the capability of D’Abernon and his colleagues.
D’Abernon was indeed anxious about the CCB being sidelined. In response to
the news that control was to be assumed by a body combining civil servants, brewers
and licensed victuallers whose powers were not to be used to close public houses or
breweries, he likened the new body to a ‘revivalist meeting with reclaimed offenders
officiating on the platform’. He warned that ‘the proposal will be attacked as little
more than a trade frame up designed to secure maximum profits at no risk, or
alternatively to escape from efficient control, and to relapse to the old path of license
and excess.’58 Seeing that his Board’s work was endangered, D’Abernon was not
afraid to fight his corner, but events were overtaking him. Evidently, how the Board
was perceived was now more important than the tangible results of its work. The
future relevance of the CCB was unclear. Meanwhile, as Turner has argued, ‘there
seemed nothing to stop the liquor trade passing into the hands of the state forever’.59
Then, at a meeting on 21 June an amazing u-turn was undertaken by the Prime
Minister. Usurping Milner’s scheme, Lloyd George presented an alternative plan to
increase beer output without taking control and argued that the parliamentary situation
was wrong for state purchase. After six months of debate and speculation, Lloyd
George suddenly decided that the government had other priorities. Perhaps the
difficulty in implementing purchase influenced his sudden abandonment of the
scheme but it is a mystery why he suddenly ruled out the idea. Waldorf Astor
remembered that ‘Milner was taken completely by surprise and put up no fight’.60
Milner himself concluded that ‘the fatal swerve . . . has, I fear, made it impossible to
57 HO 185/266, Lord D’Abernon’s Cabinet Papers 1917-1918, Milner Memorandum, 16 June 1917.
58 J. Turner, ‘State Purchase of the Liquor Trade in the First World War’, p. 611.
59 Ibid. p. 611.
60 Ibid. p. 612.
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take the one straight road which would have got us out of these difficulties, besides
opening up a prospect of an almost immeasurable social reform’.61 Turner suggests
that Lloyd George’s confused pronouncements in May had scared the brewers, who
were concerned about not being protected against heavy financial losses in the event
of purchase.62 The concerns of brewers, though, were unlikely to have been the
determining factor in such events. Whatever the reason, the state purchase plan lay in
tatters.
The prospect of state purchase during the war was thus dead. On 28 June 1917
The Daily Express reported that the ‘state purchase of the liquor trade as a war policy
has been finally and definitely abandoned by the government.’63 On this occasion
there was no reversal of policy. Committees did consider the financial implications of
state purchase in England, Wales and Scotland but the length of their investigations,
which concluded in May 1918, meant that the irons had long cooled on prospective
action. By this time the food crisis had faded. The committees themselves eventually
recommended the purchase of both the manufacture and the supply of alcoholic
liquor. Since most retail outlets were tied to brewers, the total cost based upon
average annual profits from 1910 to 1913 was estimated to be some £400 million.
However, Lloyd George did not see this as a priority any longer and the cabinet
postponed discussions on the matter indefinitely.64
Later that year, Lloyd George explained his thinking to a deputation he
received from the Methodist Churches campaigning for prohibition:
I think I was one of the first to be convinced that a restriction upon the sale of
intoxicating liquors was necessary not as a great social reform but for the
purpose of winning the war. This year the convictions up to August are 929
per week. That is something between one third and one fourth of the
61 Ibid. p. 612.
62 Ibid. p. 612.
63 The Daily Express 28 June 1917.
64 J. Greenaway, Drink and British Politics, p.111.
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convictions for drunkenness in the first year of the war and that indicates a
very considerable improvement . . . The people have made sacrifices . . . so do
not let us judge too harshly and try and impose too many restrictions upon
people who have not yet been trained to regard alcoholic drink in the same
way as you who are before me regard it . . . everybody must share in the
sacrifices, and I have seen nothing up to the present moment which induces
me to believe that when the people are convinced – whether they are men who
drink alcohol or men who do not drink alcohol – that it is necessary to give up
anything, whatever it is, I have seen nothing which lends me to believe that
they will not readily do it.65
Essentially he argued that existing restrictions, together with the work of the CCB,
had proven successful in the battle against drink. Lloyd George had eventually come
to the conclusion that state purchase was an unnecessary burden to a nation at war.
The Board was seemingly doing fine as it was. The Manchester Guardian noted that
‘the CCB have done very well on the whole and it would not be surprising that the
government should continue to leave it to them.’66
Despite this vote of confidence, the inability of the CCB to bring about state
purchase marks the nadir of the Board’s power. Its political capital, which had been
plentiful early in the war, had been spent. From now on the work of the Board was
tainted by association with a highly controversial scheme, representative in some eyes
of the worst traits of tyrannical state interference. The CCB was thus damaged and
henceforth had to face increased criticism. Moreover, while moderate licensing
proposals were henceforth seen as acceptable larger, more ambitious CCB schemes,
were deemed unworkable.
But the CCB still remained active. The Third Report of the CCB, produced in
1917, highlighted the progress of the Board. The Manchester Guardian described it as:
A hopeful document. The experience of the CCB reinforces the belief of those
who hold that a sane and practicable step towards robbing the drink traffic of
its horrors lies in the provision of houses of refreshment in which beer, wine
and spirits shall be put in their proper perspective beside tea, coffee, minerals
65 Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/228/6, Deputation to the Prime Minister from the Methodist Churches
asking for Prohibition, 14 November 1917.
66 Manchester Guardian 27 June 1917.
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and food, where there shall be room to breathe, space to sit, and a chance for
talk and fellowship without shame or excess.67
The report drew particular attention to the potentiality of transforming the pub
into a modern café. The Daily Express opined that:
People should be developed. People should be able to enter such houses with
their womenfolk and families. The provision of music of an elevating kind
would emphasise the social side and it should be possible for men to transact
business or for women to meet their friends over a light meal. In such
surroundings there would be a practical discouragement of the use and abuse
of heavy intoxicating liquors.68
Meanwhile, further restrictions were introduced by the Ministry of Food. Instead of
purchase, a scheme ensuring the increased production of beer was introduced to allay
the threat of shortages and possible industrial unrest. The permitted barrelage was to
be increased by 20 per cent in return for brewers brewing a weaker beer at 10360.69
Fears grew about the sanctity of the working man’s pint. The Daily Express
reported that ‘it is probable that the pint measure will shortly disappear from the
public house . . . a growing minority of brewers favour closing down at the end of
October for ten days or a fortnight but others think such a policy would exasperate the
working man and affect the output of munitions.’70 So infrequent was the arrival of
beer at some pubs that Butler reported that:
When [beer] is on sale in any particular houses, consumers crowd out such
houses immediately when beer is delivered to them and demand that the
licensee put it on sale forthwith although not in a fit condition for retailing.
Consumers often decline to part with glasses when empty, but thrust them
forward to be filled again . . . supervision of the premises is impossible under
such conditions.71
67 Manchester Guardian 4 January 1917.
68 The Daily Express 2 January 1917.
69 National Archives, Cabinet Papers, CAB 23/3.
70 The Daily Express 10 October 1917.
71 National Archives, Cabinet Papers, CAB 24/22, Copy of Memorandum by Waters Butler.
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Matters were not helped by the ‘hot weather’ accentuating the beer shortages.72 By
August 1917 warnings were being made that frustrated drinkers were turning to spirits
in order to alleviate their ‘intense irritation’ at being unable to buy beer.
The CCB’s best-laid plans came under threat due to a situation outwith their
jurisdiction. The working class once more felt their lifestyle to be under attack. The
government was fully aware of this discontent. In his memorandum in favour of state
control, Milner had pointed out that ‘much of the labour dissatisfaction is due to the
beer shortage and that something ought to be done at once . . . immediate control
would ease the situation as, under Government control, the bulk of beer can be
materially increased by dilution.’73 In May various deputations made D’Abernon
aware of the increasing importance of the issue. The Medical Officer of Bermondsey,
in a frank letter, wrote that the working classes had just about had enough:
The working classes, which constitute the large majority of the population,
have been irritated in various ways since the war. They have lost relatives and
friends, food has become dear and scarce, labour restrictions of various sorts
have been introduced, and finally they are threatened with total deprivation of
their favourite beverage after the prices have gone up exorbitantly and the
hours have been much restricted. Now signs are not altogether wanting to
close observers that we are nearing the ‘flashing point’ and it becomes a
serious question whether the important ‘factor’ you control should be
permitted to hasten the conflagration. I have been struck by the philosophical
way the working classes have accepted all these disabilities, and it has been
done since they thought it important for winning the war.74
It is interesting to note that supply issues were deemed to be under the jurisdiction of
D’Abernon. In fact he had limited influence over this aspect of the drink problem yet
all affairs concerned with drink were believed to be under his Board’s jurisdiction. It
was with ‘surprise that some Welsh colliers in a rather dangerous mood discovered
72 The Licensing World and Licensed Trade Review 16 June 1917.
73 CAB 24/16, GT1070, State Control of the Liquor Trade, Memorandum by Lord Milner.
74 HO 185/263, D’Abernon Semi-Official Correspondence 1915-1919, Bermondsey Medical Officer to
D’Abernon, 21 May 1917.
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that the regulations were issued by the food controller’.75 This misperception was
appreciated by D’Abernon, who wrote: ‘it was very foolish to impose an impossible
reduction. We warned the government but they would not listen. Although I lose no
opportunity of saying it, the Board have nothing to do with it – we get some criticism
and it reflects on the good restrictions which are muddled up with the bad.’76
In April 1917 the Brewers’ Journal was reporting that ‘even in large urban
areas, there are many public houses whose share is now only one barrel per week, and
in the rural districts this position must be more pronounced’.77 One month later the
same journal was reporting beer houses in many urban areas being closed for certain
days of the week due to a lack of beer. D’Abernon warned that ‘the present allowance
of beer was insufficient especially in the great munitions areas. Public houses were
allowed to be open for 5 ½ hours but in fact were only open from 2 ½ to 3 ½ hours
due to a shortage of supplies.’78 Astor suggested rationing drink as ‘it might go far to
meet the resentment among the working classes which is based on the feeling that the
brewers and whisky distillers are profiteering.’79 Resentment increased when it
became apparent that while grain for brewing was scarce, the consumption of port,
champagne and particularly wine, traditionally the drink of the upper classes, was on
the increase.80 The Board argued for a managed distribution network, adding that if
‘certain irritation and unrest in the munitions areas is to be avoided, measures must
certainly be taken to spread the reduced volume of beer over the whole country, and
to do this as evenly as possible.’81 Some breweries, in areas where the demand
75 HO 185/263, Mr Thornborough on ‘Effect of New Restrictions on Output to D’Abernon, 7 May
1917.
76 British Library, Lord D’Abernon’s Personal Papers, 17 June 1917.
77 Brewers’ Journal 15 April 1917.
78 MAF 60/100, Cabinet Papers Liquor Restriction and Control, 25 September 1918.
79 CAB 24/36, Liquor Restriction and Control: Memorandum by Major Waldorf Astor.
80 Jose Harris, ‘Businessmen in British Food Control 1916-1919’ in Burk, Kathleen, (ed.), War and the
State.
81 HO 185/265, D’Abernon’s confidential papers, 9 February 1917.
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exceeded local supply, sold their beer to other breweries to alleviate the burden of
restriction.82 In an attempt to avoid increased discontent, Milner recommended the
exclusion of light beers of no more than 2 per cent alcoholic volume from the
restrictions on barrelage, a suggestion with which the CCB concurred.83
D’Abernon was acutely aware of the situation and opposed to the restrictions.
Motivated partly by a hostility regarding the legitimacy of the orders, and partly by
bureaucratic rivalry, he made clear his belief that these restrictions led to ‘alternations
of drink famine and rush drinking which are prejudicial to public order’, and that
considerable advantage would result from an increase of the present allowance of beer
by a further amount of two or three million barrels of a fixed gravity between 10230
and 10250.84 Moreover, the Board received first hand evidence of the seriousness of
the restrictions placed on beer output in Carlisle as worker discontent manifested itself
in calls for further barrelage to be released.
In July the government agreed, due to the threat of industrial strikes, to permit
the brewing of one third more beer or 970,000 barrels during the quarter ending
September.85 The Home Secretary stated that the increase was granted for ‘reasons
connected with the conduct of the war and for no other reason’.86 In November, after
consultation with the Food Controller, D’Abernon let the War Cabinet know that he
was also in favour of the release of ‘light wines’ onto the market, as opposed to the
issue from bond of heavier wines or higher strength spirits.87 In early 1918 the Board
announced: ‘It is desirable in the national interest that beer and spirits should be
82 HO 185/265,D’Abernon’s confidential papers, Brewing and the Resumption of Malting, 9 August
1917.
83 National Archives, Cabinet Papers, CAB 24/16, Memorandum by D’Abernon, 19 June 1917.
84 HO 185/265, Memorandum by D’Abernon, 9 August 1917.
85 Twenty per cent of this increase was to be directly allocated to brewers who agreed to brew half their
output below a gravity of 10360. This beer was then given directly to workers in munitions areas. See
F. Coller, A State Trading Adventure (London, 1925), p. 134.
86 The Fourth Report of the Central Control Board
87 MAF 60/61, War Cabinet meeting, RE – release of Wine and Spirits from Board, 7 November 1917.
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available in such quantity as is consistent with reasonable contentment.’88 Until the
end of the war D’Abernon and the Board continued to argue for an adequate supply of
low gravity beer to ensure that workers did not stray to drinking higher alcohol spirits
and wines.
Although some brewing was permitted, so short were supplies of wheat that
watered down beer became more common. Brewers diluted beer to 2-3 per cent,
approximately half the pre-war strength. The average gravity of beer dropped from
10530 in 1913 to 10300 in April 1918.89 Sarcastically known as ‘government ale’, this
weak beer became synonymous with unwanted government intervention in the public
house. The weakness of the beer became a standing joke. Newspapers regularly drew
attention to the poor quality. The Manchester Guardian reported one ‘discontented ale
drinker’ saying that ‘he could make a better glass of beer out of a glass of water with a
touch of quinine and a small quantity of burnt sugar’.90 Music Hall comedians
satirised the weakness of the beer with aplomb. In a song entitled ‘Lloyd George’s
Beer’, Ernie May, rather tunelessly, sang:
We shall win the war,
As I have said before,
The Kaiser is in dreadful fury,
Now he knows we’re making it in every brewery,
Have you read of it,
Seen what’s said of it,
In the Mirror and the Mail,
It’s a substitute,
And a pubstitute,
And it’s known as government ale,
Or otherwise,
Lloyd George’s beer.
At the brewery there is nothing doing,
All the water works are brewing,
Lloyd George’s beer,
88 HO 185/266, D’Abernon’s Cabinet Papers 1917-1918, Memorandum by CCB on output of beer, 8
March 1918.
89 D. Gutzke, Pubs and Progressives: Reinventing the Public House in England 1896-1960, p. 52.
90 Manchester Guardian 29 December 1917.
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It isn’t beer,
Oh they say it’s a terrible war, oh lord,
And there never was a war like this before,
But the worst thing that ever happened in this war,
Is Lloyd George’s beer.
…Shove you head in it,
From January to October and I will bet a penny that you’ll still be sober.91
Snowden recounted the story of a man ‘who went into a public house and the barman
refused to serve him on the ground that he was drunk. The man protested, and said ‘I
am not drunk, but I may be waterlogged.’92 Accompanying this shortage of beer was
an increase in the consumption of wine. The Brewers’ Gazette reported that ‘among
the many changes in the habits of the nation is a revival of the popular taste for good
wine’.93
These stories further damaged the reputation of the CCB which was seen,
erroneously, as responsible for all official policy regarding the drink problem.
Ridicule soon followed. The Alliance News reported that ‘the casual reader must
always bear in mind that there are now two ‘Control Boards’ in operation. One is the
CCB which must not be confused with the other ‘Board of control’ (Lunacy and
Mental Deficiency). The first deals with the operations of the liquor traffic, the second
has to deal with some of its finished products.’94 For some the Board had done an
admirable job but the resolution of the problem as it stood seemed beyond the
capability of the CCB. Here parts of both the trade and temperance movement agreed.
Arthur Mee argued that the ‘Control Board has done wonders . . . but it was like
controlling the German Army to control this trade and the central lesson of this Board
91 Ernie May, Lloyd George’s Beer from a compilation of songs entitled Laughter on the Home Front:
Popular songs from the First World War Imperial War Museum Sound Archive 28943/2.
92 P. Snowden, An Autobiography: Volume One 1864-1919, p. 382.
93 The Brewers’ Gazette 8 November 1917.
94 Alliance News, August 1917.
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is that drink cannot be effectively controlled’.95 The Brewers’ Journal added that
‘after two and a half years of the Board’s regime, it is generally admitted that good
has resulted to the people and the state’.96 Elements of both sides remained blinkered.
In a book entitled Drink: The Greatest Foe the temperance activist Lieutenant Colonel
A.H. Williams lamented that ‘the nation still fails to grasp the facts or to believe that
drink is the worst of the enemies with which we have to deal’.97 Despite some evident
progress the two sides to the debate could not resist ridiculing the other, as a story
from the Alliance News indicates:
The following chestnut appears in the current Licensing World ‘old stories are
appearing in new war paint! This is the latest from the trenches: - Temperance
advocate to soldier: ‘You really don’t mean to contend that the rum ration
does any good? Soldier: - Well, it’s like this. We ad’ a little pet mouse in our
trench. One day we gave the little beggar a crumb soaked in rum. Before you
could say ‘knife’ he was up on his hind legs, shouting out ‘where’s that f ing
cat?’98
This ridicule of the opposition was constant throughout the war in the drink debate.
The CCB was powerless to change this.
Although the CCB was increasingly sidelined and satirised, in November 1916
it sanctioned a scientific investigation to divulge the real effect of alcohol on the
individual.99 This aimed to ‘prove’ that an alcohol problem existed, and to
demonstrate in physiological terms why alcohol was a danger to society. D’Abernon,
in a speech on ‘The Need for a Scientific Basis for Temperance Reform’ given to the
95 Alliance News November 1917.
96 Brewers’ Journal March 1918.
97 Lt. Col. A.H. Williams, Drink: The Greatest Foe (Protestant Truth Society 1918), p. 1.
98 Alliance News, June 1918.
99 The Committee, under the Chairmanship of Lord D’Abernon, consisted of the following members –
Professor A.R. Cushny – Professor of Pharmacology at University College, London, Dr. H.H. Dale –
Head of the Dept of Biochemistry and Pharmacology under the Medical Research Committee, National
Health Insurance, Dr. M. Greenwood – statistician to the Lister Institute of Preventative Medicine, Dr.
W. McDougall – Reader in Mental Philosophy in the University of Oxford, Dr. F.W. Mott –
Pathologist to the London County Asylums and Consulting Physician to Charing Cross Hospital, Sir
George Newman (member of the CCB), Professor C.S. Sheringham – Waynflete Professor of
Physiology in the University of Oxford and Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford, Dr. W.C. Sullivan –
Medical Superintendent of the Rampton State Asylum for Criminal Lunatics.
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Church of England Temperance society at Lambeth Palace in mid-1917, articulated
the reasons why the Board was taking such a step:
Practical information regarding the subject of alcohol (has) never been made
the subject of research, because there has been no proper recognition of the
need of a scientific basis for temperance reform. This deficiency, I am glad to
say, is now on process of being made good . . . without a solid basis of
scientific fact, temperance reform will be empirical and uncertain . . . The line
of moderate regulation and reform has been advanced.100
In the preface to this report, D’Abernon was honest in his appraisal that ‘there is an
almost entire absence of reliable data regarding the psychology of the drunkard,
though adequate information on this point is obviously essential to devising rational
methods for the treatment of the inebriate.’101 The work separated ‘what is knowledge
from what is surmise, conjecture, or popular belief, and by this preliminary clarifying
of the question, to prepare the way for further research’.102
During the course of investigations into the effect of alcohol, experiments
were conducted on prisoners in Holloway prison. In mid-1916, prisoners were made
to consume various doses of alcohol and then attempt to use a typewriter to judge how
much drink could be taken.103 Other experiments comparing the effect of alcohol and
opium were also undertaken together with tests upon cats and dogs to understand the
effect of alcohol.
The report was published in book form in March 1918 to laudatory praise
from the temperance movement. The book seemed to prove that drinking was bad for
health and thus bad for society as a whole. All of the temperance movement’s
warnings were apparently proven and justified by science. The Alliance News noted
that it:
100 HO 185/242, D’Abernon on the Need for Scientific Basis for Temperance Reform, 15 May 1917.
101 Alcohol: Its Action on the Human Organism (London,1918), p. vii.
102 Ibid. p. x.
103 For details on the types and results of experiments conducted, see HO 185/228, Alcohol Committee
Correspondence Memoranda.
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It is an honest attempt to state the truth as to the physiological action of
alcohol without conscious bias in any direction . . . The report is not a
temperance report, it is a report prepared by men of science, none of whom are
total abstainers, so far as we know, after long and careful investigation, with a
full sense of their responsibility to lay a plain statement before the nation . . .
The report, in our opinion, makes out an overwhelming case for prohibition
during the war and during demobilisation.104
D’Abernon, though, was consistent in his opposition to prohibition.105
The report exerted a profound influence over the drink debate. Much
conjecture was now elevated to the status of accepted fact. For example, the
temperance movement had perpetually discussed the link between the proper
provision of food and the avoidance of drunkenness and now the scientific inquiry
proved that alcohol taken without food endangered the stomach membrane.
The Board was predictably pleased with this contribution to the study of drink:
The authoritative character of this book, representing as it does the unanimous
conclusions of the distinguished authorities serving on the Committee, has
been widely recognised, particularly by those who have a scientific or
practical interest in alcohol and its effects, and the Board believe that the book
will exercise a marked influence upon future research as well as upon conduct
and public opinion.106
Fisher was pleased, believing it to be ‘a work of great importance and I hope it will
receive the very wide circulation it deserves. As far as I know it is the first time that
there has been a temperate, non partisan and scientific statement on this subject.’107
Despite its worthy efforts, the CCB, as we have seen, was losing public
confidence. The views of The Brewers’ Gazette were symptomatic of the newfound
antipathy towards the work of the Board: ‘this war has much to answer for, not the
least being the opportunities it has presented to a lot of incompetent bureaucrats to
restrict the working of centuries old industries in the guise of communal
104 Alliance News, March 1918.
105 Throughout the war he rejected such calls. D’Abernon to Lord Derby 8 January 1918 ‘I feel myself
that prohibition would be definite retrogression and entail a reversion to the old conflict between
extreme policies, which has caused the failure of reform during the hundred years before 1915.’
106 The Fourth Report of the Central Control Board.
107 HO 185/263, Fisher to D’Abernon, 5 March 1918.
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benevolence.’108 Furthermore, the threats of strikes brought about by the lack of beer
brought further condemnation:
The excursions of the Liquor Control Board in the introduction of laws
(hitherto the prerogative of Parliament) are continually usurping all reasonable
limits, and call for strong public action. Introduced insidiously, the full effect
of their regulations are not grasped by the people, until their baleful influence
asserts itself and threatens to overwhelm age old privileges to the prejudice
generally of the community. Now, in these precarious times, the obduracy of
the board is a national peril, and parliament should promptly take the matter
up. It is not a time to invite discontent among the workers, but to do
everything possible to allay irritation and unrest.109
The constitutional position of the Board was seen as a strength despite criticism
within parliament that it remained unaccountable. A minister in parliament did not
represent the CCB and this was a source of some anger, especially when the Board
was undertaking particularly controversial measures. Nevertheless, by 1918, this
idiosyncrasy was seen as one of the main advantages that the Board possessed.
D’Abernon wrote to Hugh Godley that ‘its [the Board’s] quasi independence of
parliament renders its action less liable to be influenced by gusts of outside opinion,
and is therefore necessary to success.’110 After three years of dealing with the difficult
and intransigent positions of those involved with the drink problem, Godley candidly
replied to D’Abernon that:
We have in effect completely autocratic powers . . . we are free to carry out
our own policy in our own way. In my view that is vital to our success. No
subject is so violently canvassed by stupid, ignorant and interested persons as
liquor control, and the closer we get to ‘public opinion’ the more liable we are
to be influenced if not coerced by irresponsible clamour.111
108 The Brewers’ Gazette 16 August 1917.
109 The Brewers’ Gazette 22 November 1917.
110 HO 185/232, Correspondence RE: Appointed Members, D’Abernon to Godley, 2 February 1918.
Sydney Neville and G.J. Wardle M.P. joined the board 26 July 1917. J.H. Thomas and Godley joined
the board 1 November 1917.
111 HO 185/232, Godley to D’Abernon, February 1918.
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This letter highlights the significant powers of the Board. At a clear moment in
history, defined by the limits of the war, real change could be enacted with a clear
rationale for action.
Over the course of 1917 and into 1918 the CCB became strongly identified
with the state purchase cause, a perception aided by the publication of Henry Carter’s
book. One reviewer noted that ‘the book is of course, written from the point of view
of an advocate of state purchase, but although the bias in favour of that method is
clearly manifested the writer’s views are put forward in moderate terms’.112 It was
produced at a time when a valuable exposition of the Board’s work was necessary to
deflect increasing criticism of its allegedly despotic ways. The drink debate was less
newsworthy in the final months of the war. The problem had seemingly been ‘dealt’
with by the CCB. Britain’s armament production had come to terms with the demands
of war. During an attack on the Hindenburg Line, British soldiers fired 943,947 shells
in a twenty-four hour period.113 Shell shortages were a thing of the past. In
consequence, a less disparaging attitude toward working class behaviour was
apparent. The rationale for the continued impingement of the CCB on working class
culture was fading.
The CCB was also increasingly resented by working class drinkers.
D’Abernon was heckled vociferously whilst giving a speech to the Lord Mayor of
Manchester. ‘We don’t want an academic speech we want more beer’ noted one
thirsty critic.114 Another accused D’Abernon of being a ‘dirty dog who sends my class
to jail’.115 D’Abernon was asked if he would use his influence to have Philip Snowden
removed from the Board. The question was ‘greeted with loud cheering and cries of
112 Manchester Guardian January 1918.
113 G. Sheffield, Forgotten Victory - The First World War: Myths and Realities (London, 2001), p. 247.
114 Manchester Guardian 16 February 1918.
115 Ibid.
268
‘he’s a traitor,’ to which D’Abernon replied that he was a man of ‘high intellectual
ability’.116 In November 1918 a damning open letter was written by the ‘executive of
the dock and riverside workers union’ concerning the work of the Board:
Summing up the value of your committee, I very much regret to say that you
have made profiteers of both distillers and brewers together with public house
owners and the consumer of the ordinary health beverages has been mulcted
into exorbitant costs. If you think that a reward for your services you are
welcome to do so, but so far as the nation is concerned they have suffered
materially by your mischievous administration and while there may be some
results of usefulness in your committee, on the whole, I think it has been an
egregious failure and a very unwarrantable cost to the community. We regard
it as the most Hun-like Department that ever the war has produced.117
On the morning of 11 November 1918 the war ended. Lloyd George made a statement
outside Downing Street that ‘at 11 o’clock this war will be over. We have won a great
victory and we are entitled to a bit of shouting.’118 Rather than shout, many preferred
a drink. The King ended his controversial abstention from alcohol by cracking open a
bottle of brandy which he described as tasting ‘very musty’.119 Throughout Britain
celebrations erupted. Government beer may have been weaker but people made up for
this by drinking generous amounts of it. In France the situation was no different.
Troops made the best of the circumstances, canvassing for ale, wine or spirits
wherever possible. As Private Frank J.H. Dunk of the Queens Own Royal West Kent
Regiment recollected:
The next morning we got up to see our officer coming down the street in his
shirt and braces with a barrel of beer on a big French wheelbarrow. He came
into the billet and said ‘come on lads, the war will be over at 11 o’clock.’
When the French folks heard, out came the flags and wine, beer, all sorts, and
everybody got totally pickled.120
In Carlisle similar exuberance was evident:
116 The Brewers’ Gazette 28 February 1918.
117 Manchester Guardian 4 November 1918.
118 G. DeGroot, Blighty, p. 249.
119 Ibid. p. 250.
120 L. Macdonald, Voices and Images of the Great War 1914-1918, p. 309.
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A very large trade was done at the various houses, as was natural . . . In the
middle of the day a raid was made on one of the Board’s lorries, which was
thought to be conveying bottles of spirits to the houses. Fortunately however,
it was conveying empties, and the crowd, quickly realising their mistake, did
no damage.121
It would have tested even the most ardent of temperance enthusiasts to suggest that
the occasion did not warrant such celebration. But most of those who came out on the
streets showed restraint. On 14 November Sir Eric Geddes viewed some of the scenes
in London. He reported that ‘the temper and conduct of the crowds were everywhere
good. There was very little drunkenness and few excesses were committed at that
hour. Of these few Australians were prominent participants.’122 With the war won
there was no longer a need to pillory the working class for their enjoyment of alcohol.
Attention, however, soon turned to what was going to happen to the CCB now that
peace had come.
121 HO 190/822, General Manager’s Report, 19 November 1918.
122 See WC 502, 14 November 1918. Sir Walter Long believed that it was urgent to get the Australians
out of London as they had been accused of taking a leading part in increasing the rowdiness of some of
the crowds in the capital.
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Conclusion: The End of the Central Control Board
On 12 November the CCB held its 103rd meeting but its future was now
uncertain. The Board at this point was composed of thirteen members with a staff of
around 1250 people.1 As a body established to ensure efficiency in wartime, the
Board’s continued existence was dependent upon the benefits of its work being
appreciated in peacetime. Given the hostile reaction to some of the Board’s measures
in the previous two years, the task of demonstrating the Board’s continued worth was
onerous, yet was undertaken by its members keen on preserving the beneficial social
reform which they believed the Board had implemented. This struggle, though,
swiftly frustrated those who undertook it.
With the end of the war, the trade believed that an end should come to the
‘arbitrary’ regulation of their livelihood. As the Brewers’ Journal noted:
The history of the trade in these unprecedented times can be penned with pride
and satisfaction . . . for the first two years our trade was caught up in the
vortex of every sort of political and other controversy. The ‘take advantage of
the war opportunists’, defying the political truce, have used every form of
assault. They have failed. Their one aim, prohibition, has ignominiously
collapsed – killed by the strongly aimed blows of the mighty workers.2
The trade believed it had weathered the temperance storm. Accordingly, with the
coming of peace, the rationale for the continued existence of the Board was
undermined. The electorate seemingly agreed as many Temperance M.P.s lost their
seat in the election of 1918, something which the Alliance News argued was ‘a real
peril to the nation’.3 The burden of accusations against the CCB’s work now carried
greater credibility. If the Board was not now working for wartime efficiency what else
could it be operating for other than the introduction of temperance principles?
1 The thirteen members of the CCB at this time were Lord D’Abernon, Butler, John Denny,
Leverhulme, Neville, Newman, Pedder, Snowden, J.H. Thomas, Hugh Godley (a barrister), Towle,
Sykes and Meicklejohn.
2 Brewers’ Journal November 1918.
3 Alliance News January 1919.
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Unpopular, and with its continued existence questioned, the Board soldiered on. This
chapter will consider its post war demise and assess the extent of the Board’s success.
The extension of the Board’s powers for twelve months after the cessation of
conflict, guaranteed by the legislation that created the Board, allowed for the
introduction of either a permanent body, or some form of permanent legislation.
D’Abernon believed that continued temperance reform was imperative. He was proud
of the achievements of the CCB and believed that it was ‘in the national interest that
restrictions should be kept’.4 By the end of the war, 95 per cent of the population of
Great Britain lived under the Board’s restrictions.5
The Board used convictions for drunkenness as the primary criteria for
legitimising its success. Although they were subject to a number of variables, notably
the strictness of police officers, conviction rates suggest a clear reduction in drunken
behaviour. In 1915 the figure stood at 135,811. In 1916 this figure had been reduced
to 84,191, a reduction of 38 per cent. This is the best indication of the effect of the
Board’s work prior to the reduction imposed on output. A further decline occurred in
1917 to 46,410 and in 1918 to 29,075 - 70 per cent lower than in 1914. To be sure, the
Board’s restrictions must have affected these figures but there is no way of
quantifying the effect of these, together with the effect of the aforementioned
restrictions imposed by the Food Controller. As the Alliance News noted, ‘we think
Lord D’Abernon, perhaps naturally, gives the Board of Control more credit than it
really deserves, as other factors have been at work, not least the actual reductions in
the quantity of available alcohol.’6 The CCB admitted other variables might have
contributed:
4 HO 185/242, Press Release, 14 June 1919.
5 The Times 15 May 1918.
6 Alliance News January 1919.
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The heavy reduction in convictions for drunkenness, may, in some areas be
partly accounted for by the withdrawal of men into the army. There has, too,
in many quarters, been evident a gradually increasing sense of the seriousness
of the national emergency, with a consequent tendency to self-restraint and
sobriety. On the other hand, the break up of home life on an unprecedented
scale, owing not only to enlistments into the Army but to the migration of men
and women into munition-making areas, the strain and the excitements
incidental to a long period of war, and, above all, the increasing spending
power of large sections of the population, are factors which, judging by past
experience, might naturally have been expected to make, not for improvement,
but for deterioration.7
Shadwell argued that the principal measures contributing to the reduction of
convictions were ‘curtailment of hours, limitation of supply and diminution of
strength and raised prices’ whilst adding that ‘the volume of intemperance can be kept
far below the former level by means of shorter hours and higher taxation.’8 Wilson
ascribed a certain proportion of the success to reduced hours, patriotism, the removal
of men, migration of war workers and reduced output of alcohol.9 While a historical
consensus exists concerning the variety of reasons behind the decline in drunkenness,
to try to isolate the relative importance of one factor over another would be a futile
and arbitrary exercise. It has been necessary, however, throughout this thesis, to draw
attention to the patriotism of those denigrated in Shadwell’s work.
As well as a reduction in drunkenness, the CCB could also claim that there
was less overall drinking. Together with a significant reduction in the number of
people locked up for being drunk went an accompanying reduction in the
consumption of alcoholic beverages. Average beer consumption in 1909-1913 was
35.1 million bulk barrels per annum. This had fallen to 21.4 million by 1918.10 For
spirits this figure stood at 31,660 gallons in 1914 but was reduced by 1918 to
7 The Third Report of the Central Control Board.
8 A. Shadwell, Drink in 1914-1922: A Lesson in Control, pp.272-273.
9 See G.B. Wilson, Alcohol and the Nation: A Contribution to the Study of the Liquor Problem in the
United Kingdom from 1800 to 1935, pp. 272-276.
10 A.R. Prest and A.A. Adams, Consumers Expenditure in the UK 1900-1919 (London, 1954), p. 76.
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15,108.11 Much less wine was also consumed. In 1914 10,630 gallons had been
imbibed by the British public. In 1917 only 7,099 gallons were drunk.12 In the longer
term a real shift in alcohol consumption patterns was precipitated by the war, as by
the early 1920s per capita consumption of spirits was half that of before the war
whilst beer consumption had fallen from twenty-five gallons to just ten.13 Taking into
consideration that post-war beer was weaker in strength, this is indicative of a major
change in social habits. This habit precipitated beneficial health results with liver
cirrhosis deaths reduced from 152 per million in 1914 to 56 per million in 1918, a
reduction of 64 per cent.14 The Board could thus point to a reduction in arrests, a
reduction in the consumption of liquor and to positive health benefits emerging as a
result of their work. The situation was so favourable that the Chief Commissioner of
the Metropolitan Police, Sir Edward Henry, argued that ‘I believe that we have now
reached a low water mark and that no measure, not even of total prohibition, would be
likely to bring about any further appreciable reduction in the number of charges of
drunkenness.’15
Moreover, getting drunk was now frowned upon rather than celebrated. The
New Survey of London Life and Labour noted ‘the social status of drunkenness has
steadily fallen in the eyes of the working class population, where once frequent
drunkenness was admired as a sign of virility, it is now regarded as, on the whole,
rather squalid and ridiculous.’16 The Scotsman remarked that the CCB ‘have not only
reduced drunkenness in the present, they have shown how it may be combated in the
11 Reginald Smart, ‘The effect of Licensing Restrictions during 1914-1918 on Drunkenness and Liver
Cirrhosis Deaths in Britain’, British Journal of Addiction, 1974, Vol. 69, p. 109.
12 Ibid. p. 109.
13 J. Greenaway, Drink and British Politics since 1830: A Study in Policy Making, pp. 111-112.
14 Reginald Smart, ‘The effect of Licensing Restrictions during 1914-1918 on Drunkenness and Liver
Cirrhosis Deaths in Britain’, p. 109. Smart also concludes that ‘areas within jurisdiction of the Board’s
orders showed a significant reduction in drunkenness and liver cirrhosis deaths whereas in areas not
covered by the CCB death rates continued to rise.’ See Smart, pp. 115-119.
15 The Times 4 December 1918.
16 G. DeGroot, Blighty: British Society in the Era of the Great War, p. 238.
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future’.17 All this combined to create a good platform on which to launch a campaign
to render some of the Board’s work more permanent, especially given consideration
of the fact that drunkenness in the early months of 1919 showed an appreciable rise
which continued into 1920.18
D’Abernon hoped that any permanent body would be under the jurisdiction of
the Ministry of Health, as opposed to the Home Office, which again indicates his
desire that the problem would progress along the road of scientific temperance as
opposed to following a restrictive direction. To many, though, the CCB was
discredited and the onset of peace merely exacerbated this discontent. The trade led
these criticisms. The National Trade Defence Association was vehement in its desire
to see the CCB quashed. Issued in 1919, under the headline How Long are Wartime
Restrictions to Continue?, one pamphlet stated:
For love of our country, and to win the war, we put up with all manner of
inconveniences and went without things we should never have dreamt of
giving up a few years ago . . . Many of these restrictions were no doubt
necessary. Some we certainly thought were not. But all these became as
nothing when we thought of the hardships endured, the dangers faced, the
sufferings borne, and the sacrifices made by out brave boys across the water . .
. victory was won last November. So isn’t it about time for us to manage for
ourselves most of the things which concern our everyday life, instead of
having this done for us by a crowd of unnecessary officials.19
The delay in clarifying the Board’s position endangered its continued existence. With
no great support or urgency from the government in establishing a permanent body
the CCB languished in a state of flux, unable to enact any further significant reform
17 The Scotsman 7 May 1918.
18 HO 185/263, D’Abernon’s Semi-Official Correspondence 1915-1919, D’Abernon to Churchill, 9
July 1919 – Since the end of 1918 there has been a considerable increase of drunkenness, probably due
in part to the relaxation of restrictions - in part also to the return of Army men – and to the large
numbers of persons in receipt of unemployed pay and gratuities. According to the Alliance News,
February 1920, convictions for drunkenness in scheduled areas increased from 27,849 in 1918 to 56,
103 in 1919. Shadwell discusses the rise in drinking in 1919 placing the blame primarily upon the
lifting of restrictions on output and extended opening hours whilst downplaying the effect of returning
demobilised troops on levels of insobriety. See A Shadwell, Drink in 1914-1922, pp. 131-135.
19 HO 190/482, Carlisle Licensed Victuallers Association 1916-1919 Miscellaneous Correspondence,
Pamphlet by National Trade Defence Association.
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whilst having to justify its continued existence. Without the challenges of war, and the
subsequent emphasis upon the drink question, the future looked bleak for the CCB.
The Board was seen as an unaccountable body which made decisions arbitrarily and
its bureaucratic meddling now transgressed upon peacetime conceptions of laissez
faire governance. As one correspondent for The Times noted, ‘there is a strong feeling
in the country that the drink traffic must revert to Parliament and that orders made by
a group of men sitting round a table must be replaced by considered legislation.’20
This situation deteriorated as the Treasury, which had been compliant with
most of the CCB’s schemes during the war, made clear that funds were now required
elsewhere. Facing questions regarding the continued funding of industrial canteens, a
Treasury official replied in ominous terms:
The position as I understand it is that now the war is at an end, expenditure on
such a purpose is no longer a proper charge to Munitions funds. If the
government however wish to go in for a policy of temperance reform in the
shape of providing improved accommodation and provision for meals for the
working classes, it is for the proper authority to approach the war cabinet and
the treasury . . . it is doubtful, if budgets are ever again to balance, that there
will be much margin for other schemes.21
The debate concerning what aspects of the CCB’s work were to be enshrined
in permanent legislation, together with post war governmental drift, was to blame for
this indecision. On the one hand, public opinion was against the permanent retention
of the wholesale restrictions that remained in force. On the other, the war experience
provided a template from which possible moderate temperance reform in peacetime
could emerge. The Times believed that:
A great opportunity for promoting sobriety is before the country. The public
and the trade itself are ready for drastic modifications of the conditions which
governed the drink traffic before the war, and a reasoned programme
20 The Times 23 January 1919.
21 HO185/263, D’Abernon’s Semi-Official Correspondence 1915-1919, Meicklejohn to D’Abernon, 23
December 1918.
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embodying most of the regulations which have proved so valuable during the
past three years would meet with a remarkable measure of support.22
The same paper speculated on the reforms which would probably satisfy public
opinion, noting that the opening hours of pubs was generally agreeable as people saw
the clear benefit of an afternoon break. Less popular were the laws concerning
treating which, ‘despite the best of intentions’, and which in theory seemed to be ‘an
excellent reform’, ‘cut across a deeply ingrained British habit and in spite of fines,
and even the serious attempts of many publicans to enforce the principal, it has not
been accepted, and is in fact now openly disregarded alike in London and the
country’.23 A secret report on labour unrest from the North Western District, which
included Liverpool, confirmed this view of events and emphasised how the CCB had
come to be seen as an agent in the class war:
The big man can take his pals to a hotel and stand them a bottle of wine, and it
is nearly time they are allowed to stand a pal a glass of beer. They had put up
with it because they had been told it was necessary but this tale wouldn’t wash
now. They say that the British tradesman is not a Bolshevik or a boozer and he
wants to be treated as a man, and governed by men, not fanatics . . . They are
moderate men and they want their glass of beer under the conditions they had
it before the war, otherwise there will be trouble for Lord D’Abernon, whom
they describe as a bigot, and the sort of man who would incite the workers to
revolt.24
The more moderate of the Board’s measures were thus the more likely to be
maintained. Radical reforms, those the workers associated with ‘fanatics’, had only
been acceptable in wartime and their continued implementation was resented.
D’Abernon appreciated the dilemma facing Lloyd George. Speaking to a
Temperance Council of the Christian Churches, D’Abernon synthesised the current
predicament facing those interested in the control of drink: ‘The question before you
is how to maintain the ground gained without imposing such restrictions upon
22 The Times 24 January 1919.
23 The Times 3 March 1919.
24 W.P. Jolly, Lord Leverhulme – A Biography, p. 161.
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recreation and refreshment as might be considered intolerable in time of peace.’25 On
that very same day, The Times reported a meeting held at Nottingham attended by
‘thousands of people’ which adopted a resolution demanding ‘the immediate removal
of the Liquor Control Board and all restrictions imposed by it as the Board was purely
a war measure, and the necessity for its continuance no longer existed’.26 Wartime
consensus had given way to divisions over the Board’s worth.
Extensive speculation and impassioned argument continued to fill the pages of
the daily press. The Bishop of London warned in The Times that it was ‘up to us to
ensure that the England our men had died for was worth saving and that there must be
no return to the disgraceful 19 ½ hours of drink selling every day’.27 The temperance
lobby, the extreme members of which wanted the government to enshrine the Board’s
work in permanent legislation regardless of what the public desired, still questioned
every government pronouncement on the subject of drink. The drink trade wanted rid
of some of the more pernicious legislation of the Board but were at least open to some
proposals being ascribed a permanence given the beneficial economic effect that had
resulted. Both fronts, though, were united in their dislike of the CCB as an
administrative body.
The future of the Carlisle scheme was also controversial and clouded in
mystery. The Board was unanimous in declaring the experiment an undoubted
success. Equally happy with the effect of state purchase was the local committee of
Carlisle which passed the following memorandum to the CCB in August 1919: ‘That
whatever course is taken on the licensing question generally, the system of state
management, which has proved such a success in this area, be maintained, with
25 The Times 16 June 1919.
26 The Times 16 June 1919.
27 The Times 16 April 1919.
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adequate powers to complete and continue the work.’28 This is unsurprising: any other
pronouncement would be akin to turkeys voting for Christmas. The end of the war
certainly brought with it worries that the experiment would be ended but the
practicalities of re-privatisation ensured that this was unlikely. The government would
have to sell its holdings and in the post-war climate there were unlikely to be any
buyers. Moreover the trade had been bought out on beneficial terms. The government
was thus wedded to an involvement in the management of Carlisle’s licensed trade. In
any case, the scheme continued to be profitable. Trading profits for the year ending 31
March 1921 amounted to £149, 700.29
Meanwhile, there was to be no return to the pre-war hours of drinking. The
experience of the war had demonstrated to the government the benefits of breaking up
the hours of opening. Nevertheless, by mid-1919 opening hours were liberalised.
Weekday opening in England and Wales was extended till 10.00 p.m. whilst in
Scotland evening hours were 6.00-9.00 p.m. and on a weekend 4.00-9.00 p.m. With
regard to restrictions placed on the production of alcohol, the CCB, as it had during
wartime, had limited influence. The restrictions on output had been a cause of concern
during the war and afterwards were deeply unpopular as they continued to impinge
upon drinkers throughout the land. Moreover, D’Abernon was acutely aware of the
damage the restrictions had done to his preferred cause of moderate reform. In a letter
to Northcliffe his anger is clear:
I have always been against any severe restrictions of the quantity of liquor
available for public consumption as I believe such restrictions to be neither
theoretically defensible nor practically wise. It would be deplorable if all the
ground gained for reasonable regulation was lost through irritation caused by
insufficient supplies.30
28 HO 185/8, Carlisle Local Committee to CCB, 20 August 1919.
29 The Times 19 October 1921.
30 HO 185/353, For Chairman, 26 May 1919.
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Restrictions on beer were also eliminated by mid-1919. In February output was
increased from 10.7 million barrels to 13.4 million and in May to 26 million, with all
restrictions ceasing in June 1919 with the gravity of beer allowed to increase to 10440.
Taxation levels on alcohol were, however, never to return to pre-war levels. Indeed,
taxation was increased further from the already high levels imposed during the war. In
April 1920 duty was raised to 100 shillings a barrel and on spirits to 72 shillings 6
pence a gallon. In August 1914 beer duty per barrel had been 7 shillings 9 pence.
These heavy increases, although not the policy of the CCB but of the Treasury, served
to cast further public suspicion on the Board.
Alongside these measures various alternate strategies for controlling drink
were once more proposed. Advocates of state purchase, such as H.A.L. Fisher31, Astor
and Lord Milner, once more rallied in an attempt to introduce this policy but they
failed due to a lack of belief at the highest level that the policy could be implemented.
Lloyd George, acutely aware that he needed the continued support of the Tories in his
coalition government, stated that he ‘knew nothing of renewed attempts at state
purchase’.32 In any event moderate opinion, if newspapers are anything to go by,
would not have countenanced state purchase at this point. Less regulation, not more,
was the dominant preference regarding control in the post-war world. This dislike of
intervention also affected advocates of prohibition as, inspired by events in the United
States, there were calls for prohibition to be introduced in Britain and even rumours of
a campaign ‘led by American money’. However this was never considered a practical
policy in Britain during wartime, and was derided throughout the war. Dreamers,
though, like to dream; campaigning for prohibition had become not just a cause but a
way of life divorced from reality.
31 President of the Board of Education and Chair of the Cabinet Committee on Liquor Restriction.
32 For an extended discussion of the political campaign for state purchase in the immediate post war
world see J. Greenaway, Drink and British Politics, pp. 117-120.
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Meanwhile, interpreting the government’s lack of action over the CCB as
indicating that the Board’s days were numbered, D’Abernon resigned from the CCB
officially in March 1920, though he had made clear his intention to do so a month or
two earlier.33 Prior to his resignation he explained to Lloyd George his belief that
‘peace having been declared, the appointment of a new authority with a new mandate
appears to me indispensable’.34 His resignation letter exemplifies his belief in the
innate worthiness of the Board’s work:
After nearly five years of strenuous work together it is delightful to look back
on cooperation and support so close that hardly any divergences of aims or
methods can be recorded . . . I will not conceal my conviction that the Board
may anticipate without undue vanity or optimism that the results attained will
permanently affect public opinion throughout the world . . . Under present
conditions the Board is compelled, if I may say so, merely to tread water – an
unsatisfactory task which offers no scope for initiative and which is essentially
different from the war emergency control which I undertook.35
Upon hearing the news, journalists penned several praiseworthy reviews extolling the
virtues and strength of D’Abernon’s chairmanship. The remaining members of the
CCB also praised him:
[They] Heard with much regret of the retirement of their chairman, Lord
D’Abernon. [He] did valuable work in initiating and encouraging the scientific
investigation of the physiological effects of alcohol and indicating the lines
upon which results of practical value might be made manifest. We assure him
of their regard, and trust that he will feel that his onerous labours have laid the
foundation of a permanent benefit to the nation.36
Lloyd George complimented D’Abernon, placing on record his determination that
‘when normal times returned, the nation must reap permanent benefit from the object
lessons which your operations have afforded, and from the broad and scientific spirit
33 This followed the resignation of Sir George Newman and Philip Snowden in March 1919. Their
places were taken by Mr Will Thorne and Dr H.H. Dale, a member of the SAC. The Times 25 March
1919.
34 HO 185/231, Correspondence RE: Appointed Members.
35 HO 185/231, Correspondence RE: Appointed Members, D’Abernon’s resignation letter, 16 March
1920.
36 HO 185/231, CCB to D’Abernon, 11 March 1920.
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in which you have dealt with the problems which you had to face.’37 This respect for
the work of the Board did not, however, transpose itself to the population in general.
Upon a further extension being granted to the CCB, the Daily Mail, under the
headline ‘Liquor Control – Longer Hours Plan Deferred – Dictators in Power another
year’, reported that:
The government propose to re-establish the Control Board with full powers for
at least another year. This means that less than a dozen people, not elected, but
nominated by the government, meeting in secret and with no appeal from their
rulings, will have the power to decide how and when 45,000,000 people in
Great Britain shall drink.38
The Board was clearly, for some, overstaying its welcome.
37 HO 185/231, Correspondence RE: Appointed members, Lloyd George to D’Abernon, 20 February
1920.
38 HO 185/231, Daily Mail Press Clipping.
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Figure 37: This cartoon, taken from The Sunday Express, illustrates the
unpopularity of the CCB by 1921 and also the view that its rules should have
applied only in wartime and not in peace. The ‘Club Rules’ illustrate that pubs
could self regulate if necessary.
With D’Abernon gone the Board was rudderless. The remaining members
became frustrated by the lack of progress. John Denny made clear his irritation in a
letter to Lloyd George:
The carrying, sooner or later, of a permanent licensing act is, of course,
imperative . . . something must be done if all the good resulting from the
Board’s work is not to be lost. If I might suggest, the main thing for the Board
is to be represented by a Minister in Parliament, who can act as Chairman in
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the ordinary sense of the term . . . The Board, thus regularised, can take up
questions of further relaxation of restrictions and general administration in a
way it cannot do just now.39
Agitation, Board members complained, was ‘undermining the future of liquor control
generally’.40 Sydney Neville suggested an alternate strategy that would effectively
call parliament’s bluff:
I feel confident that an announcement of the intention of the Board to abrogate
its orders on a definite date in the absence of any expression on the part of
parliament to the contrary, will not only quench the fire of criticism now being
directed against the Board which threatens to destroy its work, but will also
stimulate an overwhelming expression of that opinion, both in parliament and
outside, which we know to be in favour of retaining some of the Board’s work
but which at present is silent or incoherent.41
Carter saw this strategy as ‘entertaining’, and he was willing to try anything so long as
it ‘saved the restrictions’, but Neville’s risky plan was never implemented as
resolution was in sight. 42
In January 1921 a government committee was established to modify the
Board’s orders ‘so as to make them more suitable to present conditions’.43 Events,
though, transpired to make this committee somewhat redundant. In March 1921, 166
M.P.s signed a resolution calling for the abolition of the CCB. The motion read:
In the opinion of this house the continued existence of the wartime CCB is
contrary to the undertaking given by the government at the institution of the
said Board, is considered by the people to be a breach of faith, and is a fruitful
cause of unrest, that the Board should be dissolved forthwith and its
regulations annulled.44
The following month Lloyd George met with the Board and discounted the possibility
of any licensing bill being passed that year, while stating that the CCB ‘still had the
39 HO 185/231, John Denny to Lloyd George, 15 December 1920.
40 HO 185/231, Letter from Central Control Board to Lloyd George, 3 December 1920.
41 HO 185/231, Sydney Neville to Sykes, 17 December 1920.
42 HO 185/231, Carter to Sykes, 20 December 1920.
43 HO 185/232, CCB Parliamentary Control – Modification of Orders.
44 Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/96/1/9, Motion by Frederick Alexander Macquisten to Lloyd George.
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support of the public and the complete confidence of the government’.45 He spoke in
glowing terms about the CCB:
It has been a most conspicuous piece of work, I think, of social work, which
has been done by any body of men for a very long while . . . It has been a
remarkable success. I am especially interested in the experiment you tried at
Carlisle. I wish it had been possible to have extended that and to have applied
it to one of the great cities of this kingdom. I should have liked to have had it
tried in Birmingham . . . The restrictions and limitations which you have
imposed have, on the whole, commended themselves to the commonsense of
the nation.46
These words do not sound like those of a man convinced of the longevity of the
Board. But once again Lloyd George’s true intentions are difficult to read. As Waters
Butler pointed out:
You referred to us continuing our task. That is a difficulty I feel. I feel we are
a set of idlers. We have nothing to do. People come and say to us: ‘Are you
still a member of the Board? What are you doing? How often do you meet?
And so on. I am really in trouble about that point. I feel we have not a task.
The work of the Board is dormant.47
The reality was that the Board was effectively defunct; it existed in name only.
Lloyd George’s hand was forced by a private members’ bill submitted by
Colonel John Gretton M.P. that same month which proposed moderate restrictions on
the powers of licensing authorities and magistrates.48 This new licensing bill drove the
Prime Minister to propose a compromise. It was not politically expedient for him to
make drink a major issue of contention. He proposed that in compensation for the
brewers dropping Gretton’s bill, the government would definitely bring the issue to a
head by agreeing on a suitable compromise measure. A round table conference
resulted, the members consisting of the Attorney General, and eighteen M.P.s, four
45 Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/228/7, Liquor Control Board Conference, 22 April 1921.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Formulated from a brewers group created in 1917 with a ‘constructive’ attitude and later supported
by the Brewers’ Society and the NTDA. This bill was proposed originally in March 1920 but was
hindered by a conglomeration of temperance and licensing magistrates’ hostility. For further details,
and a more extensive investigation of the passage of this bill, see J. Greenaway, Drink and British
Politics, pp. 121-124.
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each from the temperance and trade sides, two representing clubs, four neutrals and
two from the government and Labour opposition. From this, in July a draft bill was
proposed and later the new licensing bill was created which abolished the CCB.
In the meantime, on 26 May 1921 Sir John Baird was elected the new
chairman of the Board but his reign was short. By July 1921 the aforementioned new
licensing bill was in place. The Bill fixed hours of opening to nine in London,
between 11.00 a.m. and 11.00 p.m., and eight in the rest of the country, between 11.00
a.m. and 10.00 p.m. A compulsory afternoon break of two hours was introduced in
accordance with the successful policy utilised by the Board during the war.
Furthermore, credit remained restricted and the long pull prohibited. The Carlisle
scheme was preserved, passing under the jurisdiction of the Home Office, and
taxation remained far higher than it had been in real terms prior to the outbreak of
war. The temperance lobby saw the act as a stopgap, merely preparing the way for
more radical legislation in the future. But in hindsight the CCB was as close to radical
as the temperance movement was to get. At the final meeting of the CCB on 21
September 1921 Baird congratulated the Board on the fact that it was their work that
had ‘led to, and had alone rendered possible, the very substantial advance on all
previous licensing legislation which had been achieved by the passing of the
Licensing Act’.49
Diverse opinions marked the Board’s demise. The NTDA in its 1920 report
noted:
[The CCB] suited the purpose of a section of the government that the public
should become habituated to the restrictions . . . the unwarranted continuance
of the Board provoked such general dislike that, when at last its abolition was
decided upon, its replacement had become impossible . . . no voice was heard
in either House of Parliament to protest against its suppression.50
49 HO 185/229, CCB Minutes of Meetings, 21 September 1921.
50 The Brewers and Licensed Trade Retail Association, MSS. 420, Box Number 247, NTDA report
1921.
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The Brewers’ Journal pointed to a general disgruntlement with the CCB whilst
appreciating the reforming work of some of its members:
Save among that small section of the people who love restriction as the rest
love liberty, the Board will pass unhonoured and unsung. At the same time the
members of that Board never expected to shine as public idols . . . much of the
unpopularity which the Board earned was caused by its own actions. The
treatment it accorded to the licensees dispossessed at Carlisle was foreign to
all ideas of British justice. Both Waters Butler and Sydney Neville have
served on the Board as members of the public first and as members of the
trade afterwards. Of one other member Lord D’Abernon a good word must be
said. Lord D’Abernon is an exceptionally minded man with a genius for ruling
and leadership. With these qualities he combines a sagacity which prompted
him to resign his chairmanship of the Board at a time when, in his judgement,
that body should have been disbanded. As to some of its other members, we
prefer to maintain a discreet silence.51
The Wine Trade Review, however, was less complimentary:
As to the Control Board, it had no right to continue its life or irritating and
unequally applied regulations, and we should have preferred its internment
and a simple return to pre-war licensing conditions . . . Once more the nation
has discovered that Government departments are not to be trusted to manage
such a concern as the drink traffic, and state purchase schemes may be
regarded as dead as a door nail . . . the universal expressions of joyful relief
must have convinced all disposed to favour prohibition that they have held
sway too long, and everybody rejoices at the dismissal of the Liquor Control
Board.52
Even members of the Board realised it had run its course. Neville recalled that ‘the
CCB was wound up and laid to rest to popular satisfaction. Like all bodies engaged in
restricting and controlling public activities, it was unpopular, it certainly made
mistakes; but in general, I believe, that its labours were essential.’53 To reformers the
CCB was regarded as a ‘golden age’ of liquor reform. Vernon described the CCB’s
restrictions as a ‘landmark, which it will be the object of reformers to reach again by
51 Brewers’ Journal August 1921.
52 The Wine Trade Review August 1921.
53 S. Neville, Seventy Rolling Years, p. 136.
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methods . . . based to a considerable extent on the principles established by wartime
control’.54
A further testament to the success of the Board came eighteen years after its
demise. Upon the outbreak of the Second World War immediate calls were made for
the full restoration of First World War restrictions from the National Temperance
Federation. In reply, the Brewers’ Journal pointed out that:
The last war accustomed the people to all kinds of restraint and restrictions.
Some of them were provided by time to be good and they have been embodied
in our national life. Others when hostilities ended were seen for what they
were – opportunist attempts to thrust on the masses the inclinations of the few.
In the present conflict the nation comes first and service and devotion to its
cause are paramount. But guard must be set on our gates lest the licensed trade
becomes as in the last war, the target of teetotal attacks guised under the cloak
of patriotism.55
History, it seemed, was repeating itself. The Board’s experiences created a template
on how to manage the alcohol problem in the exigencies of war. Both divergent
groups were ready to defend their respective interests but the context of how the
alcohol problem was viewed had changed. The drink problem was not as
controversial as it had been during the Great War. Society had moved on. In 1931 the
British Women’s Total Abstinence Union was now campaigning against the
corrupting effect of cinema as the ‘the drink question alone’ was no longer a
‘sufficient draw’.56 How different this situation was from the early days of the war
and the spring of 1915 when drink was at the forefront of political and social concern.
This dissertation has considered the drink problem in the First World War.
The early days of the war witnessed a moral panic over the drink issue, when its
presumed consequences threatened to harm the war effort. The drink problem was
54 H.M. Vernon, The Alcohol Problem, p. 72.
55 B. Glover, Brewing for Victory: Brewers, Beer and Pubs in World War Two, p. 4.
56 N. Longmate, The Waterdrinkers: A History of Temperance, p. 279.
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also used as a pretext for reforming one aspect of the social habit of the entire
working class. This was never an expressly declared motivation but when the
evidence is considered the implication is clear. In the field of symbolic politics in war,
drink was a powerful totem. Central to these issues was the CCB and in particular the
prominent role that Lord D’Abernon took in resolving the drink problem.
Initial assessments of Lord D’Abernon were fairly uncomplimentary as the
self-confidence he displayed in his work as chairman was mistaken for the work of an
arrogant self-congratulating politician. With hindsight this view seems erroneous.
Lord D’Abernon was a most capable man and a central figure in the resolution of the
drink problem. He was relatively popular with both the trade and temperance
movements, and his resignation in March 1920 destroyed the possibility of any radical
reform being maintained in the post-war world. His dynamic activism was
representative of the reforming thrust of the Board and without it the organisation
would have been severely weakened. He was a man who had clear ideas and, more
often than not, was able to implement them. John Pedder recalled the very first
meeting of the Board:
The success was due, I think, to two main agencies. In the first place, the
motive of the successful prosecution of the war, potent enough, surely, but
alarmingly vague, and in the second place, the hands of the Chairman . . . He
directed the machinery at his disposal, and adapted it to the work and the
material before him so skilfully, that every one dropped into his place almost
as though by the mere force of nature rather than by directions imposed upon
them.57
For his own part, D’Abernon hoped for a permanent legacy to be left behind:
We took up the task with the earnest desire to contribute something to the
successful prosecution of the war and to arrest the dire injury which alcoholic
excess was working in more directions than one. Once the task was grappled
with, once success was achieved in our war effort, we remained united in the
57 HO 190/876, Dinner to Lord D’Abernon, HM Ambassador to Germany – Report of the Speeches, 4
October 1920.
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earnest desire to effect something during peace, towards permanent social
improvement and towards a higher level of health and efficiency.58
The emphasis upon the scientific dispensation of temperance reform was
D’Abernon’s legacy to the drink problem and marks one of the most innovatory
aspects of the Board’s work. He hoped that rationalisation, rather than scurrilous
rumour mongering, could change the management of the drink problem forever.
There was much truth in the accusations made that D’Abernon had merely
implemented temperance reform, under the guise of social reform, in the interests of
national efficiency. After the war the distinction was not so important but in the midst
of conflict it was necessary to deny such pro temperance policies. His policies of
reducing hours, banning treating, reducing the gravity of beers and spirits and the
Carlisle scheme could have come straight from one of the many temperance journals
prior to and during the war. They were certainly not innovative. But it was the context
of war which allowed for their proliferation into ‘mainstream’ politics. The emphasis
placed upon industrial productivity and appropriate conceptions of ‘leisure’, meant
that these ideas were regarded as sensible in terms of national efficiency. Under the
jurisdiction of the Board, they proved their value in reducing insobriety. The
unfortunate by product was that they became irrevocably associated with the CCB,
which, by the end of the war, was a universally derided organisation. This, in turn,
was due to it being tainted by association with the cuts in drink production and
shortages implemented by the Ministry of Food in mid-1917. The CCB had gone out
of its way to declare itself to be a non-temperance organisation yet on the ground
people saw their supply of beer limited and drew the conclusion that the Board, as it
was in charge or ‘drink control’, was to blame. The CCB had come to be seen as
being an agent of repression in the class war. The trade had borne the CCB’s
58 Ibid.
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legislation loyally but reluctantly, but from this point onwards was unconvinced as to
the impartiality of the organisation. The trade was also convinced that the Board
should not continue after the war.
The failure within government to create a post war body to manage the drink
problem represented a withdrawal by the state from this field. But the CCB heavily
influenced the work undertaken by brewers in the 1920s and the popular emergence
of the reformed public house and policy of cultural uplift that it embodied, owes much
to the Board’s work. Even if D’Abernon was not overseeing future reform his legacy
lived on. Neville testified to his progressivism: ‘it is an undeniable fact that the
adoption of Lord D’Abernon’s policy of improvement inspired much constructive
effort in the trade in the post-First War years.’59
Public opinion was also important in the demise of the Board. In the
immediate post-war world the justification of continued infringements on the liberty
of the individual to drink did not equate with what the First World War had
idealistically been fought for: the idea of liberty and freedom at home and abroad.
People could not see why restrictions had to continue as the war had been fought to
preserve the British way of life, not to create a land of restriction and sobriety
propagated by temperance faddists. A return to ‘normality’ was desired and the CCB,
as an archetypal example of government intervention in daily life, was a casualty of
this understandable urge.
Likewise the temperance movement, after the First World War, was largely
consigned to irrelevance. The logic of the temperance argument had been proven in
the light of the clear reduction in insobriety but had been seen to be unpopular. The
failure of the movement was compounded by the failure of activists on the
59 S. Neville, Seventy Rolling Years, p. 118
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prohibitionist wing to compromise. The UKA remained convinced that prohibition
was the answer. A rational appreciation of how moderate reform offered the most
substantive opportunity for the progression of ideas, which underlay the moral and
social justification for temperance, was lacking. As so often, the moderate voice was
not the loudest. Consequently, this allowed the trade to draw attention to this radical
version of temperance ideology and label the entire movement as harbouring these
extreme ideas.
The war provided the movement with a real opportunity. Moderate
temperance legislation was implemented under the guise of being essential to national
efficiency. This could have been used to build momentum but a constant desire for
ever more radical legislation meant that the good done by these measures was
obscured by the radicalism of those proposing increasingly intrusive policies.
Moreover, much of the fuel firing the temperance question was taken away by the
measures of the CCB. Carlisle was the most radical of the Board’s measures. It was
effectively a temperance utopia where ideas could be tested. The failure to extend this
scheme nationally, when the opportunity was there and the CCB supported it,
revealed the limits of the temperance crusade. Even then, prohibitionists remained
disgusted at the government’s involvement in the selling of drink. With the
introduction of moderate temperance measures, some of which was permanently
enshrined in the 1921 Licensing Act, the continued purpose of the moderate
temperance lobby was also called into question. There was nowhere left for it to go
aside from the realms of radical prohibitionism. It would have been appropriate if
temperance advocates, so proud of wearing the white ribbon, had at this point instead
raised the white flag. The gridlocked antagonism between the temperance movement
and the trade remained.
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In contrast, the trade came out of the war rather well. Having consented to
government intervention, it could portray itself as patriotic, willing to sacrifice
elements of its business for the greater national good. This ran contrary to those
depictions of the trade from temperance foes as interested merely in money and in
corrupting society through the sale of alcohol. With reputations intact, the trade found
that war did not prove as bad economically as had been expected. Brewers were now
receiving more money for a lighter product. During the war brewers produced roughly
two thirds of the bulk output with one third of the raw materials.60 Figures published
in The Economist showed that profits for a representative sample of firms had in total
risen from £2,902,157 in 1914 to £4,973,199 in 1918.61 Trade duties remained high,
and as one journal noted, ‘Englishmen are condemned to consume an insipid travesty
of beer and pay for it as though it was champagne.’62 The war had also shown that
money could be made from varying the type of trade within the pub. The increase in
the number of soft drinks for sale, together with an increasingly diverse clientele, was
encouraging for the future of the trade in the post-war world. It was up to this new
progressive faction within the industry to take up the mantle offered by the war, to
build on the lessons of the CCB as the foundation for opening up the pub as a place of
sociability for all in the community. The progressive faction of brewers had done well
in pacifying the extreme wings of the various brewers’ organisations but they could
not create a surge in support for the CCB. By the end of the war the Board had
become unpopular across the brewing fraternity because legislation accepted during
the conflict was unwelcome in peacetime.
60 Lesley Richmond and Alison Turton, (eds.), The Brewing Industry: A Guide to Historical Records
(Manchester, 1990), p. 14.
61 Waldorf Astor Papers, MS 1066/1/1071, Article ‘Breweries and Beer Duty’. Figures refer to the
following companies Guinness, Barclay, Perkins, Bass, Ratcliff, Bent’s, Boddington’s. Cannon,
Chester’s, Huggins and Co, Mitchell and Butler, Newcastle, Watney, Combe, W.B. Reid, Whitbread,
William Hancock. In 1919 profits increased further to £6,498,263 but fell in 1920 to £5,882,311.
62 The Licensing World and Licensed Trade Review 13 August 1921.
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The popularity of the CCB’s legislation with the general public is difficult to
measure. In an age prior to regular polling data one has to rely on anecdotal evidence.
The CCB was never going to be the most popular of institutions given that it was
created to limit and control the enjoyable experience of going to the pub. Stories
claiming that, according to Frank Coller, Secretary to the Minister of Food, even the
German Chancellor regarded the actions of the CCB ‘as violating the liberty of the
subject’, did not aid matters.63 Consent to the Board’s measures is also difficult to
judge. The only criteria by which an insight into this can be gauged is by considering
the decline in convictions in drunkenness, which, as has been said above, indicates
either an innate patriotism, a belief that drinking in wartime was damaging to the
nation or, after 1917, a shortage of beer and spirits. However, the general public
seemed to abide by the new rules. The ban on treating, for example, however
unpopular, was applied throughout the land; there was no widespread revolt. This
compliance with the Board’s legislation, if anything, should lay low the ghost of
accusations that there were ‘too many people who could not be trusted.’
However, some issues proved too difficult for the Board to solve. The creation
of a ‘café society’ eluded D’Abernon and his colleagues. At one of his final meetings
with the Board, Lloyd George noted ruefully:
One often sees on the Continent, where the man gets his mug of lager in front
of him and he takes his time over it and goes on talking, but here when a man
stands in front of a bar what does he do? He tosses his drink off and he has
another at the same place or goes to another place and then has another…the
working man is conservative. If you have got him accustomed to drinking at
the bar he does not like to have it at any other place.64
Such problems still afflict society today. Politicians yearn for a change in the drinking
habits of the nation to ape our fellow Europeans. With the advent of ‘twenty-four hour
63 Frank Coller, A State Trading Adventure, p. 133.
64 Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/228/7, Liquor Control Board Conference, 22 April 1921.
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drinking’ a more leisurely pace of drinking was predicted. It will be interesting to see
how this prediction turns out. Perhaps politicians today could learn some lessons from
the experiences of the Central Control Board.
The repercussions of war are many and varied. The drink debate during the
First World War exemplifies how British society focussed on unpatriotic social habits
when the war was not going well. Someone had to be blamed and the drinkers of the
nation provided a suitable scapegoat. Drink had been a longstanding concern. The war
merely presented an ideal opportunity for familiar arguments to be cast in a new light.
The moral panic that resulted stemmed from a desire to be seen to be doing
everything to win the war but the truth was, in fact, far simpler and more difficult for
temperance activists to swallow. It did not really matter whether the domestic Tommy
drank, because the war was not won in the pubs of Britain. Victory was gained on the
battlefield. Victory celebrations took place in that most popular of British institutions,
the public house, which will always have a certain allure. In the cold light of the post-
war world anxious war worries were swiftly forgotten. Time had been called on the
protagonists of panic.
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